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Abstract: The development of analogical reasoning has traditionally been understood in terms of theories of adult competence. This
approach emphasizes structured representations and structure mapping. In contrast, we argue that by taking a developmental
perspective, analogical reasoning can be viewed as the product of a substantially different cognitive ability – relational priming. To
illustrate this, we present a computational (here connectionist) account where analogy arises gradually as a by-product of pattern
completion in a recurrent network. Initial exposure to a situation primes a relation that can then be applied to a novel situation to
make an analogy. Relations are represented as transformations between states. The network exhibits behaviors consistent with a
broad range of key phenomena from the developmental literature, lending support to the appropriateness of this approach (using
low-level cognitive mechanisms) for investigating a domain that has normally been the preserve of high-level models. Furthermore,
we present an additional simulation that integrates the relational priming mechanism with deliberative controlled use of inhibition
to demonstrate how the framework can be extended to complex analogical reasoning, such as the data from explicit mapping
studies in the literature on adults. This account highlights how taking a developmental perspective constrains the theory
construction and cognitive modeling processes in a way that differs substantially from that based purely on adult studies, and
illustrates how a putative complex cognitive skill can emerge out of a simple mechanism.
Keywords: Analogical reasoning; cognitive development; connectionism; relational priming; transformation similarity
1. Introduction
“Analogy lies at the core of human cognition,” as Holyoak
et al. (2001, p. 2) point out. Analogies underlie creative
thought and problem solving, and as such are implicated
in virtually all aspects of human life. Analogies are found
in science (e.g., comparing an atom with the solar
system), in politics (e.g., the first President Bush compar-
ing Saddam Hussein with Adolf Hitler), and in everyday
living. It is not altogether surprising, then, that analogy is
an equally powerful force in cognitive development. Child-
ren use analogy to extend their knowledge about the bio-
logical, physical, and psychological world and to solve
problems (e.g., Brown & Kane 1988; Holyoak et al.
1984; Inagaki & Hatano 1987; Pauen & Wilkening
1997). Spontaneous analogies have been observed in
very young children (Pauen & Wilkening 1997; Tunteler
& Resing 2002), and there is even some evidence that
infants are able to reason by analogy from around their
first birthday (Chen et al. 1997).
Given its importance to cognition, it is equally unsur-
prising that analogy has been the focus of a number of
detailed theoretical accounts, many of which have been
implemented as working computational models (for a
recent review, see French 2002). The majority of this
work has focused on adult reasoning, and existing develop-
mental accounts are largely adaptations of adult models
(e.g., Gentner et al. 1995). From a developmental perspec-
tive, these accounts are wanting in that they posit specific
mechanisms (e.g., structure-mapping) with no plausible
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explanation as to how such mechanisms arise during
cognitive development.
The work presented here is an attempt to fill this gap by
providing a theory of the emergence of analogical reason-
ing abilities. The theory suggests that basic analogical abi-
lities may arise from the normal functioning of a memory
system as its domain knowledge increases. Importantly, no
special additional mechanisms are required to deal with
simple analogies. Rather, the ability to generate and use
such analogies is argued to arise from the priming of
relations that hold between terms in the analogy. The
account thus illustrates how a putative complex skill
could emerge out of relatively simple mechanisms. Our
approach is comparable to emergentist theories of other
cognitive skills such as language, which is sometimes
envisaged as a “new machine constructed entirely out of
old parts” (Bates & MacWhinney 1989). A further conse-
quence of our approach is that analogy may best be under-
stood not as a uniform cognitive skill but, instead, as an
umbrella term that describes different task-specific con-
stellations of basic memory and control processes.
The rest of this target article unfolds as follows. First, we
present a brief overview of the current state of research
into analogical reasoning and its development. In the
second section we consider key aspects of current
accounts of analogical reasoning and consider why these
are difficult to reconcile with some aspects of cognitive
development. We then present our suggestions for a
more developmentally constrained theory based on
priming within a semantic memory system. Subsequently,
this verbal theory is implemented in a model that,
although simple, illustrates how our account of analogical
completion functions. We then demonstrate how this
account is able to tie together a wide range of developmen-
tal findings into a single explanatory framework. Finally,
we consider the theoretical implications of the model for
the development of analogical reasoning.
1.1. Key features in the development of analogical
reasoning
Because we are primarily concerned with development,
we start by considering general accounts (and evidence)
of how analogical reasoning develops before going on to
consider more detailed and specific (largely adult)
accounts of analogy. One approach (e.g., Halford et al.
1998; Hummel & Holyoak 1997; Piaget et al. 1977; Stern-
berg & Rifkin 1979) sets analogy alongside other cognitive
skills and attempts to provide a domain-general expla-
nation for all such skills. The second approach focuses
more on whether analogical reasoning arises from increas-
ing knowledge (e.g., Brown 1989; Gentner 1989; Gentner
et al. 1995; Goswami 1992; 1996). While reviewing the
experimental results from both approaches in sections
1.1.1–1.1.4, we enumerate the key phenomena that a
developmental account of analogy must capture.
1.1.1. Analogy as a domain-general cognitive skill. Early
research into the development of analogical reasoning
(e.g., Piaget et al. 1977; Sternberg & Rifkin 1979) found
scant direct evidence of analogy use by young children.
This was generally taken as evidence of domain-general
structural changes in children’s reasoning abilities. For
example, Piaget tested 5- to 12-year-old children on
picture-based “a is to b as c is to what?” analogies and
found only occasional and uncertain evidence of analogical
reasoning (Piaget et al. 1977). Piaget interpreted this as
suggesting that analogical development should be under-
stood in terms of his more general account of the develop-
ment of logical reasoning. In a similar vein, Sternberg and
colleagues (Sternberg & Nigro 1980; Sternberg & Rifkin
1979) used children’s reaction time data to argue that
there was an age-modulated shift from solving analogies
using largely associative strategies to using more genuine
analogical reasoning strategies. However, both Piaget’s
and Sternberg’s experimental results, and consequent
theoretical positions, have been criticized on the grounds
that they failed to take into account the children’s knowl-
edge of the relations underlying the analogies. Conse-
quently, they greatly underestimated children’s analogical
reasoning abilities (Goswami 1991).
Some more recent theorists have also argued that
domain-general changes have a particularly important
role in young children’s emerging analogical reasoning
abilities. These accounts focus on the development of
capacity limits in active memory instead of structural
changes in underlying reasoning mechanisms. Halford
argues (see Andrews & Halford 2002; Andrews et al.
2003; Halford 1993; Halford et al. 1998) that one of the
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most fundamental constraints acting on cognitive develop-
ment is the maximum relational complexity that can be
processed in parallel in working memory (see also
Hummel & Holyoak [1997] for a similar account concern-
ing the LISA model, discussed in section 1.2.1 of the target
article). Halford and colleagues define complexity as “the
number of related dimensions or sources of variation”
(Halford et al. 1998, p. 803). Tasks involving one source
of variation start to be processed around the first birthday.
Binary relations (i.e., with two sources of variation),
including rudimentary analogical reasoning, can be under-
stood by about 2 years of age. By age 5 children are able to
process ternary relations and so are able to demonstrate
skills such as transitivity. For example, Richland et al.
(2006) tested 3- to 14-year-old children on analogical map-
pings between pictures that varied in the number of
relations that had to be integrated and the presence or
absence of perceptual distractors. Although the youngest
children performed well on the simpler analogies, rela-
tional complexity severely disrupted their mapping
success, a result that diminished with age. The authors
interpret these results as evidence that the general matu-
ration of working memory and inhibitory mechanisms is
at the heart of increased performance on analogical
reasoning tasks. Finally, it is worth pointing out that
these conclusions are not uncontested. Indeed, Goswami
(1998) and Gentner and Rattermann (1998) provide
some evidence that children younger than 5 years of age
are able to form analogies involving ternary relations,
while Halford et al. (1998) argue that these latter findings
can be explained in terms of decomposing ternary
relations into binary relations.
1.1.2. The development of analogical completion as
knowledge accretion. In contrast to the early null find-
ings, recent researchers have demonstrated analogical
reasoning very early in development. Most strikingly,
Chen et al. (1997) demonstrated 10- and 13-month-old
infants’ ability to use analogy to solve a simple task.
Here, the infant’s parent modeled a task where the
infant had to combine two sub-goals to reach a toy – re-
moving a barrier, pulling a cloth, and then pulling a
string to reach the toy. The infants subsequently had to
disregard superficial similarities to transfer the parent-
modeled solution to a novel task involving the same under-
lying structure. This result suggests that at least the
precursors of analogical reasoning are present from
before the first birthday. Similar studies have demon-
strated that 17- to 36-month-olds (see Brown 1989) and
2- to 4-year-olds (Crisafi & Brown 1986) benefit from analo-
gical transfer in simple problem solving paradigms. Further-
more, children from 3 to 4 years of age can, given sufficiently
familiar domains, solve analogies for more complex “a is to b
as c is to what?” type analogies (Goswami & Brown 1989;
1990; Rattermann & Gentner 1998a).
Results such as these have been taken as evidence that
the crucial constraint on analogical development is the
knowledge that the child has, not some kind of general
structural change (e.g., Goswami 1992). As children’s
knowledge about the world becomes richer, they can
better use this knowledge to form and understand analo-
gies. It is worth noting that there is no inherent contradic-
tion between domain-general changes in processing
relational complexity and knowledge accretion. Indeed,
domain-general accounts also acknowledge a strong role
for knowledge accretion as a driving force in analogical
development. However, a substantial difference between
the positions of Halford and colleagues and that of
Goswami is that the latter places a far greater importance
on the development of relational representations and
downplays the importance of maturational change in
working memory capacity.
Observation 1: There is a strong relationship between
accretion of relational knowledge and successful analogical
reasoning (Goswami & Brown 1989; Rattermann &
Gentner 1998a).
To investigate this knowledge accretion account,
Goswami and Brown (1989; 1990) developed a picture-
based test similar to Piaget’s a:b::c:d analogies, for use
with 3- to 9-year-olds. However, unlike Piaget’s experi-
ments, Goswami and Brown used relations that were fami-
liar to the young children, such as cutting (e.g., Playdoh is to
cut Playdoh as apple is to cut apple). They found evidence
of analogical completion in even the youngest children and
found a correlation between analogical completion and an
independent test of relational knowledge. They concluded
that analogical reasoning is domain specific. Children start
using analogies at different points in development as a
result of the development of the appropriate knowledge
representations. Further evidence for knowledge con-
straining analogical reasoning comes from studies investi-
gating 4-year-olds’ analogical transfer solving biological
problems (Brown & Kane 1988) and physical problems
(Pauen & Wilkening 1997), and young children’s analogi-
cal inferences (Inagaki & Hatano 1987; Vosniadou 1989).
Observation 2: Given that children’s analogical reasoning
depends on their underlying domain-specific knowledge,
there is domain-specific as opposed to a domain-general
change over development in children’s ability to form
analogies (Goswami & Brown 1989).
An additional developmental phenomenon is the extent
to which children use analogy spontaneously. Ingaki and
Hatano (1987), Goswami and Brown (1989), and Pauen
and Wilkening (1997) all reported some degree of analogi-
cal transfer in the absence of any explicit guidance. Spon-
taneous transfer was demonstrated more systematically in
4-year-olds by Tunteler and Resing (2002), whose results
not only suggest that spontaneous analogical transfer
occurs even in young children, but also that it becomes
more likely with increasing experience of the problem
domain – again consistent with the knowledge accretion
account. Evidence for spontaneous analogical reasoning
is particularly interesting in that it further suggests that
analogy is an emergent phenomenon (with important
developmental implications considered later).
Observation 3: Analogical ability occurs spontaneously within
a domain (Goswami & Brown 1989; Ingaki & Hatano 1987;
Pauen & Wilkening 1997; Tunteler & Resing 2002).
1.1.3. The relational shift and knowledge accretion.
Gentner and colleagues (Gentner 1988; 1989; Gentner &
Toupin 1986; Gentner et al. 1995) have suggested an
Leech et al.: Analogy as relational priming
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account of the development of analogy based on Struc-
ture-Mapping Theory (SMT), which is discussed in more
detail in section 1.2.1. A key component of this account
is that children undergo a relational shift whereby their
analogical reasoning changes over time from being initially
based on the similarity of object attributes to gradually
including relational information between objects and sub-
sequently incorporating systems of relations. Gentner
et al. (1995) proposed that this change results from chil-
dren progressively re-representing relations. Children
move from using first order predicate-argument represen-
tations, for example, darker (a, b) (i.e., a is darker than b)
where the dimension, darkness, and the comparison,
greater than, are conflated in the same representation, to
using increasingly abstract relational representations that
support more complex mappings (e.g., greater[dark-
ness(a), darkness(b)] with the comparison clearly separ-
ated from the dimension).
Observation 4: Over development, children show a “rela-
tional shift,” changing their preference for judging simi-
larity from surface similarity to relational similarity
(Gentner 1988; Gentner & Toupin 1986; Rattermann &
Gentner 1998a).
Evidence for the relational shift comes from a number
of areas, including a replication of the Goswami and
Brown (1989) study taking into account object similarity
(Rattermann & Gentner 1998a), studies of children’s
metaphor comprehension (Gentner 1988), object simi-
larity as a constraint on analogical problem solving
(Holyoak et al. 1984), and children’s performance on
cross-mapping tasks. We focus specifically on the last of
these. In a cross-mapping task (see Fig. 1), children
must make an appropriate analogical transfer in the pre-
sence of a conflict between object similarity and percep-
tual similarity. A number of experiments (see Gentner
et al. 1995) suggest that younger children find cross-
mapping problems harder than older children, although
the delay in cross-mapping performance may be driven
by specific aspects of the task design and very rich,
highly detailed stimuli. Goswami (1995) demonstrated
that even very young children (3 years old) can solve the
kind of simple cross-mapping tasks involving relative
size represented in Figure 1. Although changes in cross-
mapping ability could arise from development in domain-
general abilities such as working memory capacity, they
are also consistent with the hypothesis that children
become better at processing relational information with
age.
Observation 5: Children can solve analogies even when
there is a conflict between object and relational similarity
(cross-mapping), although these analogies may be harder
(Gentner et al. 1995; Kotovsky & Gentner 1996; Ratter-
mann & Gentner 1998b; although see Goswami 1995).
One interesting experimental finding is that the age at
which children can solve cross-mapped analogies can be
manipulated by teaching children relevant relational
labels (Kotovsky & Gentner 1996; Rattermann &
Gentner 1998b). With appropriate teaching of relational
labels, a 3-year-old child can solve cross-mapped analogies
normally only solved at 5 years or older. Similarly, Loe-
wenstein and Gentner (2005, Experiment 3) found that
preschool children who heard words for spatial relations
performed better on a spatial mapping task than those
who did not, and Goswami (1995) also demonstrated
that 3- and 4-year-olds can use the familiar relational
structure from “Goldilocks and the Three Bears” (i.e.,
Daddy Bear . Mummy Bear . Baby Bear) to solve tran-
sitive mapping problems. Such evidence is strongly con-
sistent with the knowledge accretion account, although
the importance of relational labels is also consistent with
Halford’s (e.g., Halford et al. 1998) relational complexity
account of analogical development.
Observation 6: Provision of labels affects the formation of
representations and subsequent performance in analogical
reasoning tasks (Kotovsky & Gentner 1996; Loewenstein &
Gentner 2005; Rattermann et al. 1990).
1.1.4. Indicators of discontinuous change. A very differ-
ent approach to the development of analogical reasoning
comes from dynamical systems theory (van der Mass &
Molenaar 1992). Hosenfeld et al. (1997) investigated
whether the development of analogical reasoning could
be understood as a phase transition (specifically a bifur-
cation) in a dynamical system. Their longitudinal study
with eighty 6- to 8-year-olds looked for indicators of
such a discontinuous change in children’s performance
on twenty geometric analogies. The authors found evi-
dence for three such indicators, all occurring at approxi-
mately the same point in development. First, a rapid
improvement in children’s test scores was observed, con-
sistent with a sudden jump in children’s performance.
Second, Hosenfeld et al. noted an increase in the inconsis-
tency of children’s responses, which they interpreted as an
increase in anomalous variation typical of transitional
dynamical systems. Third, they reported evidence of a
critical slowing down in solution times around the time
of the sudden jump.
Figure 1. An illustration of cross-mapping with the relation
larger-than. The circle in the center of the top row can be
mapped onto two of the circles in the lower row as indicated
by the arrows. The dashed arrow shows a literal similarity
mapping where identical objects are mapped onto one another.
The full arrow shows the relational cross-mapping where object
identity is ignored and the mapping is based on the relative
size of the objects.
Leech et al.: Analogy as relational priming
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Observation 7: During the course of analogical develop-
ment, children display several indicators of a discontinu-
ous change (Hosenfeld et al. 1997): (i) sudden jump in
correct responses, (ii) anomalous variation, and (iii) criti-
cal slowing down.
We have summarized the developmental literature into
seven key phenomena that any successful theory of the
development of early analogical reasoning must take into
account. The primary focus of the following work is on
simple analogies of the kind first solved by very young child-
ren (i.e., involving comparisons between pairs of relations)
demonstrating these developmental markers. As such we,
initially, do not consider some aspects of more complex
analogical reasoning, (like the importance of relational
complexity; Andrews & Halford 2002; Andrews et al.
2003). However, in sections 4 and 5 of the target article
we consider more complex analogies and analogical
mapping, and we will briefly return to the issue of the
interrelationship between relational complexity and analo-
gical reasoning at that point.
1.2. Models of analogical reasoning
Having reviewed behavioral data relevant to the develop-
ment of analogical reasoning, we now turn to existing
accounts and computer models of analogical reasoning in
general and the extent to which such accounts can
capture the developmental phenomena listed in the pre-
vious section. The following review is necessarily brief,
but more extensive surveys of computational models of
analogy can be found in Holyoak and Barnden (1994),
Barnden and Holyoak (1994), and French (2002). We
start with Structure-Mapping Theory (SMT) (Gentner
1983; 1989), which has probably been the most influential
theoretical position in analogical reasoning for the past two
decades (for other models strongly influenced by SMT, see
Forbus et al. 1994; Keane & Brayshaw 1988; Keane et al.
1994; Larkey & Love 2003). SMT is important because it
illustrates several key aspects of many current theories of
analogy. It has also led to a substantial body of empirical
research (e.g., Bowdle & Gentner 1997; Clement &
Gentner 1991; Markman & Gentner 1997).
1.2.1. Structure-Mapping Theory and related models.
Structure-Mapping Theory is an account of how people use
analogies to draw inferences (e.g., inferring that an electron
rotates around a nucleus based on the more familiar knowl-
edge that the planets rotate around the sun). For SMT, the
actual attributes of objects such as color, size, and so on, are
normally irrelevant; what is important are the relations
between objects (such as Object A revolves around Object
B). In SMT, mental representations are highly structured,
being composed of predicates with arguments. Given this
assumption, SMT distinguishes between object attributes,
and relations between objects, at a purely syntactic level,
with no regard for semantic content.
Analogical reasoning, under this account, involves first
selecting a base domain from memory based on surface
similarity, followed by creating a structural mapping
between base and target. This process involves trying to
put objects in the base in a one-to-one correspondence
with objects in the target. Predicates between target
objects are then matched with identical predicates in the
base domain. Which relations are mapped from base to
target are governed by a preference for systematicity
among the relations, that is, a preference for higher
order relations between relations. This preference deter-
mines what inferences will result from an analogy.
Structure-Mapping Theory has been implemented in
the two-stage MAC/FAC (“many are called but few are
chosen”) computational model (Forbus et al. 1994). This
model is a compromise between the desire to have struc-
tural analogies and the computational requirements of
searching through long-term memory. The MAC com-
ponent economically selects a few candidates from a vast
number of options in long-term memory using a nonstruc-
tural matcher based on the number of occurrences of
a predicate in a candidate. The FAC stage then uses
the much more computationally expensive Structure-
Mapping Engine (SME) (Falkenhainer et al. 1989) to
choose the best structural match from the candidates.
This two-stage process was designed to be consistent
with the body of psychological research which suggests
that nonstructural similarity constrains the retrieval of a
base domain (e.g., Gick & Holyoak 1983; Novick 1988;
but see Blanchette & Dunbar [2001; 2002] for a discussion
of the role of other factors such as audience characteristics
and goals on analogical reasoning, as well as the important
distinction between analogical retrieval and generation).
Importantly, SMT has been used to simulate the develop-
ment of analogical reasoning (Gentner et al. 1995). The same
process model was tested on an analogical task under differ-
ent representational assumptions, mirroring Gentner et al.’s
assumptions about the knowledge base of 3- or 5-year-old
children. By changing how much higher-order relational
information was represented, Gentner et al. simulated key
differences in performance seen in experiments with
3- and 5-year-olds. SMT demonstrated successful cross-
mapping for the older children – and demonstrated a
relational shift. Furthermore, by varying the abstractness
of representations, Gentner et al. were able to use SME
to simulate the age-related change observed in children
from making only within-dimension mappings (e.g., within
the dimension size) to cross-dimension mapping (e.g.,
mapping greater size onto greater brightness).
A consideration of SMT is important because two
central features of the model – explicit, structured re-
presentations and some form of structure mapping –
appear in some form or another in many other models.
This can be seen even in accounts that use seemingly
fundamentally different architectures. For example, the
Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine (ACME; Holyoak
& Thagard 1989) and Learning and Inference with
Schemas and Analogies (LISA; Hummel & Holyoak
1997) are both hybrid connectionist/symbolic systems.
Yet, they both focus largely on the process of mapping
between base and target domains, incorporating multiple
constraint satisfaction of semantic information as well as
structural information. ACME (as SMT) starts with predi-
cate-argument representations. Three constraints then
govern the mapping process: structural, semantic, and
pragmatic. These constraints are intended to act together
as pressures to make local decisions about correspon-
dences between elements in order to produce a psycholo-
gically plausible global mapping. LISA is an attempt to
build upon ACME to incorporate more aspects of tra-
ditional connectionist models. Key to the working of
Leech et al.: Analogy as relational priming
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LISA is that relevant objects and roles are bound via tem-
poral synchrony (Shastri & Ajjanagadde 1993). For
example, the proposition loves(Jim, Mary) is represented
in LISA’s semantic units by the patterns for Jim and
Lover being active simultaneously while the patterns for
Mary and Beloved are independently synchronously
active. Hummel and Holyoak (1997) hypothesize that
maturation in the number of concepts that can be simul-
taneously processed could explain the development of
analogy. Halford et al. (1994; 1998) make similar develop-
mental claims from a different Structured Tensor Analogi-
cal Reasoning (STAR) symbolic connectionist approach
(see also Eliasmith & Thagard 2001).
The Copycat models (Hofstadter 1984; Mitchell 1993)
are another example of hybrid accounts of analogical
reasoning. These models involve a long-term memory,
interconnected nodes forming a semantic network, and a
working memory where structures representing the ana-
logical problem are built. These models also consist of
“codelets” or “agents” that cooperate and compete to con-
struct descriptions of relationships between objects.
Copycat differs from other models by actively constructing
new representations. The representations are influenced
by both top-down and bottom-up processes, motivating
Hofstadter to describe Copycat as “high level perception”
(for similar accounts, see also Barnden 1994; French 1995;
Kokinov & Petrov 2001).
1.2.2. Distinguishing features of models. A useful
characterization of models of analogical reasoning might
split them according to how information is represented.
Thus, models such as SME, ACME, LISA and STAR,
which all use structured predicate-argument type re-
presentations as input to the model, may be contrasted
with models such as Copycat, that start with less struc-
tured representations. In the former type, representation
formation is an integral component of the modeling
process, whereas in the latter, analogy is viewed as more
closely related to perceptual processes.
2. Analogy as relational priming
Although explicit mapping appears to be a near ubiquitous
feature of the theories and models surveyed above (e.g.,
Gentner 1983; Holyoak & Hummel 2001; Kokinov &
French 2003; Novick 1988), there is evidence to suggest
that it may not be necessary for successful analogical
reasoning. For instance, Ripoll et al. (2003) demonstrated
a disassociation between analogical mapping and analogi-
cal transfer. Explicit mapping accounts (e.g., SMT)
predict that analogical transfer occurs only after a
mapping is established between the base and the target.
Consequently, if analogical transfer requires prior
mapping, then the reaction time of analogical transfer
should increase with reaction time for mapping. Ripoll
et al. (2003) found that while reaction time increased in
a cross-mapping condition when participants were asked
to perform a mapping task, reaction time did not increase
when participants were tested for analogical transfer.
Therefore, there is reason to consider alternatives to expli-
cit mapping as the fundamental mechanism behind the
development of analogy-making abilities.
In the following sections we describe the two mechan-
isms that form the backbone of our developmental
account of analogy-making. First we suggest that priming
is centrally implicated in analogical reasoning. Second,
we propose that relations are best represented as trans-
formations between states, rather than as explicit symbols.
2.1. Analogical reasoning as priming
Many cases of analogy involve seeing the similarity
between the prominent relation in one domain and the
prominent relation in a second domain. Within traditional
approaches to analogical reasoning, the cognitive mechan-
ism for an a is to b as c is to . . .? analogy involves mapping
the a term onto the c term and the b term onto the
unknown d term and then transferring across the relation
between the a and b terms to the c and d terms. We
suggest that this is accomplished via a simpler mechanism
based on relational priming. Put most simply, we propose
that exposure to the a (e.g., puppy) and b (e.g., dog) terms
of an analogy primes a semantic relation (e.g., offspring),
which then biases the c term (kitten) to produce the appro-
priate d term (cat).
What evidence is there for this proposal? First,
medium- to long-term semantic priming is a ubiquitous
phenomenon that is well established in the adult literature
(e.g., Becker et al. 1997; see also Chapman et al. [1994] for
a review of priming in children). Second, several studies
now suggest a general role for priming in analogical
reasoning. For example, Schunn and Dunbar (1996) pre-
sented participants with a biochemistry problem on one
day and with a genetics problem on the following day.
Although the two problems were different, their solutions
both involved inhibition. Participants were significantly
more likely than controls to propose an inhibition solution
to the genetics problem following the biochemistry
problem. However, the participants did not mention the
prior biochemistry problem either during the experiment
or in a post-task questionnaire. Consequently, the authors
explained the results as implying a form of priming.
Kokinov (1990) also demonstrated priming in analogical
problem solving. Prior to being given a difficult target
problem (e.g., heating water in a forest), participants
were primed with a different analogical problem whose
commonsense solution was well known to them (e.g.,
heating a cup of tea in a mug). The performance of the
participants rose substantially immediately after priming,
returning to control levels after 24 hours.
Third, recent studies have repeatedly demonstrated the
presence of relational priming under a variety of different
conditions (Estes 2003; Estes & Jones 2006; Gagne 2001;
2002; Gagne & Shoben 1997; Gagne et al. 2005; Gerrig &
Murphy 1992; McKoon & Ratcliff 1995; Spellman et al.
2001; Wisniewsky & Love 1998), including relational
priming resulting directly from analogical reasoning
(Green et al. 2007). In these studies, prior exposure to a
relation (e.g., by presentation of two nouns joined by a
relation, such as apple and cake) facilitates subsequent
judgments involving that relation (e.g., made of).
In summary, semantic priming effects are commonly
reported across many areas of cognitive psychology (see
Tulving & Schacter 1990). More importantly, relational
priming is a robust psychological phenomenon that does
not require explicit strategic control. Consequently,
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relational priming is a choice candidate mechanism for a
developmental account of analogy, emerging from simple
memory processes. The ubiquity of priming effects in
development suggests that it is a plausible building block
for a theory that posits the emergence of analogical com-
pletion from simple cognitive mechanisms (for a similar
view of the relation between inhibition – negative
priming – and cognitive development, see Houde´ 2000).
Indeed, a strength of a relational priming account of ana-
logical reasoning is that it does not posit analogy-specific
mechanisms.
2.2. Representation of relations
Some models of analogical reasoning (e.g., Copycat)
attempt to integrate analogical reasoning with lower-
level perceptual representations. Other models (SME,
LISA) use explicitly structured predicate and argument
type representations. The issue of how object attributes
and relations are represented is important for modeling
analogy because it constrains what else can take place;
for example, mapping is one obvious way to compare
systems of explicit structured representations (e.g., predi-
cates). However, there are serious concerns about how
these predicate representations can be acquired (see
Elman et al. 1996; Shultz 2003). Hence, predicate and
argument representations may not be appropriate for a
developmental account of analogical reasoning.
In fact, within the context of analogy, relations need not
be represented in predicate/argument terms at all. For
the purposes of analogy it may be sufficient to conceptual-
ize relations as transformations between items. This has
the important advantage that relations may be learned
via well-understood (connectionist) procedures. More-
over, there are notable precursors in the literature for
viewing relations as transformations. For instance,
Thomas and Mareschal (1997) and Hahn et al. (2003)
argue that transformations underlie similarity judgments
and, by extension, analogical reasoning. One such
account, the metaphor as pattern completion model
(MPC) (Thomas & Mareschal 2001; Thomas et al. 2001),
is particularly relevant because of its strong focus on deve-
lopment and because it simulates the emergence of meta-
phor, closely related to analogy. Similarly, Rogers and
McClelland (2004) present an account of the development
of semantic cognition that proposes that relations are
transformations. Finally, viewing relations as transfor-
mations in a semantic space suggests that “relational simi-
larity” might be a performance factor in analogical
completion; this is indeed the case, at least in adult partici-
pants (Leech et al. 2007).
3. A model of the Goswami and Brown paradigm
The seven key developmental phenomena we detailed in
earlier sections can all be seen in variants of the “a is to
b as c is to what?” analogies, such as the Goswami and
Brown (1989; 1990) paradigm. According to Sternberg
(1977a), “a is to b as c is to what?” analogies incorporate
the core information processing components required
for analogical reasoning. Therefore, to facilitate compari-
son with the developmental evidence, we have embodied
our two central theoretical tenets (relational priming and
relations as transformations) in a connectionist model of
the Goswami and Brown paradigm. We will first describe
the task and model and then present a number of specific
simulations exploring this paradigm, before finally pre-
senting a simulation which takes a step back and tenta-
tively suggests how the underlying principles of the
specific model could form part of a much more general
explanatory relational priming framework.
3.1. The Goswami and Brown paradigm
The Goswami and Brown forced choice task involves
children selecting a picture to complete an analogical
sequence involving simple causal relations (see Fig. 2).
After seeing three pictures (e.g., bread, cut bread, and
lemon) the child is given four response options: (a) the ana-
logically appropriate response (e.g., cut lemon); (b) the
correct transformation applied to the wrong object (e.g.,
cut cake); (c) the wrong transformation applied to the
correct object (e.g., squeezed lemon); and (d) an object-
similarity match (e.g., yellow balloon).
Consistent with the Goswami and Brown paradigm, the
model focuses on simple causal domains (e.g., cutting,
melting, turning on, burning) such as those used to test
young children (Goswami & Brown 1989; 1990; Ratter-
mann & Gentner 1998a). In these tasks, common objects
(e.g., apples, bread) are transformed by a causal agent
(e.g., knife), as when an apple is cut by a knife. The
event sequence experienced by the network in the
example would be: first, to be presented with represen-
tations of an apple and a knife, and then, with represen-
tations of a cut apple and a knife. The task of the
network is to learn the transformation from apple to cut
apple in the context of knife, which, consistent with
our theoretical assumption about transformations and
relations, is equivalent to learning the relation cutting.
Once the network has learned such relations, analogical
completion may be modeled by first exposing the
network to the a and b terms of the analogy (e.g., apple
and cut apple), thus priming a relation (in this case
cutting); and then presenting the network with the
c term of the analogy (e.g., bread). The network should
then settle into a state consistent with the product of the
c term and the primed relation (in this case, cut bread).
3.2. The model
3.2.1. Network architecture. Figure 3 shows the architec-
ture of the connectionist network used to model both the
acquisition of relational information and the completion of
analogies within the Goswami and Brown paradigm. All
network weights are bidirectional and symmetrical,
Figure 2. An illustration of the Goswami and Brown paradigm
(adapted from Rattermann & Gentner 1998a).
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thereby enabling the flow of activation in all directions
throughout the network. The bottom layer (roughly corre-
sponding to the input layer) is split into two banks of units,
representing the presentation of two different objects in a
“before,” or pre-transformation, state. The two different
banks of units correspond to an object [i.e., Object(t1)]
that can be transformed (e.g., apple) and a causal agent
object [i.e., CA(t1)] that causes the transformation (e.g.,
knife). Similarly, the upper layer (corresponding to the
output layer) is split into two banks, representing the
same two objects [i.e., Object(t2) and CA(t2)] in their
“after,” or post-transformation, state. In the current simu-
lations, we assume that objects are encoded in terms of
perceptual features only (e.g., shape, size, color) at both
input and output.
One can think of the “before” and “after” represen-
tations as two temporally contiguous states of the world.
Because both the “before” and “after” states can be
obtained by direct observation of the world, learning of
relational information does not require an external
teacher, and constitutes a form of self-supervised learning
(Japkowicz 2001). Both the “before” and “after” states
of the object representations [i.e., Object(t1) and
Object(t2)] and the hidden layer have 40 units each. The
“before” and “after” states of the causal agent [CA(t1)
and CA(t2)] have 4 units each. The activation of any unit
varies according to a sigmoidal activation function from
0 to 1 (this is sometimes referred to as an “asigmoid acti-
vation” unit; Shultz 2003). The initial weights are random-
ized uniformly between +0.5.
Because of the bidirectional connections, input acti-
vation can cycle throughout the network before settling
into a stable attractor state. During training, contrastive
Hebbian learning is used to change the connection
weights such that attractors on the output units coincide
with target output states of the network (for an explanation
of contrastive Hebbian learning and a presentation of the
benefits – in terms of biological plausibility – of this
algorithm with regard to other supervised training algo-
rithms, see O’Reilly 1996; O’Reilly & Munakata 2000).
As with the better-known backpropagation training algor-
ithm, contrastive Hebbian learning creates internal re-
presentations across the hidden units to solve complex
problems. As the name suggests, within the learning algor-
ithm weight changes are calculated locally as the differ-
ence between a Hebbian and an anti-Hebbian term.
These terms correspond to different states of activation
of a unit. Contrastive Hebbian learning requires two
phases of activation during training. The first phase, the
minus phase, involves clamping some of the units [e.g.,
the Object(t1) units] to a desired pattern and letting the
remaining units’ activation spread through the network
(we used five activation cycles between each weight
update). For example, in Figure 3, the Object(t1) and
CA(t1) units are clamped, and the hidden units and
Object(t2) and CA(t2) are free to change and settle into
a stable state. The resulting activation state of Object(t2)
is taken as the response the network arrives at for a
given input. In the second phase, the plus phase, all the
external units (inputs and outputs) are clamped on. Only
the hidden units’ activation settles into a stable state, con-
strained by all the external units [i.e., the Object(t1) and
Object(t2) and CA(t1) and CA(t2) units]. The state of acti-
vation of the plus phase corresponds to the desired acti-
vation of the network given a certain input.
Contrastive Hebbian learning uses the difference
between the plus and minus phases to update the connec-
tion weights as follows:
Dw ¼ a½xþyþ  xy
where a is a learning-rate parameter (set to 0.1 in all simu-
lations reported here), x and y are the activations of two
interconnected units, and the superscripts distinguish
between the values of the plus and minus activation
phases. As learning proceeds, the difference between the
weights in the plus and minus phases reduces as the acti-
vation in the minus phase comes to replicate that in the
plus phase.
3.2.2. Training: The learning of causal relations. In the
current model, networks were trained on input patterns
produced on-the-fly by adding Gaussian noise (m ¼ 0.0,
s 2 ¼ 0.1) to prototypes selected at random from a prede-
fined pool of 20 different possible Object(t1) prototype
patterns, and 4 different CA(t1) prototype patterns.
The prototypes consisted of randomly generated input
vectors with slot values within the range [0, 1], and
where each vector slot value was set to 0 with a probability
of p ¼ 0.5. Slot values were set to 0 in the prototypes to
increase the sparsity of external representations, whereas
the addition of noise to the prototypes was intended to
capture the fact that although two instances of, for
example, cutting an apple with a knife are similar, they
are not identical.
Four transformation vectors were also randomly gene-
rated but were set to have a Euclidean distance from
every other transformation of less than 10. The transform-
ation vectors encode the relation between the pre- and
post-transformation states of the object. In fact, the
Figure 3. Top: schema of the model architecture. Below: an
example of the different activation phases during training.
Darkly shaded layers are clamped onto a given target activation
pattern (e.g., apple, etc.); unshaded layers are unclamped and
free to change.
Leech et al.: Analogy as relational priming
364 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:4
transformed state of the object, Object(t2), is obtained by
adding a transformation vector to Object(t1). For example,
Object(t1) (e.g., apple): [0.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.4]
might be transformed by the vector (e.g., cut):
[20.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0], resulting in Object(t2)
(cut apple): [0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.9 0.0 0.4]. Note that
although the transformation vector is used to generate
the target pattern corresponding to any particular input,
the transformation vector itself is never presented to the
network. Different objects (e.g., bread or apple) trans-
formed by the same relation (e.g., cut) are transformed
by the same vector. Thus, the network can learn about a
particular transformation by generalizing across sets of
Object(t1)/Object(t2) pairings that are affected by that
transformation.
In the model, CA(t1) represents a causal agent (e.g.,
knife) which when presented concurrently with certain
(but not all) objects at Object(t1) (e.g., apple), leads to a
transformed Object(t2) representation (e.g., cut apple).
Consequently, the target pattern for the Object(t2)
depends on CA patterns. In the simulations presented
here CA(t1) always remains the same at CA(t2) (i.e., CA
is never transformed). Training consists in randomly
selecting an object and a causal agent, computing the
transformed state, Object(t2), and updating the weights
such that the actual Object(t2) state produced by the
network approaches the target Object(t2). The partition-
ing of banks of units into object and causal agent layers
is actually a property of the training regime, not of the
network architecture. More complex training environ-
ments could also lead to a change in the state of CA at
t2 (e.g., knife at t1 to wet knife at t2).
Each of the 20 Object(t1) representations can be
affected by 2 of the 4 causal agents (and thus 2 of the 4
transformations). When an object is presented in conjunc-
tion with one of the remaining 2 causal agents, the target
Object(t2) pattern is the same as the untransformed
Object(t1) pattern. Thus, whereas the causal agent knife
transforms apple to cut apple, the causal agent water (for
example) has no affect on apple. Equally, whereas the
causal agent knife transforms apple to cut apple, the
causal agent knife has no affect on rock. Hence, the pre-
sence of the causal agent alone is not a predictor of
whether a transformation will occur. Given this organiz-
ation, there are 360 potential analogies (20 objects  2
causal agents  9 other objects that can be affected by
the same causal agent) on which the network may be
tested.
3.2.3. Testing: Analogical completion. The testing of
analogy completion proceeds in a different way from the
learning of relation information. As we have stressed,
priming is fundamental to our account of analogical com-
pletion. It occurs in the network because the bidirectional
connections allow the hidden and “after” layers to main-
tain activity resulting from an initial event. The activity
that is maintained in the network biases how new external
input is then subsequently processed.
To illustrate how activation-based priming and pattern
completion combine to complete analogies, we consider
the archetypal case of a:b::c:d analogies. First, the units
are clamped with the representation of apple at Object(t1)
and cut apple at Object(t2), while CA(t1) and CA(t2) are
initially set to 0.5, the resting value. This corresponds to
being presented with the information apple:cut apple
(i.e., the first half of an a:b::c:d analogy). The causal
agent is not presented to the network at any point
during testing. The network settles into the attractor by
filling in CA(t1) and CA(t2) and arriving at hidden unit
activations consistent with the transformation cutting.
Following this, the Object(t1) and Object(t2) units are
unclamped, and a second pattern, corresponding to
bread, is presented to Object(t1) and nothing presented
to Object(t2). CA(t1) and CA(t2) are initially presented
with resting activation patterns and then unclamped.
This corresponds to being presented with the information
bread:? (i.e., the second probe-half of the a:b::c:d analogy).
By unclamping the original object and causal agent units
and by presenting a different Object(t1) pattern, the
network is no longer in equilibrium and settles into a
new attractor state. During training, the network has
encoded, in the connections to and from the hidden
layer, the similarities in the transformations corresponding
to relations such as cutting. Consequently, the prior
priming of the apple and cut apple transformation biases
the network to settle into the attractor state consistent
with the transformation cutting, which gives the cut
bread pattern at Object(t2). The network has now pro-
duced the appropriate response at Object(t2) to complete
the analogy (i.e., apple:cut apple::bread:cut bread).
3.2.4. An example of developing analogical ability. In the
Goswami and Brown paradigm, children are presented
with the a:b::c terms of the analogy and four response
options. Figure 4 shows, at three different stages of learn-
ing, the sum of squared distance (SSD) between the actual
output of the network when tested on the bread:cut bread:
apple:..? analogy and four possible trained Object(t2) pat-
terns as activation propagates throughout the network over
five cycles. The lower the y-axis value, the closer the actual
Figure 4. The y-axis shows the sum-of-squared distance
calculated between the actual output of the network and four
target patterns (the four different lines). The lower the y-axis
value, the closer the actual activation is to that target pattern.
Figures (a–c) show the network’s response to an analogy (e.g.,
bread is to cut bread as apple is to what?), and (d) shows an
example of the network’s response to a non-analogy (e.g., bread
is to bread as apple is to what?).
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activation is to that possible output pattern. Consequently,
Figure 4 shows which of the four objects that the network
has been trained on is closest to the network’s actual
response after different amounts of training. The four
Object(t2) target patterns (taken from the Goswami and
Brown paradigm) that the network’s response is compared
with are: (1) the analogically appropriate transformed
object (i.e., cut apple); (2) a possible Object(t2) which is
perceptually identical to the Object(t1) representation
(e.g., apple); (3) the Object(t1) changed by an inappropri-
ate transformation (e.g., bruised apple); and (4) a different
Object(t1) pattern transformed by the correct transform-
ation (e.g., cut banana).
After 100 epochs of training (Fig. 4a), the network is
unable to complete the analogy appropriately. Instead its
output is closest to apple (i.e., the object similarity
response). After 2,000 epochs of training (Fig. 4b), the
output is ambiguous, equally close to both apple and cut
apple. After 5,000 epochs of training (Fig. 4c), the
network settles into the appropriate state (i.e., cut apple).
3.2.5. An example of non-analogy. To infer correct analo-
gical completion, it is not enough to demonstrate that it is
occurring in the appropriate context. It is also important
that the network does not produce an analogical response
when it is not appropriate. Consistent with the results in
Figures 4a–c, it could be the case that the network has
developed the attractor corresponding to cut apple with
a basin so wide that the activation settles into it whenever
the network is presented with apple. However, consider-
ation of the performance of the network after 5,000
epochs of training (Fig. 4d) demonstrates that this is not
the case. Here, the network was presented with bread at
Object(t1) and the untransformed bread pattern at
Object(t2). Subsequently, Object(t1) was clamped to
apple and the network allowed to settle. The resulting acti-
vation state was consistent with the Object(t2) for the
untransformed apple pattern. Thus, when primed with a
non-transformation example, the network appropriately
produces the non-analogical response.
3.3. Simulating the developmental markers of analogical
completion
Having established that the model captures the broad-
brushed developmental profile of children’s analogical
completion, we now consider how the model captures
the seven key more detailed developmental phenomena
highlighted above.1
3.3.1. The relationship between knowledge accretion
and successful analogical reasoning. The thick line in
Figure 5 shows the network’s performance when tested
on all 360 possible analogies across training. An analogy is
assumed to have been successfully completed if the sum
of squared difference between the actual activation and
the analogically appropriate target is lower than the sum
of squared difference between the actual activation and
each other possible response. After 100 epochs of training,
less than 20% of analogies are completed successfully.
However, by 5,000 epochs of training, the network pro-
duces the analogically appropriate response for almost
100% of possible analogies. The thin line in the same
figure shows the mean sum of squared error at Object(t2).
This is a measure of how well the network has mastered
the causal domain on which it is trained. The proportion of
analogies correct and sum of squared error are strongly nega-
tively correlated (Spearman’s r ¼ 0.99; p , 0.001).2 Thus,
consistent with developmental evidence, the network’s per-
formance on analogical completion is highly correlated
with its domain knowledge of causal transformations.
The relation between domain knowledge and analogical
completion may also be shown by extracting the causal
agent responsible for a given transformation. Goswami
and Brown (1989) tested relational knowledge by asking
children to choose the casual agent responsible for trans-
forming different objects. This may be tested in the
network by prompting it with apple and cut apple at
Object(t1) and Object(t2) and resting patterns at CA(t1)
and CA(t2). The network should then produce the appro-
priate causal agent (i.e., knife) at CA(t1) and CA(t2). This
ability is important because it demonstrates that the analo-
gical completion observed in the network is not simply a
matter of forming a simple input-output (or stimulus-
response) link.
Figure 6 presents the performance of the network at
extracting the causal agent over training. The proportion
of correctly produced causal agents closely correlates
with performance on analogical completion (Spearman’s
r ¼ 0.508; p , 0.001). This strong correlation mirrors
the results obtained by Goswami and Brown (1989) with
young children.
3.3.2. Domain-specific change in children’s ability to
reason analogically. Domain specificity is a natural corol-
lary of the strong and drawn out relationship between rela-
tional knowledge and analogical ability – as the network
gradually becomes able to master relational knowledge
in different domains it will acquire the ability to solve ana-
logies in that domain. Figure 7 illustrates this phenomenon
by showing the network’s performance over training when
a single object is tested on two analogies involving distinct
causal transformations. For this example, the network
solves one analogy over 2,500 epochs earlier than the
other. Again, this is consistent with the developmental
Figure 5. Percentage of analogically appropriate responses at
Object(t2) (thick line) and the normalized mean sum of
squared error at output (thin line) over training.
Leech et al.: Analogy as relational priming
366 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:4
literature: the profile parallels the analogical performance
observed with children, suggesting that the ability to solve
analogies in different domains arises at different points in
development.
3.3.3. The spontaneous production of analogical com-
pletion. As noted above several developmental studies
have shown that children use analogies without explicit
teaching (e.g., Goswami and Brown 1989; Ingaki & Hatano
1987; Pauen & Wilkening 1997; Tunteler & Resing 2002).
The network mirrors this performance. At no point is the
network trained on an example of an analogy; instead the
network is only trained on transformations. Nor does the
network have any dedicated architecture for performing
analogy. Analogical completion is an emergent phenom-
enon resulting from the way relational information is rep-
resented and the way analogies are tested.
3.3.4. A shift in analogical judgment from surface simi-
larity to relational similarity. Children demonstrate a rela-
tional shift over development. They appear to move from
judging similarity in terms of object features to judging
similarity on the basis of relational similarity in analogy
tasks (Rattermann & Gentner 1998a). To investigate
whether the network undergoes a relational shift over
training we compared the types of errors produced by
the network with those made by children. Two of these
types of errors are: object-similarity errors (where the
network responds at Object(t2) with the same pattern as
at Object(t1)) and wrong transformation errors (where
the network produces the appropriate object at Object(t2)
but transformed by a non-primed causal agent).
Object-similarity errors and wrong transformation
errors are the kinds of errors predominantly made by
4- to 5-year-old children (Rattermann & Gentner 1998a).
Table 1 presents a comparison of children’s analogical
completion over development and the network’s analogi-
cal completion over training. The network provides a
reasonable approximation of the children’s response pro-
files. Importantly, it shows the same shift over training
with a considerable decrease in the proportion of appear-
ance responses (from 22.4% to 2.5%). This is matched
with an increase in correct responses (i.e., correct trans-
formation responses) from 39.3% to 63.5%. Such behavior
is consistent with the relational shift phenomenon in
which children produce more transformation-based analo-
gies as they get older.
Bootstrap re-sampling tests (Efron & Tibshirani 1998)
were used to compare the mean performance for children
in each cell to the distribution of means found by repeat-
edly sampling subsets of the individual networks’ responses
at 2,300 and 2,800 epochs. Children and the model do not
differ on either correct response (p . 0.1) or object simi-
larity (p . 0.1). The networks produce significantly
fewer wrong transformation errors than the children
(p , 0.01), however, the difference in means between
4- and 5-year-old children on wrong transformation
responses does not differ significantly from the differences
Figure 7. Domain specificity of analogical completion. The
thick and thin lines show performance on a single example
object involving different transformations (e.g., analogy
1 ¼ apple:cut apple::bread:cut bread; analogy 2 ¼ apple:bruised
apple::banana:bruised banana). (The figure shows raw unfitted
data averaged over 10 replications.)
Figure 6. The thick line shows the percentage of correctly
produced causal agents over training when the network is
prompted with a transformation. For comparison purposes, the
percentage of analogies completed appropriately (the thin line)
is also included (averaged across 50 replications).
Table 1. The profile of responses made by children and the
network, averaged over 50 replications (in percentages)
Children Networks
Response
Type 4-year-olds 5-year-olds
2,300
epochs
2,800
epochs
Correct
analogy
35 67 39.3 62.5
Incorrect 35 28 16.1 8.9
Object-similarity 22 3 22.4 2.5
Note. The children’s data are taken from Rattermann and Gentner
(1998a).
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in network performance at 2,300 and 2,800 epochs
(p . 0.1).
3.3.5. The effect of relational labels on analogical
performance. Gentner and her colleagues (Kotovsky &
Gentner 1996; Loewenstein & Gentner 2005; Rattermann
et al. 1990) have repeatedly found that prior training or
exposure with appropriate relational labels facilitates child-
ren’s analogy-making. A variant of the network shows a
parallel effect on analogical completion when trained
with an analogue of relational labels.
To model the effects of labeling on analogical com-
pletion the network architecture was modified to include
two additional layers of four relational units: RL(t1) and
RL(t2) (see Fig. 8). These were bidirectionally connected
to the hidden layer (as are the CA(t1) and CA(t2) layers).
During training, each of the relational label units uniquely
coded for a transformation, thereby labeling that relation.
For example, when the network was presented with apple
and knife it was also presented with the relational label
cutting (e.g., RL(t1) ¼ [1 0 0 0], whereas the relational
label bruising might be RL(t1) ¼ [0 1 0 0]). Therefore,
the RL(t1) and RL(t2) served to uniquely identify a trans-
formation irrespective of the Object(t1) and Object(t2),
and as opposed to the CA(t1) and CA(t2), which as in
the original simulations were ambiguous. Although the
addition of the RL units simplifies the learning task con-
fronting the network, it provides no additional information
that is not already conjointly present in the object and
causal agent layers.
There was a marked difference in analogical completion
over training with the addition of relational labels (Fig. 9).
On average, relational labels resulted in the network com-
pleting analogies earlier. To assess whether this difference
is statistically meaningful, we found the maximum value of
the first derivative of the fitted curves for each individual
network – this value corresponds to the sudden jump in
performance for each network (See Sect. 3.3.6). The
median number of epochs before the maximum slope
was 1,830 when labels were supplied and 2,665 when
labels were not supplied. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test
indicated that this difference was highly significant,
p , 0.0001. Despite the substantial difference in perform-
ance across relational label conditions, both early (prior to
1,500 epochs) and later (after 4,000 epochs) analogical
completion were similar to completion without relational
labels. Thus, the presence of relational labels does not
change the overall developmental picture. What it does
is move forward developmentally the point at which
there is a sudden shift in the ability to complete analogies.
Again, this behavior mimics the performance observed
experimentally with children. The role that the label
plays here is to provide clearer, more consistent, task rel-
evant constraints. The network’s performance is acceler-
ated because it can make use of this more consistent cue.
3.3.6. Indicators of a discontinuous change. The
network also exhibits all three indicators of discontinuous
change in children’s analogical reasoning abilities identi-
fied by Hosenfeld et al. (1997). First, Hosenfeld et al.
reported a sudden jump or rapid acceleration in the pro-
portion of children’s correct responses between test ses-
sions. The network shows a similar rapid acceleration in
performance at an average of 2,230 epochs of training
(Fig. 10a). This figure also shows the first derivative (rate
of change) of analogy performance. The first derivative
reveals not only the sharp discontinuity of the sudden
jump, but also the complex developmental trajectory. In
particular we see reductions in the rate of change of ana-
logical performance surrounding the sudden jump, and
also that the model exhibits secondary, less extreme,
sudden jumps in analogical performance.
Hosenfeld et al. (1997) also demonstrated an increase in
the inconsistency of children’s responses occurring along-
side the sudden jump in correct performance. One way to
assess the inconsistency of the network’s response is to
present the same network twice with noisy versions of
the same analogy. The percentage of analogies that are
not completed in the same way is a measure of the net-
work’s inconsistency at a given training epoch. Figure 10b
shows the percentage of inconsistent responses calculated
on presentation of each analogy twice to 50 networks.
Figure 10b reveals that the inconsistency of the network’s
performance undergoes a rapid increase and peaks at
around 2,500 epochs, shortly after the onset of the sudden
jump. A nonparametric correlation comparing the epoch
of the maximum value for the first derivative of accuracy
(the sudden jump) with the maximum first derivative
for the inconsistency scores across individual networks
Figure 8. Schema of the model architecture incorporating
relational labels.
Figure 9. The percentage of analogies solved appropriately
both with relational labels (the thin line) and without (the thick
line). Data are averages of 20 networks in each condition.
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reveals a strongly significant relationship (Spearman’s
r ¼ 0.54; N ¼ 50; p , 0.001).
Finally, Hosenfeld et al. (1997) also found a critical
slowing down in children’s solution times accompanying
the onset of the sudden jump in correct responses. If we
take the number of cycles necessary before the network
settles into its final response as a measure of solution
time, then the same pattern can be observed with the
behavior of the network. Figure 10c shows the mean
number of activation cycles required to settle over train-
ing. The number of cycles peaks around 2,300 epochs, in
the neighborhood of the “sudden jump,” and across net-
works this correlates significantly with the occurrence
of the sudden jump (Spearman’s r ¼ 0.285; N ¼ 50;
p , 0.05).
3.3.7. The relative difficulty of cross-mapped analogies.
Children (and adults) can complete analogies appropri-
ately even when there is a strong conflict between object
similarity and relational similarity (e.g., Gentner et al.
1995). This is most clearly shown in cross-mapping situ-
ations, where the same object appears in both the base
and the target but with a different role. In repeated
studies (see Gentner et al. 1995), children have solved
cross-mapped analogies. However, these analogies are
hard, and older children perform considerably better
than younger children.
Because the current model is designed to capture per-
formance in the Goswami and Brown (1989; 1990) and
Rattermann and Gentner (1998a) studies, with analogies
consisting of two objects, the exact cross-mapping experi-
ments presented in Rattermann et al. (1990) and Gentner
and Toupin (1986) cannot be directly simulated. However,
Figure 11 illustrates how the network can be tested on an
analogue of the three-object cross-mapping experiments.
There are two important aspects of the analogy presented
in Figure 11: first, identical circles (B and R1) have differ-
ent roles (B is larger than A, whereas R1 has the same role
as C); and second, there is response competition between
the literal similarity response (R1) and the relational
response (R2). Thus, analogies of the type presented in
the figure constitute a genuine test of cross-mapping.
We trained a modified network on a different set of
stimuli in order to simulate a cross-mapping situation.
The training environment consisted of three objects com-
posed of nine units and three causal agents and associated
Figure 10. (a) Evidence for a “sudden jump.” The thick line is
the percentage of analogies completed correctly. The thin line is
first derivative (rate of change) of the percentage correct across
time, demonstrating a “sudden jump” centered around 2,200
epochs of training (over 50 replications). (b) Inconsistency
across training with standard error curves below and above the
mean (over 50 replications). (c) Number of activation cycles
before a unique response, across training with standard error
curves below and above the mean (over 50 replications).
Figure 11. An illustration of cross-mapping with the relation
larger than (the network was not tested on this analogy). The
same object appears in both the base and the target domains,
but with a different role. The network has to choose between
the analogically inappropriate identical object (R1 on the left)
and the correct response (R2 on the right).
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transformations. Each object could be transformed when
presented in conjunction with two out of the three
causal agents. Training and testing were conducted in
the same way as in the other simulations with the same
network parameters and architecture. Crucially, one
object vector when transformed by one causal agent was
identical to a different untransformed object, leading to
the potential for response competition. Given its environ-
ment, the network could be tested on six possible analo-
gies, with one cross-mapped analogy.
Figure 12 shows the results for cross-mapped and non-
cross-mapped analogies, averaged across 20 replications.
After 15,000 epochs of training the cross-mapped analogy
was completed almost with complete accuracy. However,
the networks failed to complete any cross-mapped analogy
in any replication before approximately 9,900 epochs. This
is in contrast to the non-cross-mapped analogies, which
were solved substantially earlier in training, reaching
close to 100% performance after approximately 6,400
epochs of training. The maximum first derivative occurred
950 epochs earlier for the non-cross-mapped analogies
than for the cross-mapped analogies (Wilcoxen signed-
rank test: sum of positive ranks ¼ 105; N ¼ 20; p , 0.001).
In summary, the network is able to disregard all object
similarity to solve analogies even when the same object
representation occurs in different roles in the base and
the target. The results also suggest that cross-mapped ana-
logies are harder for the network to learn (although how
difficult a cross-mapped analogy is to solve still depends
on how easy it is for the network to learn the appropriate
transformations). Both of these aspects of the model’s
behavior are consistent with the developmental evidence:
that children can solve cross-mapped analogies (consistent
with Goswami 1995) but that they are more difficult than
other similar analogies.
3.4. The development of representations within the
model
Many of the parallels with developmental phenomena
observed in the network’s performance arise from the
interaction between the contrastive Hebbian learning
algorithm and the regularities in the training set. It is
worth considering how this interaction affects the net-
work’s internal representations over training.
The learning task facing the network can be seen in
terms of two distinct processes: auto-association [replicat-
ing the pattern of activation at Object(t1) at Object(t2)]
and transformation [producing a transformed version of
the Object(t1) activation at Object(t2)]. In fact, auto-
association can be viewed as a transformation encoded
by a vector filled with 0s. Because this auto-association
(or null transformation) occurs more frequently than the
other transformations, the network initially learns auto-
associations, replicating the activation at Object(t1) at
Object(t2) and ignoring the transformations. It is this
aspect of the learning algorithm that results in object simi-
larity errors early in training instead of the less frequent
transformation responses. Later in training, the network
has learned to perform both auto-association and trans-
formations. Consequently, the learning algorithm encodes
the transformations given the appropriate conjunctively
active CA(t1) activation pattern. This allows the network
to build up more complex internal representations which
support the production of the desired activation pattern
at Object(t2) and which are a prerequisite for the appro-
priate completion of analogies.
The shift in strategy is also observed in the changes that
take place in the network’s internal representations at
different points in training. Although the network is
made up of bidirectional connections, information about
a state at a given time [i.e., Object(t1) and CA(t1)] must
pass through the hidden layer before it has any impact
on the Object(t2) and CA(t2) response units. Hence, the
hidden units provide an area in which information about
objects and causal agents can be combined. The network’s
output [i.e., Object(t2) and CA(t2)] is driven by how the
network organizes (represents) the object and causal
agent information at the hidden layer.
Figures 13 and 14 show the location, in the first two
principal components space, of the hidden unit activations
for each possible Object(t1) and CA(t1). The grey ellipses
illustrate the clustering of hidden unit activation following
presentation of every pattern at Object(t1) alongside each
pattern at CA(t1). After 100 epochs of training (Fig. 13),
the hidden unit representations group the inputs accord-
ing to the pattern at Object(t1). For example, the 1s (i.e.,
1a, 1b, 1c, 1d) are grouped together, as are the 2s, the
3s, and so on.
Figure 14 shows the same analysis after 5,000 epochs of
training (i.e., after the behavioral spurt observed at around
2,400 epochs). This suggests that the hidden units no
longer group the inputs on the basis of Object(t1) features.
Instead, the network has developed more complex internal
representations. The different shaded ellipses illustrate
the clusterings of hidden unit activations for the different
causal agents (a–d). There is considerable overlap for the
clusterings corresponding to causal agents a–d. The
overlap reflects the fact that the 2-dimensional display is
no longer sufficient to illustrate the complexity of the sep-
aration that is embedded in a 40-dimensional space.
We used a k-means cluster analysis technique to explore
the representations that exist in this higher dimensional
space. This technique is appropriate because we have
strong prior theoretical reasons for investigating whether
Figure 12. The network’s performance on normal and cross-
mapped analogies (20 replications). The thin line is the average
percentage correct of the non-cross-mapped analogies. The thick
line is the average percentage correct for the cross-mapped analogy.
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the network’s hidden units cluster into four different
groups according to causal agent. Table 2a shows the
idealized outcome of a k-means cluster analysis showing
perfect grouping by causal agent (when four groups are
specified). Table 2b shows the actual results of the
k-means analysis after 100 epochs of training. The fit of
the model at 100 epochs was assessed against the null
hypothesis that each cell has a count of 5. This analysis
revealed that the model clustering did not differ from
that expected by chance (x2(9) ¼ 11.2; p . 0.25). Thus,
at 100 epochs, the hidden units do not cluster by causal
agents. This is consistent with the principal components
analysis showing that at 100 epochs the network groups
events by object similarity and not by causal agent.
However, Table 2c indicates that after 5,000 epochs of
training the hidden unit activations group largely by
causal agents. For each causal agent there is a separate
dominant cluster similar to the idealized results in
Table 2a. Frequency counts for the model cluster data cor-
related highly with the idealized data (Spearman’s
r ¼ 0.712; N ¼ 16). Thus, later on in training the hidden
units are grouping the input according to causal agent,
and consequently, are representing the transformations
and not just the object attributes.
One way of describing how the internal representations
change over training is to say that the learning algorithm
“pays attention” to different aspects of the environment
and develops different representations over time. Initially,
the learning algorithm considers only the coarse object
patterns irrespective of transformations (i.e., relations),
whereas later in training the learning algorithm pays
increasing attention to the transformations. This charac-
terization of the network’s behavior parallels Gentner’s
(1989) proposed explanation for the developmental
changes observed with the relational shift. She suggested
that children’s changing performance in analogical reason-
ing and metaphor comprehension tasks results from
changes in what children pay attention to (from object
attributes to relations) and how the objects and relations
are represented. Note, however, that one of the strongest
implications of the analogy as relational priming account is
that the relational shift does not arise simply from a matur-
ing system shifting from generally representing the world
in terms of objects to representing the world in terms of
relational systems. Instead, the apparent relational shift
is a consequence of acquiring greater and richer relational
knowledge – as suggested by Goswami’s notion of “rela-
tional primacy” (Goswami 1991).
In summary, the work presented so far accounts for the
development of early analogical reasoning in young child-
ren in terms of simple priming mechanisms and increasing
world knowledge. The current framework stresses the
importance of the interplay between the learning mechan-
ism and the environment in determining not only the final
representations, but also the developmental trajectory of
how the network represents objects and transformations.
Of course, explaining the simple analogies used to test
young children in terms of relational priming begs the ques-
tion of how such a mechanism might explain the more dif-
ficult and complex analogies used to test adults – analogies
on which young children typically fail. Thus, in the next
section, we ask whether a priming-based account can be
extended to account for complex analogies with multiple
objects and multiple relations typically used to assess
adult analogical reasoning. Our aim here is not to develop
a full theory of all aspects of analogical reasoning in
adults, but rather, to demonstrate the potential of our rela-
tional priming framework for modeling adult performance.
4. Analogies with multiple objects and multiple
relations
In our view, analogical reasoning is actually something of
an umbrella term referring to several different cognitive
Figure 14. A two-dimensional principal components analysis
after 5,000 epochs of training. The grey ellipses illustrate the
clusters of hidden unit responses to different causal agents.
The darker regions represent the overlap between clusters.
Figure 13. A two-dimensional principal components analysis of
the hidden units after 100 epochs of training. Each dot represents
the response of the hidden units following presentation of a
specific object and causal agent pair. Each object is represented
by a number (1–20), and each causal agent is represented by a
letter (a–d). Thus, the point marked by 5d is the location in the
first two principal component space of the hidden unit activation
resulting from presenting the fifth object and fourth causal agent
to the network.
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processes working in concert and heavily dependent on
specific task demands. Our position echoes earlier
approaches. For instance, Goswami (1991) suggests that
analogical problem solving and a:b::c:d analogical com-
pletion may, to some degree, tap distinct cognitive pro-
cesses. We maintain that complex analogies involving
systems of relations and simple analogies involving rela-
tional priming may use similar underlying memory pro-
cesses (e.g., pattern completion and relational priming)
in considerably different ways as elaborated in section
4.1.3.
The following simulation exemplifies our approach with
an account of how relational priming could build up an
analogy between the Gulf War in 1991 and World War
II involving multiple objects and networks of relations.
This simulation is not intended to be a definitive account
but instead is intended to illustrate that there is no essen-
tial conflict between the relational priming account (with
additional cognitive control) and complex analogical
reasoning. However, we acknowledge that there is con-
siderable future work ahead of us before the model pre-
sented here could capture all the subtleties of fully
fledged adult analogy.
In this simulation we address how the relational priming
account could explain: (1) networks of relations (through
iterative unfolding); and (2) one-to-many mappings
(through additional controlled inhibitory mechanisms).
The core theoretical mechanisms of the model (i.e., rela-
tional priming and relations implemented as transfor-
mations, pattern completion, gradual adaptation of
connection weights) remain from earlier simulations. The
main difference between the simulations is in additional
controlled inhibitory processes present only during testing
of analogical reasoning.
4.1. The model
4.1.1. The model architecture. There are two architec-
tural differences from that of the previous simulations
(see Fig. 15):
(i) A single context layer instead of two causal agent layers.
In earlier simulations it was useful to talk about a causal
agent in order to make the relationship between the
model and the Goswami and Brown paradigm as transparent
as possible, the idea being that children learn about one
object which is transformed (the apple) and another
object which is instrumental for the transformation (the
knife) but which does not undergo a transformation
itself. It was therefore logical to represent the causal
agent at both time step 1 (i.e., the “before” state) and
time step 2 (i.e., the “after” state). However, the
“before” and “after” causal agent layers can be collapsed
into a single layer (in terms of the network architecture,
the single [context] and duplicate [causal agent] represen-
tations are functionally identical). This single layer can,
more generally, be thought of as representing the
context in which the auto-association or transformation
of an object (e.g., an apple) occurs. The principal benefit
of using a single context layer is that it allows greater flexi-
bility of the types of situations that can be represented and
therefore simulated. For instance, instead of the Object(t1)
and Object(t2) layers representing different temporal
states, these layers could equally be interpreted as repre-
senting different objects (e.g., robin and bird) at a single
time point. In this case the context layer would represent
a more abstract relational label such as ISA (i.e., robin
ISA bird); see Rogers and McClelland (2004) for further
discussion.
(ii) Additional inhibitory connections. In addition to
receiving the normal input via connections from other
layers, in the adapted network all external units (i.e.,
Figure 15. Schema of the adapted model architecture. Arrows
with round ends represent inhibitory connections. Object 1 and
Object 2 layers ¼ 12 units each; context layer ¼ 6 units; hidden
layer ¼ 15 units.
Table 2. (a) Idealized results of a k-means cluster analysis showing perfect clustering by causal agent. The
clusters are represented as numbers at the top; the different causal agents are the letters A–D. Each cluster
contains all the hidden unit activations corresponding to a causal agent. (b) Actual clustering after 100
epochs. (c) Actual clustering after 5,000 epochs (where the results closely resemble the idealized results)
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Object 1 and Object 2 and the context layers) can also be
selectively inhibited (i.e., switched off). This inhibition
only occurs during analogical completion (testing), not
during knowledge acquisition (training), and can be
understood in terms of inhibitory connections from an
additional control system (see Davelaar et al. 2005). Rela-
tional priming combined with selective inhibition of either
context or object layers underlies how the network can
demonstrate complex analogical completion representa-
tive of a wider variety of behaviors.
4.1.2. Training. In the current simulations, the training
environment implements a version of an analogy compar-
ing the Persian Gulf War of 1991 with World War II. As
such, the 11 object prototypes in the training set group
into two categories: (i) five from the Persian Gulf: these
are Saddam Hussein, George Bush Senior, Iraq, Kuwait,
and the United States; and (ii) six from World War II:
Adolf Hitler, Winston Churchill, Germany, Poland, Austria,
and the Allies. We chose these two domains (the Gulf
War and World War II) because they have previously
been the focus of analogy research (e.g., Spellman &
Holyoak 1992), and can support analogies involving net-
works of relations.
In contrast with our earlier simulations, object proto-
type representations are binary vectors (i.e., each unit is
either on or off). Each object representation consists of
two components, an orthogonal component uniquely iden-
tifying the object (this can be thought of as the object’s
label or name) and an orthogonal component representing
which category the object belongs to (i.e., either Gulf War
or World War II). Although, these object representations
are highly simplified, they do permit a straightforward
illustration of how relational priming is compatible with
complex analogical reasoning.
In addition, there are six distinct orthogonal context re-
presentations, each consistent with a different relation. The
network is trained (for 2,000 epochs) on only a subset of
contexts and objects designed to reflect some of the rela-
tional structure underlying the analogical comparison of
the Gulf War and World War II (see Table 3). As in
previous simulations, each prototype pattern presented
to the network has Gaussian noise added (m ¼ 0.0;
s2 ¼ 0.01).
4.1.3. Testing. In testing, there are three processes invol-
ving the proposed inhibition mechanism that, working
in concert, illustrate the iterative unfolding of a complex
analogy. At each time step some combination of the object
or context layers is inhibited (this could be thought of as
shifting conscious attention between different contexts and
objects), and the network falls into a new attractor state
with either the new context or a new object. We consider
each of the three proposed processes in turn.
(1) Selecting a new object with the same role (i.e.,
relation) in the parallel (or target) domain. This process
involves finding a different pair of Object 1 and Object 2
representations that correspond to the same context re-
presentation. This process can be thought of as giving the
network two objects and then asking what other two differ-
ent objects have the same relation, that is, a:b. . .? with the
response c:d, in contrast to previous a:b:c. . .? d analogies.
After presentation of Object 1 (e.g., Iraq) and Object 2
(e.g., Kuwait) and settling into an attractor state (e.g., with
the context representation occupies), the Object 1 and
Object 2 representations are inhibited. This inhibition
reflects the active, volitional search that is involved in com-
pleting some complex analogies. The pattern completion
properties of this type of recurrent network ensure that
the network subsequently settles into an attractor state
consistent with the prior context representation (occupies)
but with different Object 1 and Object 2 representations
(e.g., Germany and Austria, respectively). This allows
the network to form analogies from limited information.
In order to traverse a network of relations, building up a
large multipart analogy, the network has to find new
relations for consideration in a controlled way. The follow-
ing two processes address this issue:
(2) Selecting a new role in the same domain for the same
object. One possibility for finding a new relation is to
simply inhibit the context layer and allow the network to
settle into a new attractor consistent with the Object 1 re-
presentation and a new context representation. This can
be understood as: Given an Object 1 activation (e.g., Iraq),
what other relation (other than Occupies) goes with this
object? In response, the network would produce the
context representation Defies and the Object 2 represen-
tation United States.
(3) Selecting a new role in the same domain for a differ-
ent object. It is also possible to find a pair of different
objects connected by a different relation. This involves
inhibiting the previous Object 1 and Object 2. This
process results in a pair of new objects and a new relation
(e.g., Bush Motivates United States), which are from the
same domain as the prior objects. Both processes (2)
and (3) can subsequently be used to form a new
mapping with the other domain, using process (1) above.
4.2. Results
The three processes detailed above can be used sequen-
tially to explore similarities between two domains invol-
ving multiple relations and objects to build up a large,
complex analogy. Figures 16 and 17 demonstrate the net-
work’s performance on one such analogy using the Gulf
War and World War II domains (the network’s exploration
Table 3. The objects and relations that the network was exposed to
over training
Object 1 Relation Object 2
Gulf War Bush Motivates United States
Saddam Threatens Kuwait
Bush Orders_attack_of Iraq
Saddam Dictator_of Iraq
Iraq Defies United States
Iraq Occupies Kuwait
WW2 Churchill Motivates Allies
Hitler Threatens Poland
Churchill Orders_attack_of Germany
Hitler Dictator_of Germany
Germany Defies Allies
Germany Occupies Poland
Germany Occupies Austria
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of the analogy presented in these figures is one example
out of many possible trajectories). Figure 16 shows the
network’s journey through the space of multiple concepts
as it discovers the multirelation analogy, whereas
Figure 17 shows the successive activation states of the
network as analogical completion unfolds through time.
First, the network is given a domain as the base by present-
ing the network with Object 1 and Object 2 layers consist-
ing of the component representing the domain (i.e., Gulf
War) and resting values for all other Object 1 and
Object 2 units. The network then completes the Object
1, Object 2, and context layers consistent with this
domain (i.e., Saddam threatens Kuwait). This activation
state constitutes the starting point of the analogy. Sub-
sequently, process (1) is used to find a mapping in the
alternative domain (i.e., Hitler threatens Poland). Follow-
ing this, either process (2) or process (3) is used to find a
different relation involving the same Object 1 represen-
tation (i.e., Hitler dictator of Germany). Process (1) is
then repeated to find a mapping in the Gulf domain
(i.e., Saddam dictator of Iraq). Subsequently, process (1)
and either process (2) or (3) are interleaved iteratively to
traverse the network of relations, thereby building up a
complex analogy (see Figs. 16 and 17). Importantly, this
model reveals how relational priming may serve as a fun-
damental subprocess when building analogies involving
networks of relations and many-to-many comparisons
across domains.
4.3. Discussion
In the current implementation, iterative unfolding is
guided by an essentially blind process of relation selection
(i.e., processes (2) and (3) above involve finding a different
random relation or object). This, however, is not to say that
iterative unfolding is necessarily an unguided bottom-up
process. One way in which top-down information can play
a strong role is in terms of systems of relations and the way
that these are gradually encoded in the network’s internal
representations. In the network’s training environment,
systems of relations will co-occur with greater frequency
and across different examples over individual relations
that do not co-vary consistently. Connectionist networks
are good at picking up these statistical regularities and
representing them in the hidden units, such that systems
of relations are represented as closer in hidden unit space.
Any consequent analogical mappings (i.e., given a certain
relation) made with these hidden units will thus contain
a bias for selecting a new relation from within the same
coherent relational system. Rogers and McClelland (2004)
discuss the importance of this type of consistent covari-
ance for the related but distinct development of semantic
cognition. Here, we see how this consequence of the
statistics of the input could explain biases for systems of
relations which have been repeatedly reported in the
analogy literature, and, more importantly, could explain
how and why these biases develop.
Importantly, a process of iterative unfolding also resonates
with evidence as to how children learn about relational struc-
tures. Children’s analogy abilities become more systematic
and sophisticated as they gradually absorb and internalize
more of the richness of the structural relations (particularly
causal systems of relations) in the biological, physical, and
psychological domains in which they find themselves (for a
review, see Goswami 2001).
Figure 17. The activation states of the units of the network in
the Object 1, Object 2, hidden, and context layers across
different time steps 1–12 – tracing out the unfolding of the
complex analogy set out in Figure 16. The enlarged dark grey
circles indicate the maximally active unit for either the Object
1 or Object 2 layer. The network was tested following 2,000
epochs of training.
Figure 16. An example of the network’s trajectory through
“conceptual” space. The two grey boxes represent the different
domains (i.e., Gulf War, bottom left; World War II, top right).
The x,y-coordinates of each point correspond to the maximally
active unit in the Object 1 and Object 2 layers, respectively, at
different time steps. Initially, Gaussian noise is presented to the
network, and the network randomly falls into the activation state
corresponding to Saddam, Kuwait in the Gulf War domain. On
each subsequent step, the inhibitory processes described in (1),
(2), and (3) drive the network to different points in the
conceptual space. First, process (1) finds a match in the World
War II domain (Hitler, Poland). Then process (2) finds a
different transformation in the same World War II domain
(Hitler, Germany) with a different relation [dictator_of]), with
process (3) subsequently finding the appropriate mapping in the
Gulf War domain (Saddam, Iraq). This interplay of relational
priming with processes (1), (2), and (3) continues until the full
set of mappings between the two domains has been explored.
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We do not consider in detail how the postulated
additional control processes are implemented in a full con-
nectionist account, or how these processes develop – this
is beyond the scope of the current paper (although cer-
tainly not beyond the scope of connectionist modeling,
e.g., Davelaar et al. 2005; O’Reilly 2006; Rougier et al.
2005). Tentatively we suggest that the work of O’Reilly
and colleagues provides a useful template for understand-
ing how flexible cognitive control systems could develop in
response to task demands (see Rougier et al. 2005). This
work considers the interaction of a network that can
rapidly update or maintain activation according to a
dynamic gating mechanism trained with reinforcement
learning. Task-relevant representations self-organize over
training. These representations are capable of capturing
data from Stroop and Wisconsin-card sorting tasks – both
tasks that require the kind of active maintenance and inhi-
bition necessary for the proposed iterative unfolding of
analogies. Furthermore, one of the interesting aspects of
the Rougier et al. work is that the network is able to
generalize to novel tasks. Therefore, such an approach
is a useful starting point for investigating the origins of
the controlled iterative unfolding that we propose for
complex analogical mapping and how such skills general-
ize to analogies in novel domains, although there are
likely to be considerable challenges ahead in satisfactorily
marrying the simple analogical processes detailed earlier
with the controlled processes in a single developmental
model.
5. General discussion
The account of analogical completion presented here is an
attempt at a novel developmental theory of analogical
reasoning. Contrasting our model with models inspired
by adult reasoning (e.g., SME, LISA) indicates that
taking a developmental perspective constrains the model-
ing process in a substantially different way. Unlike most
accounts of adult analogical reasoning, which are largely
concerned with analogies involving systems of relations,
our developmental account has been forced to emphasize
different qualities such as knowledge acquisition and the
importance of reconciling analogy competence with
other lower-level cognitive processes. This difference in
emphasis results in an explanatory framework that brings
together a wide range of seemingly disparate developmen-
tal experimental findings in a single computational model.
In contrast to other models of analogy that have been
applied to developmental phenomena, the model pre-
sented here is able to account for all of the key develop-
mental phenomena listed in the introduction. As such, it
is worth reflecting on some of the theoretical implications
of the model’s two underlying core assumptions: the
central role of priming and the treatment of relations as
transformations.
5.1. Relations as transformations
5.1.1. The relational shift revisited. The key benefit of
viewing relations as transformations between states is
that relations do not have to be represented explicitly,
avoiding the difficulties of learning explicit structured re-
presentations. By attempting to simulate the acquisition
of relational knowledge, the current account is consistent
with and provides a possible developmental mechanism
for knowledge accretion theories of analogical develop-
ment. This is especially clear for simple causal relations
(e.g., cutting) such as those considered with the model,
where there is a direct physical change in an object.
However, as emphasized in the final simulation, poten-
tially all relations could be viewed as transformations.
Our account of the relational shift depends crucially on
how well the network learns object transformations versus
auto-associations (i.e., null transformations). At the heart
of the relational shift is a change from ignoring transfor-
mation information (auto-association) to incorporating
transformation information into the network’s internal
representation of the object. The rate at which this
occurs reflects the relative mix of transformation versus
non-transformation experiences that the network encoun-
ters, thereby grounding the relational shift squarely within
the experiences that the child encounters. This position
contrasts markedly with Gentner’s Structure-Mapping
account, which posits that the relational shift derives from
a process of knowledge becoming increasingly abstract.
Instead, our position resembles far more the relational
primacy hypothesis of Goswami.
One of the more unexpected consequences of the
current account as a developmental theory is that it
implies that there is no necessary relational shift for any
given relation in a child’s similarity judgments. The rela-
tional shift is modulated by the frequency with which child-
ren encounter transformations versus auto-associations
(i.e., null transformations). This even implies that for
high-frequency relations children might show an initial
bias for transformational similarity over object-based simi-
larity. For the network exposed to high-frequency trans-
formations, this early preference for transformation over
auto-association would correspond to it being able to
solve analogies but not non-analogies (i.e., the network
would make errors like apple:apple::bread:cut bread).
For such high-frequency relations the network would,
accordingly, undergo something akin to a relational shift
in reverse, gradually becoming able to produce the
object-similarity response and producing the transform-
ation response only when appropriate rather than all of
the time. Thus, the theory and model strongly predict
that with a subset of highly familiar relations children
will, in contrast to the expectations of the relational-shift
hypothesis of Gentner (1988), choose relational responses
over object-similarity responses even when an object-simi-
larity judgment would be more appropriate. A useful test
of the validity of the model would investigate the relational
judgments of children to similar stimuli that differ in the
appropriateness of a relational or object-based interpre-
tation. Following the analogy as relational priming
account, we would expect that over development there
should be a shift away from relational responses for the
object-based stimuli – an inverse relational shift.
5.1.2. Transformation size in analogical reasoning. One
factor that affects how well the network learns a transform-
ation is the degree of confusability or overlap between
different input-output training patterns (e.g., how similar
are the representations between apple and cut apple).
The lesser the overlap between the auto-associative (e.g.,
apple) and the transformed (e.g., cut apple) responses
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(i.e., the greater the size of the transformation) the easier it
is for the network to learn the pattern sets that define the
transformation. As a consequence, the network will also
be better at completing analogies involving states that
are very different as compared to those that do not differ
very much. The model therefore predicts that analogies
involving larger transformations will be solved more
readily than analogies involving smaller transformations.
This prediction is a consequence of our two key theoretical
assumptions (analogy as relational priming and relations as
transformations), and their implementation within the
network model. No other model of analogical reasoning
makes a similar prediction.
In order to explore this prediction, Leech et al. (2007)
tested adolescents and adults on analogies where the
transformations involved varied along some dimension.
Consistent with our model’s predictions, it was found
that for both adults and adolescents, analogies involving
larger transformations were solved more accurately than
analogies involving smaller transformations.
5.1.3. Transformation and predicate structure. Some
readers may argue that relations are not really implemented
as relations, but, instead, we have built predicate structure
into the network architecture, with the Object(t1) layer
being the patient and the CA(t1) (or context) layer being
the agent or instrument. However, this is not the case.
Any layer (or slot) of the network can be trained as a
patient or an agent in a transformation. Indeed, architec-
turally the CA(t1) layer and Object(t1) layer are not
functionally different. For example, we could train the
model on knife at CA(t1) and broken knife at CA(t2) (in
addition to training the network that knife cues a physical
transformation in apple). Then a single network could
solve analogies involving knife as agent and knife as
patient.
5.2. Analogy as priming
Central to the question of whether priming can play an
important part in analogical reasoning is whether analogy
(and related underlying mechanisms) need be explicit.
Priming is normally considered as an automatic, implicit
mechanism (e.g., Tulving & Schacter 1990), whereas
analogy is generally characterized as an essentially explicit
ability. Therefore, analogy as relational priming seems at
first glance to be a somewhat paradoxical theoretical pos-
ition. However, we believe that this argument has only
superficial validity, primarily because it is important to dis-
tinguish between cognitive processes and the behavioral
and cognitive results of those processes. For instance,
although priming – an implicit process – may be a core
mechanism of analogy, the result of that process can still
be explicit and accessible to the system (i.e., the resulting
analogy can be verbalized or used as input to some other
cognitive process). Language comprehension provides an
illustrative example of a domain that involves some implicit
mechanisms (including semantic priming) and verbali-
zable explicit outcome (e.g., see Kutas & Federmeier
2000). Secondly, our account of analogy as relational
priming is compatible with both implicit analogical reason-
ing mechanisms (as suggested by the earlier simulations
of analogical completion with uncontrolled relational
priming) and with much more deliberative mechanisms
(i.e., the controlled use of inhibition and relational
priming to iteratively unfold a large and complex analogi-
cal mapping).
Priming effects are ubiquitous in perception and cog-
nition and have been observed across development.
Viewing analogy as related to a form of priming demon-
strates how a high-level cognitive process can be rooted
in lower-level processes. This provides a possible expla-
nation of the early and natural use of analogical reasoning
by young children. The proposed relationship between
analogical reasoning and more basic priming mechanisms
can be understood as analogous to how some researchers
have related cognitive skills (including reasoning and
categorization) to more general, lower level processes
of inhibition (e.g., Dempster & Brainerd 1995; Houde´
2000).
Consistent with this perspective, we envisage analogy as
something of a heterogeneous phenomenon: Different
types of analogy will utilize a variety of memory and
control processes in considerably different organizations
and to considerably different effect. While our aim has
not been to provide an exhaustive account of analogical
reasoning, we have suggested two possible configurations
of cognitive processes that may underlie distinct types of
analogical reasoning. These configurations illustrate the
explanatory power of analogy as relational priming, and
demonstrate how the framework is compatible with
complex adult levels of performance.
Although there is strong evidence that relational
priming may be involved in analogy, further work needs
to be done to establish how well the two processes are
interrelated. In fact, the analogy as relational priming
account stands or falls on the predicted intimate relation-
ship between analogy and priming, especially through
development. In this vein, a strong test of our account
concerns whether relational priming can be demon-
strated in children and if so whether this correlates
with performance on more standard analogical reasoning
measures.
5.3. The role of world knowledge
Both children and adults can readily form analogies
involving novel stimuli. They do this rapidly and follow-
ing very little exposure. This may appear to be inconsist-
ent with the lengthy training regime and slow connection
weight adjustments that form the basis of analogical
reasoning in our simulations. This is not the case. Even
stimuli that appear novel often share a great deal of
underlying information with prior experience. For
example, novel square drawings moving on a computer
monitor will tap into considerable existing world knowl-
edge about the possible relations between moving
items. More generally, when the network is presented
with a “novel” problem, the task will be made easier if
the network can co-opt existing representations into
learning the new problem (e.g., Altmann 2002; Shultz
& Rivest 2001; Shultz et al. 2006). A similar explanation
of why children can rapidly draw causal inferences
about novel objects that they have never encountered
before is given by McClelland and Thompson (2007),
who demonstrate that providing a network with
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substantial previous experience in a domain can lead to
rapid “one-shot” causal learning.
5.4. Explicit mapping
In our final simulation we demonstrated how relational
priming could be used deliberatively to build up a
complex explicit analogy. The final simulation illustrates
how a situation that is normally assumed to be an
example of explicit structure mapping is consistent with a
simpler conception of analogy combined with meta-cogni-
tive processes used to elaborate an initial mapping. We
acknowledge that the current adult model is underdeve-
loped and in particular fails to explain the etiology of the
control and memory processes necessary for handling
complex adult analogies; and that a fuller account of adult
analogy would, therefore, be necessary to convince many
researchers in the structure-mapping community of the
explanatory power of the relational priming account of ana-
logical reasoning. However, we believe that the iterative
mechanism for building up mappings based on relational
priming is useful for illustrating some important distinctions
between our account and existing models.
In our view the elaboration of an initial mapping is both
deliberative (i.e., non-automatic) and task-directed. To
demonstrate, reconsider the World War II/Gulf War
analogy. Holyoak and colleagues (e.g., Holyoak &
Hummel 2001; Spellman & Holyoak 1992) have shown
that people can come up with complex mappings
between 1990 and 1939 (e.g., Saudi Arabia is comparable
to France; Kuwait is comparable to Poland; George Bush
could be Roosevelt or Churchill). However, most of these
explicit mappings are irrelevant for the analogy to fulfill its
intended purpose of stressing the similarity between inva-
sions from Hitler’s Germany and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq,
and consequently emphasizing that if Saddam Hussein
were not stopped something terrible – like World War
II – would be visited on the world. The analogy still
holds if only Saddam Hussein and Hitler (both conceived
as dangerous, aggressive dictators) are compared and
nothing else is mapped. Thus, in this situation at least,
there does not need to be an explicit mapping of relational
structure to form an analogy (though making such struc-
ture explicit may well serve to increase the intensity of
any argument based on the analogy).
A mechanism of iterative unfolding, such as the illustra-
tive one presented in the final simulation, also enables a
fuller comparison of the current model’s scope with
respect to other phenomena such as the systematicity
effects shown in conjunction with Structure-Mapping
Theory. As we noted in the previous section, relations
that constitute a system will vary coherently in a naturalis-
tic training environment. This means that a connectionist
network learning about that domain will develop internal
representations that reflect this relational structure (some-
thing that developing children also do – see Goswami
2001). Consequent inferences or analogical reasoning
based on these internal representations would, therefore,
contain a bias towards systems of relations (see Rogers &
McClelland 2004; 2005; Thomas & Mareschal 2001).
How world knowledge is acquired is also of particular
importance in determining the kinds of relations that
prime others. In the adult relational priming literature,
priming effects have typically been quite small. These
small effects (although semantic priming effects are typically
larger in children than adults; Chapman et al. 1994) could in
part result from the fact that experimenters have focused on
very general relations defined in linguistic taxonomies (e.g.,
the relation have; for a discussion, see Estes & Jones 2006),
rather than on the more specific types of relations that are
salient and useful for explaining the world. This parallels
the evidence from Goswami and colleagues that causal
explanations are particularly relevant to children in making
sense of their environments, because many real-world
events feature cause-effect patterns (see Goswami 2001).
It follows that in order to further develop our account of
iterative unfolding with systems of relations it will be necess-
ary to provide training regimes that better reflect a child’s
environment, and, in particular, training regimes that
emphasize the relations and relational structures that are
most salient within the child’s environment, and as such
are most likely to serve as primes.
We have so far not discussed the important issue of rela-
tional complexity (Halford et al. 1998) and how the iterative
unfolding account could marry simple proportional analogies
such as a:b::c:d with the developmental effects of relational
complexity on children’s reasoning. However, to address
this issue, one open question that would first need to be
broached is how n-ary relations would be implemented
(e.g., relations with three arguments such as gives in John
gives Mary the book). One simple way, following event
semantics (Davidson 1967), to generalize our account to
analogies involving n-ary relations would be to decompose
an n-ary relation into multiple binary relations around an
event: for example, GIVER(event, John), GIVEE(event,
Mary), and GIVEN(event, book). Higher arity relations,
according to the iterative unfolding account, would then
require more temporary storage of partial results (e.g.,
dealing with the ternary relation give would require tempor-
ary storage of the giver, the givee, and the given). Hence, this
approach would also predict that relational complexity would
constrain analogical reasoning and that, across development,
ability with higher arity relations will correlate with some
measure of working memory efficacy.
The important distinction underlying our approach to
more complex analogies is between the explicit mapping
framework where analogies are worked out completely
by some cognitive mechanism (e.g., LISA), and an alterna-
tive view where simple analogies are first made before sub-
sequently being checked and expanded if necessary using
explicit iterative unfolding. To reiterate, according to our
account, explicit structure mapping is a meta-cognitive
skill: a relational priming mechanism reveals a relational
similarity between two domains, but the reasoner can
iteratively unfold this by repeatedly applying the simpler
mechanism over and over again to components of a
domain in order to extend the analogy or to discover
where the analogy breaks down. This second account has
an important role for explicit mapping; the key difference
is that explicit mapping is no longer necessary for analogy
to occur, but instead describes a subset of analogies.
Future work involving, for example, patients following
neurological insult, or possibly transcranial magnetic
stimulation with healthy participants, could provide
strong evidence for the disentangling of mapping from
analogy. In particular, given that explicit mapping is
likely to employ more frontal regions, whereas relational
priming is likely to be more temporal, we predict that
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frontal damage should have relatively little impact on ana-
logical reasoning when explicit mapping is not central to
performance, and that more temporal damage should
severely reduce relational priming and consequent analo-
gical reasoning.
One interesting prediction from the model that also
suggests a dissociation of analogy and mapping concerns a
developmental asymmetry in analogy completion when
base and target are reversed. For each analogy, it is pre-
dicted that there will be a period when the model can com-
plete an analogy one way but fails to complete its reverse.
For example, apple:cut apple::bread:cut bread at a given
point in development may be easier than the reverse
analogy: bread:cut bread::apple:cut apple. This phenome-
non arises in the model because pattern completion is dif-
ferently constrained in the base domain and the target
domain. The base domain involves greater external con-
straint (i.e., both the a and b terms) than the target
domain (just the c term). Consequently, the model is
more likely to appropriately complete an analogy if the
less well learnt relation is in the more highly constrained
base domain than if it is in the less constrained target
domain. This prediction is hard to reconcile with struc-
ture-mapping accounts and so constitutes a further strong
test of the validity of analogy as relational priming model.
5.5. Development revisited
One of the principal lessons from this work is that it is vital
to place development squarely at the heart of any account of
cognition. This is not a new proposal (e.g., see Karmiloff-
Smith 1998; Mareschal et al. 2007; Piaget 1970; Thelen &
Smith 1994) but one that is often overlooked by investi-
gators of adult cognition. Many models of adult cognition
have become very complex, often positing a myriad of
specialist mechanisms, but are also very powerful at
explaining many different aspects of adult performance on
a range of complex tasks. However, in many cases, these
models make no attempt to explain how the complex struc-
tures assumed to be part of adult cognition emerged. In
contrast to this, we have emphasized the need to explain
how cognitive mechanisms emerge over time with experi-
ence of the world. The result is that a very different kind of
model is arrived at. As discussed in sections 4 and 5.4, our
current account still has a substantial way to go to capture
the complexity and richness of adult analogical reasoning.
Indeed, in section 4 we sketch one possible way forward.
That objection notwithstanding, it still remains for adult-
level models to make contact with the developmental con-
straint: namely, that all proposed mechanisms must have a
developmental origin in order to be plausible. Thus, while
the developmental model does not reach adult levels of
competence, the adult model does not make sufficient
contact with its developmental origins. A complete expla-
nation of analogical reasoning must breach this gap.
In summary, relational priming has been presented as a
developmentally viable account of early analogical com-
pletion. We have shown that the account, implemented in
a connectionist model, captures a broad range of deve-
lopmental phenomena, including seven detailed develop-
mental markers of analogical ability. Our final simulation
demonstrates how the simple relational priming mechanism
can be applied iteratively to traverse complex analogies.
This approach promises to provide a fuller developmental
picture of the mechanisms underlying the gradual transition
from simple to more complex reasoning.
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NOTES
1. Unless otherwise stated, all figures shown in this section
portray the raw network data after fitting by 15 b-spline functions
with a lambda smoothing coefficient of 0.5 using the Functional
Data Analysis MatLab toolbox (Ramsay & Silverman 2002). This
results in much clearer trajectories that can be interpreted in
terms of higher derivatives (see Shultz [2003] for a full discussion
of the benefits of using this method of presenting network data
for estimating developmental trajectories). This smoothing process
does not change the essence of the results we present nor the argu-
ments that we make based on these network simulations. We thank
Tom Shultz for suggesting this additional analysis.
2. It is important to note that the sum of squared error at
output is calculated for the network appropriately producing
either a transformational or auto-associative response (which it
is being trained on) – not analogical completion (which it is
never trained on). As such, sum of squared error and percentage
analogies correctly completed are logically independent, and
non-parametric correlation is an appropriate statistical test to
assess their relationship.
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Abstract: According to the target article authors, initial experience with a
circumstance primes a relation that can subsequently be applied to a
different circumstance to draw an analogy. While I broadly agree with
their claim about the role of relational priming in early analogical
reasoning, I put forward a few concerns that may be worthy of further
reflection.
As someone interested in naturalized epistemology, I have bene-
fited from reading Leech et al.’s target article for it argues that
there is a need to study early analogical reasoning in a develop-
mental framework. Although complex analogical reasoning – as
observed in adults with proper mental makeup and education –
may be explicated in the abstract (Falkenhainer et al. 1989),
a developmental approach requires, more than anything else,
psychological plausibility. In one of the better works in the
latter regard, Thagard et al. (1990, p. 290) affirm that the compu-
tational model they describe is “intended to be a model of human
cognition, so it is essential that it be consistent with the results of
psychological experiments.” It is uplifting to watch Leech et al.
pay careful attention to present-day cognitive psychology and
never let the results of their work drift away from correlation
with its accomplishments.
Leaving aside the connectionist implementation for others to
comment upon, I think it is fair to say that the core of Leech
et al.’s argument is the cognitive apparatus for an “A is to B as
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C is to . . .?” (denoted as “A:B::C:?” in what follows) analogy,
which is customarily handled thus:
map A onto C
map B onto D (this is the unknown term to occupy the . . .
position)
transfer across the relation between A and B to C and D (so as to
correctly determine D)
Their conjecture is that relational priming accomplishes this task
neatly. To wit, exposure to A and B primes a relation R that then
biases C to show the way to the appropriate D. To give an
example from the simple causal domains of childhood, after
seeing the triple “cake, slice of cake (i.e., cut cake), pizza,” the
analogically appropriate response would be “slice of pizza” (i.e.,
cut pizza). Here, the terms “cake” and “slice of cake” prime a
relation (“cutting”) that then biases “pizza” to produce the appro-
priate response “slice of pizza.”
Relational priming is a commonsense notion, and its relatives
are widespread. Estes and Jones (2006, p. 89) define relation
[sic] priming as a phenomenon in which grasp of a word pair
(“plastic spoon”) is facilitated by the past presentation of another
(“wooden plate”) that instantiates the same conceptual relation
(“made of”). Recanati (2004, pp. 148–51), inspired by Wittgen-
stein, elucidates how someone learns a predicate P – a central
concern in cognitive linguistics. The learner observes the appli-
cation of P in a particular context (situation) K and associates
P and K. In another context K0, the learner will assume that P
applies in case she discerns that K0 is adequately “similar” to
K (Akman 2007). If her judgment regarding the resemblance
of K and K0 is flawed (in other words, K and K0 are similar in a
way not pertinent for the application of P), then communal help
would come and correct the learner. The learning phase of the
learner boils down to noting enough contexts in which P is reason-
ably applicable. In some sense, we can say that P and K cause a
“legitimate context of application” to be primed.
Unfortunately, the notion of relational priming is fairly proble-
matic. It is true that an analogy problem such as “puppy:dog::
kitten:?” can be solved rather easily with relational priming. Basi-
cally, exposure to “puppy” and “dog” primes the relation “off-
spring,” which then biases “kitten” to produce “cat” as the D
term. But the question arises: Why not the relation “younger
than”? Let me borrow the notation of situation theory for a
second (Barwise & Perry 1983) and say that if R is a binary
relation and A, B are objects appropriate for the respective argu-
ment places of R, then we shall write,,R, A, B, 1.. to denote
the informational item that A, B stand in the relation R. My point
is that exposure to “puppy,” “dog” could potentially prime several
candidate relations, and it is no easy feat to decide which one of
these is to be preferred. (It is a different matter to inquire
whether this would affect the correct solution of the analogy
problem.) In a nutshell, ,,offspring, puppy, dog, 1.. and
,,younger than, puppy, dog, 1.. , ,,cuter than, puppy,
dog, 1.. , and so on, are all possible informational items, not
to mention the more theoretical ,,isa, puppy, dog, 1.. . Pre-
sumably, this problem does not arise in the aforementioned cake
example because of the implicit presence of a causal agent (e.g., a
knife), but even that is suspect. Surely, the primed relation could
have been “larger than” in that example. (Or “more expensive
than,” if you truly want to make life difficult for a fan of relational
priming.)
It is also crucial to observe that R has two argument roles, yet
these “slots” into which appropriate objects can be placed are not
ordered in any way – and “certainly not linearly ordered as a
finite sequence” (Devlin 1991, p. 116). In the case of the relation
“offspring,” the argument roles can be termed as “ascendant” and
“descendant.” Accordingly, one apparent objection has to do
with the “direction” of the relationship. Maybe “ancestry”
(rather than “offspring”) should be the primed relation as it
does the job equally well; after all, one of the informational
items ,,ancestry, ascendant: dog, descendant: puppy, 1..
and ,,offspring, descendant: puppy, ascendant: dog, 1.. is
redundant given the other. In all likelihood, young children
would never use these abstract relations anyway; they would
prefer a tangible relation such as “mother of.” At least this is
what my 5-year-old consistently does. Whenever she sees a
lonely cat in the backyard, she says that the animal is seeking
“the mom” (and never “the dad” or “the parents”).
To make things more complicated, it is not clear whether other
examples superficially similar to “puppy:dog::kitten:?” can be
solved effortlessly. Take “rake:leaves::magnet:?.” In this case,
exposure to the first pair should presumably prime the relation
“conveniently collects in one place (location).” Then the answer
“paper clips” would be apparent. However, I trust that this
must be a tough one for a child of five.
Finally, take the celebrated line attributed to Groucho Marx:
“Military justice is to justice as military music is to music.”
When this is formulated as “military justice:justice::military
music:?,” it is straightforward to say that the first two terms
prime the theoretical relation “ako” – representing one class
being a subset of another – and hence the D term can be trivially
worked out as “music.” However, and I say this somewhat hesi-
tantly, the correct understanding here starts from the reverse
direction. In other words, what makes the analogy a striking
one (one that works) is that we are supposed to know that military
music is invariably dreadful as a harmonious experience and that
military justice should fail in the same vein. Maybe another
Groucho quip is in order: “A child of five would understand
this. Send someone to fetch a child of five.”
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Abstract: The target article criticises neural-symbolic systems as
inadequate for analogical reasoning and proposes a model of analogy as
transformation (i.e., learning). We accept the importance of learning,
but we argue that, instead of conflicting, integrated reasoning and
learning would model analogy much more adequately. In this new
perspective, modern neural-symbolic systems become the natural
candidates for modelling analogy.
The target article identifies two different stages as important for
analogical reasoning: the learning of transformations (or relations)
between objects, and the application of the acquired knowledge.
The importance of learning, building a knowledge base, is high-
lighted in the article, as the analogy performance improves when
more expertise is acquired. In what regards the application of
knowledge for analogy, the process can be divided into two
steps: (1) the recognition of the context, exemplified by the
search for the most appropriate relation to be considered, and
(2) the further reasoning over a different object, which might be
seen either as a search for the most relevant target, or as the appli-
cation of a transformation (as advocated in the article).
Among other works, the authors mention Shastri and Ajjana-
gadde (1993), an important reference for the research on
the integration of neural and symbolic artificial intelligence
approaches. Since then, the research on neural-symbolic systems
has evolved considerably with a strong focus on the integration
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of expressive reasoning and robust learning into effective compu-
tational systems. Neural-symbolic systems might be considered
nowadays as an alternative to traditional intelligent systems,
enhancing the main features of trainable neural networks with
symbolic representation and reasoning. Among the different
neural-symbolic systems, we will consider those that translate sym-
bolic knowledge into the initial architecture of a neural network,
such as Connectionist Inductive Learning and Logic Programming
(CILP) (d’Avila Garcez et al. 2002). In CILP, knowledge is rep-
resented by a propositional logic program, and the translation con-
sists in setting up a three-layer feed-forward neural network in
which input and output neurons represent propositional variables,
and the hidden neurons represent clauses (rules) involving such
variables, with the overall network presenting a semantic equival-
ence with the original logic program.
In light of these developments, we can propose a neural-sym-
bolic approach to model the procedures involved in the experi-
ments shown in the target article. Instead of focusing on the
dichotomy between relations and transformations, we prefer to
analyse each stage of the described analogical procedure as sub-
suming aspects of learning and reasoning. Regarding the stage of
building the knowledge base, neural-symbolic systems would
cater for empirical learning with the possibility of integrating
background symbolic knowledge about the domain, which can
improve performance as shown in Towell and Shavlik (1994)
and d’Avila Garcez et al. (2002).
As for the application of analogical reasoning, in an
“A:B::C:D”-like example, we can consider two steps. First, the
recognition of the relation (or transformation) between A and
B. Considering, again, a neural-symbolic representation of possi-
ble functions, the system should be able to receive two objects as
input, recognise the relation R between them, and keep this
information in a short-term memory for immediate use. This
kind of mapping with the use of short-term memory can be
found in neural-symbolic systems such as Sequential Connec-
tionist Temporal Logic (SCTL) (Lamb et al. 2007), an extension
of CILP catering for the representation of temporal logic pro-
grams. Once the relation has been identified, the process can
be seen as a simple inference, as described above.
We can show the adequacy of neural-symbolic systems in
representing this kind of reasoning considering the same
example used in the target article. The initial learning step
should build the knowledge represented by a set of clauses,
where we are considering two different atoms (propositional vari-
ables) for representing the relations: Recognise_R, to represent
when a relation R is recognised between two instances, and
Apply_R, illustrating the application of R over an instance of
the input. The set of clauses for the example is expressed below:
Cut_Apple if Whole_Apple and Apply_Cut;
Recognise_Cut if Whole_Apple and Cut_Apple;
. . .
Cut_Cheese if Whole_Cheese and Apply_Cut;
Recognise_Cut if Whole_Cheese and Cut_Cheese.
Also, for the application of this case of (A:B::C:D), the agent
should have some knowledge about the task, which can be rep-
resented in temporal propositional logic by inserting a clause
“(next) Apply_R if Recognise_R,” for each relation “R,” where
“(next)” is the operator referring to the next time point. There-
fore, if the system recognises a relation “R” at time point t, it
applies the reasoning over the next item presented at time
point tþ 1 using “R.” In Figure 1, we show an example of a
network based on such a program. After the network is built,
we have a first step where information about objects “A” and
“B” would activate an output neuron representing the relation
between them (Recognise_R). As for the second step, we
would have information about “C” as input, together with the
relation obtained at the previous time point (e.g., propagated to
a context unit [Apply_R] through a recurrent link as done in
Elman [1990]). With “C” and “R,” the network is capable of infer-
ring “D” according to the stored knowledge.
A simple example like the one above shows that, with a slight
change in perspective, a neural-symbolic system can perform the
same analogical reasoning as proposed in the target article. And
the benefits of this are to allow for the use of symbolic back-
ground knowledge, which is important to model cognitive tasks
such as language, and to integrate explicitly robust learning and
relational reasoning abilities in the same system, as part of
what we consider a more appropriate (or complete) modelling
of analogy.
Finally, we corroborate the target article’s idea that analogy
should be seen as an umbrella to different aspects of cognition,
serving also as a way of dealing with the problem of absence of
explicitly represented knowledge, even in symbolic cases. Cases
like the use of language illustrate the array of possibilities in
the development of models of cognitive behaviour. Sound deduc-
tive inference and inference by induction, analogy, and even dis-
covery have a role to play in the new logic landscape. This
constitutes a challenge for different research areas and in particu-
lar computer science, as suggested by Valiant (2003), according
to whom the modelling and integration of different cognitive abi-
lities, such as reasoning and learning, is a great challenge for
computer science in this century.
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Abstract: This commentary questions the general assumptions concerning
the cognitive value of analogical reasoning on which the argument
developed by Leech et al. appears to rest. In order to better assess the
Figure 1 (Borges et al.). Recurrent network for analogical
reasoning.
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findings of their meta-analysis, it shifts the perspective from development
to evolution, and frames their “how” concern within a broader “why”
issue.
This commentary does not bear upon the technicalities of the
empirical evidence marshaled by Leech et al. to support their
developmental claims concerning analogical reasoning. Nor does
it address the validity of the connectionist simulations which are
presented as plausible neurological explanations for this cognitive
competency, which is a defining feature of human psychology. It
concerns instead the general assumptions regarding analogical
reasoning on which the authors’ whole argument implicitly rests.
First, the pervasive notion that analogical reasoning can be
construed as normative can be questioned. The authors con-
stantly refer to the “correct” analogy in their analysis of the experi-
mental results of the tests based upon the formula: a is to b as c is
to what? It is noticeable that the “correct” answers that are
expected are all ultimately based on lexical units and their seman-
tic values even when the tests are apparently purely visual (e.g.,
a whole pie and a slice of pie). The most convincing part of the
general argument is that the “correct” answers rely on the
general knowledge available to the children tested. This also
holds for the adults. But general knowledge is necessarily “cul-
tural knowledge.” General or “common sense” knowledge is
largely built on stereotyped analogies, which are a part of the cul-
tural endowment imparted to children during their earliest
languaging and socializing process. It is in this sense normative
and culture-dependent. It is socially adaptive, and it does not
have any heuristic value.
But analogical thinking is also the source of innovative thinking
when it is applied outside the confines of the cultural box. There
is anecdotal evidence that children make “wild” analogies. Analo-
gical thinking can be highly innovative and lead to counterintui-
tive scientific hypotheses or, alternatively, to unsettling artistic
visions as in the creative methods promoted by the Surrealist lit-
erary movement of the 1920s: what they called the “image” was
the perception of a relation – semantic or morphological –
between cognitively “distant” realities (Breton 1924/1969, pp.
20–21). In those cases, analogical thinking is unpredictable and
has the power to shatter commonsense knowledge. Do infants
(and children) start with such “wild” analogical processing of
information, and do they need to be “educated” according to
their cultural analogical norms? Training by the caretakers is
after all very similar to the tests that are described in the target
article (e.g., the kitten is the puppy of the cat), but saying that
the apple is the kitten of the apple tree probably would not be
accepted as a valid answer, although it would be biologically
insightful. Then, what about rocks being analogically construed
as the puppies of the mountain?
Analogical thinking may be a defining feature of human cogni-
tion, but this evolved mental tool to infer knowledge is defini-
tively double-edged. It can equally be the source of scientific
discoveries or the perpetuation of erroneous beliefs. A large
part of counterintuitive scientific knowledge was built upon the
overcoming of entrenched analogical thinking that sustained
intuitive evidence, notably in physics and medicine. This is why
it is dangerous to uncritically mix analogical and objective truth
as the authors do. They overlook the fact that their implicit
notion of “normative” analogical thinking is culture-dependent,
and not necessarily adaptive in the evolutionary sense of the
term. Their examples show that their reasoning is based on posi-
tivistic “scientific” (commonsense) knowledge with the corre-
sponding semantic map that is conveyed to infants and
children with gesture and language. Other worldviews in other
cultures do inculcate different analogies. And some of these ana-
logies can determine, more often than not, maladaptive behavior.
Without raising the thorny issues of the evo-devo debate, it
might be productive to evoke the evolutionary significance of
analogical reasoning. It seems that the human brain is particu-
larly adept, for better or worse, at relying on analogical reasoning.
Inferring knowledge from incomplete information (and acting
upon it) is undoubtedly adaptive in most (or at least some)
cases. There seems to be good empirical evidence that all percep-
tions are based on priming and anticipation (e.g., Glimcher 2003;
Gold & Shadlen 2007). But, obviously, like the much-celebrated
“theory of mind” (TOM) that evolved as a highly adaptive feature
of the human genetic endowment (e.g., Penn et al. 2008), it can
extend beyond its adaptive range. If TOM prompts populations
to attribute mental states to apparently animated objects such
as volcanoes, meteorological events, or virtual entities, and if ana-
logical reasoning construes these objects as bloodthirsty preda-
tors that have to be satiated or pacified by sacrificing precious
resources, obviously TOM (and analogical thinking upon which
TOM ultimately rests) is not unambiguously adaptive.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the two main examples of
analogical thinking put forward by Leech et al. are particularly
infelicitous – and probably prove my point. Niels Bohr’s popular
suggestion in 1913 that atoms were to be thought of as miniature
planetary systems proved to be seriously misleading and was
soon repudiated by Bohr himself, who recanted as early as
1919 (von Baeyer 2003, p. 63). No serious progress could have
been achieved in physics if this analogy had become entrenched.
As to the Gulf War, the analogy with World War II explored at
length by the authors cannot stand political or historical scrutiny.
This analogy was created as a political argument developed by the
American administration of the time to convince their European
allies to join the fight. The image was indeed powerful through
the foregrounding of superficial similarities, but very shallow if
closely examined. Its purpose was to achieve an emotional
impact on the media. Analogies can provide compelling rhetori-
cal arguments through a drastic simplification of situations and
problems but are a very shaky ground for constructing scientific
or historical knowledge. At most, they can be heuristic. Priming is
an effective shortcut to decision making that is not risk-free and
can be very costly. Not all shortcuts lead to survival (e.g., Chittka
& Osorio 2007).
Analogy as relational priming: The challenge
of self-reflection
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Abstract: Despite its strengths, Leech et al.’s model fails to address the
important benefits that derive from self-explanation and task feedback in
analogical reasoning development. These components encourage explicit,
self-reflective processes that do not necessarily link to knowledge
accretion. We wonder, therefore, what mechanisms can be included
within a connectionist framework to model self-reflective involvement
and its beneficial consequences.
We commend Leech et al.’s attempt to draw together diverse and
apparently contradictory accounts of analogy within a single con-
nectionist model. From our standpoint, the particular strengths
of this model are that it makes developmental processes para-
mount, embeds higher level processes in lower level ones, and
captures the way in which analogising can take place through
sub-symbolic relational priming. Yet their model neglects the
possibility that the transfer from lower- to higher-level cognition
might occur through explicit, self-reflective processes. To the
extent that connectionist approaches fail to embody such
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processes, then, Leech et al.’s model needs to be enhanced to
accommodate mechanisms that can interleave self-reflective
thinking with activation-based priming and pattern completion.
In particular, evidence from microgenetic studies – short term
investigations designed to chart or manipulate the process of
developmental change – identifies two factors associated with
explicit, self-reflective thought that are important to any compre-
hensive model of the development of children’s reasoning skills:
the child’s explanation of strategy use and feedback provided on
task performance. These factors, which derive from the child’s
interactions with the broader task and social environments, are
not given serious consideration in Leech et al.’s model.
Asking children to provide retrospective explanations of their
answers during analogical problem solving tasks has been shown
to aid the development of their analogical reasoning skills in
several recent studies (e.g., Cheshire et al. 2005; Siegler &
Svetina 2002). Leech et al. simulated how the provision of
verbal labels for relational terms benefits subsequent analogical
reasoning behaviour, but there are key differences between pro-
viding such verbal cues and asking children to explain why they
chose a particular answer. Verbal labels may augment the re-
presentation of spatial or transitive relations and thus facilitate per-
formance, but self-explanation prompts children to be reflective in
order to verbalise explicitly why they have selected a response.
What seems to be needed is an account of how the explicit
process of self-explanation can impact beneficially on analogical
reasoning. It may be, for example, that self-explanation somehow
increases the likelihood of an appropriate relational item being
selected in the future. Such an account, however, is complicated
by the finding that improvements in relational mapping that
derive from self-explanation are transitory, with children reverting
to a preference for superficial object similarity when no longer
asked to explain (Cheshire et al. 2005). The inherent fragility of
benefits deriving from self-explanation seems especially difficult
to model via activation-based priming and pattern completion.
Children also benefit from feedback during analogical reason-
ing and other cognitive tasks (e.g., Cheshire et al. 2005; Muldoon
et al. 2007; Siegler 2006; Siegler & Svetina 2002). Again,
however, such interaction with the social environment associated
with learning is not considered in Leech et al.’s proposals. Our
microgenetic data indicate that there is a rapid phase of learning
when explicit feedback is given, with such feedback promoting
long term improvements in analogical reasoning. A connectionist
model could no doubt simulate the rapidity and permanence of
such feedback-based learning. But exactly how positive and nega-
tive feedback strengthens the connections between the nodes in
the network is a complex issue and one that seems unlikely to be
addressed simply through an appeal to relational priming and
pattern completion mechanisms.
Furthermore, our microgenetic data suggest different trajec-
tories of change for children in different conditions dependent
upon the presence or absence of feedback and explanation.
Figure 1 compares the effects over seven sessions of repeated
testing without feedback or explanation (i.e., simple priming),
providing feedback, asking children to explain their decision,
and a combination of the two (see Cheshire et al. 2007). Asking
children to provide explanations enhances performance in
terms of a preference for relational mappings over superficial
object matches, but, as noted above, this improvement is transi-
tory, and children subsequently revert to a preference for object
similarity when no longer asked to explain (Cheshire et al. 2005).
Although the effects of explanation versus feedback on analogis-
ing are qualitatively different to each other (i.e., explanation leads
to more transitory effects; feedback produces more enduring
changes), the combination of the two leads to greater accuracy
and more permanent learning. The varied developmental path-
ways depicted in Figure 1 attest to the subtle and complex
influences of self-reflective processes on the development of ana-
logical reasoning. We contend that such subtleties and complex-
ities need to be matched by equally sophisticated mechanisms
within a connectionist framework of the type proposed by
Leech et al.
In conclusion, Leech et al.’s model falls foul of a long-standing
problem that in concentrating on the development of internal
structures such models are solipsistic (Frawley 1997). The deve-
lopment of analogical problem solving is not just due to repeated,
passive exposure to a problem and general knowledge accretion.
Through their active commitment to learning children partly
train their own networks by strengthening different connections
based on their individual experiences (which may include expla-
nation and feedback). Can the interplay between implicit net-
works and explicit, self-reflective thought be modelled in a
detailed, psychologically plausible, and testable manner?
Analogy is priming, but relations are not
transformations
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Abstract: Leech et al. make two proposals: that relational priming is
central to analogy, and that relations between objects are best represented
as transformations of those objects. Although their account of analogy
as relational priming is a useful contribution to our understanding of
analogical development, in this commentary I show that relations in
general cannot be represented by transformations.
In the “additive transformation” model of relations proposed by
Leech et al., a relation R holding between two objects, Object 1
and Object 2, is represented by a transformation vector T, which,
when added to the feature vector representing Object 1, pro-
duces the feature vector representing Object 2. The transform-
ation vector T defines the relation R: if any pair of objects are
related by relation R, that means the first object can be trans-
formed into the second object by adding the vector T; conversely,
if one object can be transformed into another object by adding
the vector T, that means those two objects can stand in relation
R to each other. (The zero vector has a special meaning in this
model: it represents the auto-association relation, which simply
transforms an object into itself.) Leech et al. use this transforma-
tional representation of relations to simulate and test a relational
priming account of analogy. These simulations involve training a
Figure 1 (Cheshire et al.). Different paths of change in a
microgenetic study of the development of analogical reasoning
(Cheshire et al. 2007). Sessions involved 22 matrix-completion
trials (essentially involving analogies of the a:b::c:d form) whose
solutions entail relational mapping processes. Sessions 1, 6, and
7 were not associated with any experimental manipulation.
Session 7 occurred approximately 8 weeks after Session 6.
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connectionist network to learn relations encoded as transform-
ations. To train the network on relation R the network is
presented with pairs of objects in which the first object’s
feature vector differs from the second by the transformation
vector T. These object pairs are presented in conjunction with
a feature vector that labels the relation in some way. Over the
course of training, the network learns to associate the relation
label with the transformation required to get from one object
in a pair to the other; in other words, the network learns the
transformation. Leech et al. show that networks trained in this
way can learn a number of different relations and can, by allowing
objects to prime relations, carry out simulations of something
very like analogical reasoning. These simulations produce
results that agree with those seen in experimental studies of
analogy, and thus support a relational priming model of analogy.
Although this additive transformation model is plausible for
causal relations such as the cutting relation used by Leech
et al., in general relations cannot be represented by transform-
ations. The problem is that many relations are bidirectional:
they can hold both between Object 1 and Object 2 and also
between Object 2 and Object 1. The relation threatens, for
example (which Leech et al. also use in their simulations), is
bidirectional: it can hold both between Iraq and the United
States (i.e., Iraq threatens the United States) and between the
United States and Iraq (i.e., the United States threatens Iraq).
Both directions of a bidirectional relation, however, cannot be
represented via the same additive transformation, and so such
relations cannot be represented in an additive transformation
model of relations.
To see why bidirectional relations cannot be represented in the
additive transformation model proposed by Leech et al., assume
that relation R is bidirectional and that R holds both between
Object 1 and Object 2 and between Object 2 and Object 1. Let
[Object 1] represent the feature vector describing Object 1, and
[Object 2] denote that describing Object 2. By definition, for
the relation R to hold in both directions, the two expressions
(1) ½Object2 ¼ ½Object1 þ T
(2) ½Object1 ¼ ½Object2 þ T
must both be true (where T is the transformational vector repre-
senting relation R, as before). However, by substituting Equation
1 into Equation 2 we can see that this means
(3) ½Object1 ¼ ½Object1 þ T þ T
must be true. This can only be true when
(4) T ¼ 0:
Thus the bidirectional relation between two objects can only be
represented via transformation if the transformational vector T
applied to convert one object to the other is simply the zero
vector. But the zero vector only “converts” one object into
itself (auto-association, in Leech et al.’s terms). The additive
transformation model is thus unable to represent bidirectional
relations between two different objects. This means that if a
transformational system of relations is set up to represent “Iraq
threatens the United States,” that system is necessarily unable
to represent “the United States threatens Iraq.”
Leech et al.’s additive transformation model of relations, then,
can only apply to relations which are not bidirectional: relations
which, if they hold between Object 1 and Object 2, cannot hold
between Object 2 and Object 1. The causal relations used by
Leech et al. in their first simulation are clearly not bidirectional
because they involve irreversible physical change to an object:
the cutting relation transforms an apple into a cut apple, but
cannot transform a cut apple back into an apple. Leech et al.
have thus provided a relational priming model of analogy
which works for certain types of relations (relations that are not
bidirectional), but not for relations in general.
This difficulty with bidirectional relations does not take away
from the success of Leech et al.’s account of analogy as relational
priming. Their account applies well to an important, and perhaps
a fundamental, type of relation (simple causal relations), and
gives a good account for the developmental results on analogies
using relations of that type (Goswami & Brown1989; Goswami
et al. 1998). It may be possible to extend this account by using
a different transformational model of relations rather than the
additive model used by Leech et al. – for example, a transforma-
tional model based on modular arithmetic may be able to suc-
cessfully represent bidirectional relations. It is hard to see how
modular arithmetic could be implemented in a connectionist
network, however. It may be better to accept that the transforma-
tional model of relations will only work well for relations that
actually involve transformations: for relations that are not trans-
formations, a different model will be needed.
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Abstract: Six questions are posed that are really specific versions of this
question: How can Leech et al.’s system be extended to handle adult-level
analogies that frequently combine concepts from semantically distant
domains sharing few relational labels and that involve the production of
abstractions? It is Leech et al. who stress development; finding such an
extension would seem to have to be high on their priority list.
I begin with my first question: Why is apple:cut apple :: bread:cut
bread an analogy and not a simple categorization? After all, they
are both from the food domain. If I show a child a paradigmatic
dog – for example, a beagle – and then show that child an
unusual dog – for example, a hairless Chinese Crested – then
if the child correctly identifies the Chinese Crested as a dog,
we would say that the child has categorized the Crested, not
that the child has made an analogy. Presumably then, what
makes an analogy is mapping relational structure. (I am happy
to grant this, but it is a gift, since, for all we know, most concepts
have relational structure. So, appealing to such mapping, even
mapping systems of structures, may not actually distinguish cat-
egorization from analogy.) But is any relational categorization
an analogy? Perhaps relational mapping isn’t all there is to
analogy. Though the notion is hard to define experimentally or
even theoretically, the “semantical distance” between the two
analogue domains is also important: the greater the distance,
the deeper the analogy (Leech et al. make some interesting com-
ments related to this in sect. 5.1.2). So, now my second question:
Could Leech et al.’s connectionist network make an analogy (with
appropriate changes) between apple:cut apple and team:cut from
the team, or cut of a deck of cards? Or, since the result in their
examples of cutting an apple and a loaf of bread is a slice,
could their network be trained in such a way as to make an
analogy with slice of life?
Admittedly, analogies between cutting an apple and being cut
from a team are more complex, “adult-level” analogies, and
Leech et al. admit that their model has a ways to go before it
can make adult analogies; yet, though they do an admirable job
of arguing that their model can be extended to make such analogies,
one still wonders whether their three central notions of pattern
completion, relational priming, and implicit representations are
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up to the task. This leads to my third question: Can their implicit
relational representations account for both the abstraction and con-
scious knowledge seen in adult analogies? This third question is
really comprised of three, more specific, questions, to which I
now turn.
Two crucial aspects of adult analogies are that they create
abstractions on the fly (the relational structures of the two ana-
logues are abstracted; this is sometimes called “relational
change”; see Dietrich et. al 2003) and they bring to consciousness
the fact that the two analogues are indeed analogous (one can
always say, “X is like Y’ or ‘X reminds me of Y’; see Dietrich
2000; and cf. Leech et al., sect. 5.2, first para.). Rutherford’s
crucial analogy between the deflected trajectories of alpha par-
ticles and the orbital paths of comets is a classic example of the
sort of abstraction that I mean (the abstraction is due in part to
the fact that deflected trajectories are by no means orbits –
Rutherford 1911; also see “Rutherford Scattering” and “Gold
Foil Experiment” in Wikipedia). This analogy (not the data
behind it) doomed the reigning plum-pudding model of the
atom and led eventually to the better Bohr model of the atom.
Science is rife with such examples.
It is hard to see how these two aspects of analogy could be rea-
lized in Leech et al.’s model. How can a relational structure be
abstracted if it’s only implicitly represented as a state transform-
ation? That would seem to require abstracting the states. Is
that possible on their model? And how can the knowledge of
something be brought to consciousness if it is not explicitly
represented?
Models of analogy that use explicit, discrete representations
seem to be able to handle these two aspects. Structure-
mapping theory (Gentner 1983) is a good example. However,
structure-mapping theory is not the final word on analogy, as
everyone, including Gentner, admits (though, of course, there
is disagreement on why it is not the final word). It is clear that
Leech et al.’s developmental model of analogy brings important
new insights to the table. What is not clear is how to have one
model that does justice to the developmental data, the obvious
constraint that analogy would seem to have to arise from
simpler mechanisms such as priming, and the fact that analogies
produce abstractions to which we have conscious access (as we do
to the analogies themselves). This problem of different, incompa-
tible models explaining different aspects of a single cognitive
phenomenon is quite common in cognitive science. This takes
me to my final question.
In their Gulf War/World War II model, Leech et al. use the
exact same relations in each domain (see Table 3 in sect. 4.1.2).
This seems to weaken their case that their relational priming
model could be extended to adult-level analogies, for it is very
unlikely that the exact same relations would obtain in different
domains. It is even very unlikely that the same labels (names)
would obtain in different domains. This problem is related to a
problem within structure-mapping theory (SMT). According to
SMT, analogies are isomorphisms between high-level structures.
In an important sense, the analogous concepts simply share one
structure that funds their being analogous. Furthermore, SMT
assumes that these isomorphisms obtain before a given analogy
is made (indeed, the isomorphisms explain why the analogy
was made). The probability that such isomorphisms obtain
before an analogy is made is very low – too low to account for
the quantity of analogies an individual produces (Dietrich
2000). Therefore, on any SMT-like model, the relevant represen-
tations in an analogy have to change at the time of retrieval in
order to forge the needed isomorphism (Dietrich et al. 2003).
Perhaps relational priming could solve this problem without
invoking retrieval-based change.
It seems as though the best extension of Leech et al.’s system for
handling adult-level analogies would be a system combining their
insights regarding relational priming, a process for rendering
explicit some implicit relational representations, together with a
process for abstracting those explicit representations so that
semantically distant analogies can be made. Is such an extension
compatible with how Leech et al. see their future work unfolding?
Developing structured representations
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Abstract: Leech et al.’s model proposes representing relations as primed
transformations rather than as structured representations (explicit
representations of relations and their roles dynamically bound to
fillers). However, this renders the model unable to explain several
developmental trends (including relational integration and all changes
not attributable to growth in relational knowledge). We suggest looking to
an alternative computational model that learns structured representations
from examples.
Leech et al. propose relational priming as the mechanism for the
development of analogy making in children, and they provide
simulation results that follow several known trends observed in
children’s early analogical reasoning. However, there are limi-
tations in the present model that undercut its feasibility as a
general explanation for the development of analogy. First, the
authors claim that rather than explicitly representing relations
as structured representations, it may be sufficient to conceptua-
lize relations as transformations on objects. A consequence of
this approach is that it appears to leave the model unable to inte-
grate multiple relations when making analogies. For example, it is
unclear how the model could sort out the mappings between
kicks (x, y) and kicks (y, z) and hits (b, c) and hits (a, b). Although
the authors acknowledge that their current model does not
explain all aspects of relationally complex adult analogical reason-
ing, in fact the ability to represent integrated relations is crucial
to a developmental model as well. By 5–6 years of age, children
are well above chance in tasks requiring integration of multiple
relations (Andrews & Halford 2002; Holyoak et al. 1984; Rich-
land et al. 2006), and even children ages 3–4 show some ability
to integrate two relations (e.g., Rattermann & Gentner 1998a;
Richland et al. 2006).
Second, all developmental changes in the model derive from
knowledge accretion, but knowledge has been shown unable to
predict all behavioral patterns of development (see Goswami
et al. 1998; Richland et al. 2006). In Richland et al. (2006), child-
ren were asked to map analogical correspondences between sets
of two pictures in which the same relation was represented (e.g.,
picture A showed dog chases cat chases mouse; picture B showed
mom chases boy chases girl). A test of the stimuli showed that
children ages 3–4 had sufficient relational knowledge to identify
the primary relation at 90% accuracy across all the pictures, indi-
cating that adequate relational knowledge could not be the expla-
nation for condition or age related differences in performance.
Although 3–4 year olds could solve simple one-relation analogies
between the scenes (e.g., dog chases cat; boy chases girl), the
same participants (with the same relational knowledge) showed
significantly lower relational mapping accuracy when there was
an additional processing load. This was either in the form of an
object similarity distracter in the target scene, or when the
mapping task required a higher level of relational complexity.
All pictures were counterbalanced across conditions. With age,
children improved in these conditions in timing that coincides
with maturation of working memory and inhibitory control
systems. These data indicate that while acquisition of adequate
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relational knowledge is likely a prerequisite to relational reason-
ing, it is not sufficient to explain established developmental
patterns.
The authors motivate the approach of using priming rather
than explicit relational representations because no current
models account for how explicit relational representations can
be learned. This is, however, an oversight. The Discovery of
Relations by Analogy model or DORA (Doumas & Hummel
2005a; 2007; Doumas et al. 2008) is a connectionist model that
learns explicit representations of relations from unstructured
examples. Beginning with simple distributed representations of
objects as feature vectors, DORA uses comparison to bootstrap
learning explicit representations of object properties and rela-
tional roles. DORA then uses mapping to link sets of relational
roles into complete multi-place relations. Importantly, DORA
uses time to dynamically bind these representations of object
properties, roles, and relations to arguments (see, e.g., Doumas
et al. 2008; Hummel & Holyoak 1997; 2003). In other words,
DORA learns explicit representations of relations that explicitly
specify bindings between relational roles and fillers. The result-
ing representations allow DORA to account for numerous
phenomena from children’s and adults’ relational reasoning
including all those accounted for by the target model, as well
as numerous phenomena the present model cannot account for
(such as relational integration; see Doumas et al. 2008).
Relational processing in conceptual
combination and analogy
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Abstract: We evaluate whether evidence from conceptual combination
supports the relational priming model of analogy. Representing
relations implicitly as patterns of activation distributed across the
semantic network provides a natural and parsimonious explanation of
several key phenomena observed in conceptual combination. Although
an additional mechanism for role resolution may be required, relational
priming offers a promising approach to analogy.
Leech et al. propose that analogies are understood by relational
priming. For instance, PUPPY:DOG::KITTEN:??? is completed
by applying the relation between the base concepts (a PUPPY is
the offspring of a DOG) to the target concepts (a KITTEN is the
offspring of a CAT). In addition to its occurrence in analogy, rela-
tional priming also occurs regularly in common language use.
Indeed, object concepts are combined frequently in language
(e.g., BIRD NEST), and like analogies, such conceptual combi-
nations are understood by retrieving or inferring some relation
(e.g., habitation) between the given concepts. In conceptual
combination, relational priming occurs when one phrase (e.g.,
BIRD NEST) facilitates comprehension of a subsequent phrase
(e.g., FISH POND) that instantiates the same relation (Estes
2003; Estes & Jones 2006; Gagne´ 2001; Spellman et al. 2001).
Given this fundamental similarity between analogy and conceptual
combination, then, research on conceptual combination may serve
as a useful tool for evaluating models of analogy.
Leech et al. posit that relations are represented as transform-
ations between activation states. More specifically, a relation is
represented as the pattern of activation required to transform
an input object (e.g., APPLE) into an output object (e.g., CUT
APPLE). In terms of conceptual combination, this corresponds
to a simple concept (e.g., NEST) being transformed into a com-
pound concept (e.g., BIRD NEST). Because such transform-
ations are carried out within the hidden layer of the model, a
relation is represented implicitly as a pattern of activation
within the semantic network.
This transformational model of relational representation natu-
rally explains several of the key observations in research on con-
ceptual combination. First, familiar combinations (e.g., BIRD
NEST) and novel combinations (e.g., TURTLE CAGE) are
understood via the same processes. Intuitively, it seems that fami-
liar combinations would be understood by simply retrieving the
compound concept from memory, whereas novel combinations
necessitate a relational inference. However, the evidence suggests
that familiar and novel combinations undergo the same compu-
tations (e.g., Gagne´ & Spalding 2004). The transformational
model provides a straightforward explanation for this otherwise
counterintuitive observation: The relational inference entails a
transformation from simple concepts to a compound concept,
regardless of the familiarity of the compound. Although the rela-
tional transformation may proceed more quickly for familiar
compounds than for novel compounds, it nevertheless must
occur in both cases.
Second, relational representations are independent of the con-
cepts that instantiate them. If relational representations were
concept bound, then relational priming should only occur
when the base and target exhibit lexical repetition (e.g., BIRD
CAGE! BIRD NEST; Gagne´ 2001). In actuality, however,
relational priming also occurs in the absence of lexical repetition
(Estes 2003; Estes & Jones 2006; Raffray et al. 2007; Spellman
et al. 2001). For example, FISH POND facilitates the compre-
hension of BIRD NEST because both combinations utilize the
same relational representation. Because the transformational
model posits that relations are represented as unique patterns
of activation that may be triggered by multiple input objects,
the model clearly predicts relational priming without lexical re-
petition (otherwise, it couldn’t possibly explain analogy). The
independence of relational representations is further evidenced
by the facilitative effect of relational labels on analogy com-
pletion. Although a relational label does not add new information
to the network, it effectively cues the relational transformation,
regardless of the concepts that instantiate it.
Finally, relational representations are somewhat specific. To
illustrate, BIRD NEST, TURTLE CAGE, and COOKIE JAR
all nominally instantiate a general location relation. So if rela-
tional representations were this general, then TURTLE CAGE
and COOKIE JAR should both facilitate comprehension of
BIRD NEST. But in actuality, TURTLE CAGE facilitates com-
prehension of BIRD NEST, but COOKIE JAR does not. This
selectivity of relational priming indicates that relational represen-
tations are specific, more like habitation (i.e., TURTLE CAGE
and BIRD NEST) and containment (i.e., COOKIE JAR). The
transformational model explains this selectivity of priming as a
consequence of relational similarity. That is, the pattern of acti-
vation required to transform NEST into BIRD NEST is highly
similar to that required to transform CAGE into TURTLE
CAGE, but is relatively dissimilar to the transformation from
JAR to COOKIE JAR. Without sufficient relational similarity,
relational priming cannot occur (Estes & Jones 2006).
An important issue that may pose a challenge for the transfor-
mational model is role resolution. That is, once a relation
between concepts is inferred, those concepts must also be
assigned to appropriate roles in that relation. Otherwise, the rela-
tional inference would lead to frequent errors in interpretation
(Hummel & Holyoak 2003). Consider the causal relation, for
which it is crucial to distinguish cause from effect (see Fenker
et al. 2005). WIND EROSION and GROWTH HORMONE
both instantiate the causal relation, but note that the ordering
of cause and effect is reversed in the two combinations.
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Because the transformational model has only implicit relational
representations, with no explicit provision for role resolution, it
is unclear how the model will account for such differences. To
demonstrate the issue with analogy, consider WIND:ERO-
SION::SMOKE:???. Once the base pair activates the causal
transformation, the target pair will tend to undergo the same
transformation. But on what basis will the model correctly
produce an effect of SMOKE (e.g., COUGH) rather than
a cause (e.g., FIRE)? A simple solution is to stipulate that
each relation has two distinct transformations, one for each
possible ordering of role assignments (e.g., cause! effect and
effect cause). However, the cost of this relational proliferation
may essentially offset the benefit of representing relations
implicitly. Thus, we view role resolution as an important issue
requiring explicit elaboration in the model.
In summary, the transformational model parsimoniously
explains several key phenomena of conceptual combination.
Although important issues remain to be addressed, we believe
that Leech et al. have provided a promising framework for mod-
eling analogy and other relational processes, such as conceptual
combination.
Relational priming is to analogy-making as
one-ball juggling is to seven-ball juggling
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Abstract: Relational priming is argued to be a deeply inadequate model
of analogy-making because of its intrinsic inability to do analogies
where the base and target domains share no common attributes and
the mapped relations are different. Leech et al. rely on carefully
handcrafted representations to allow their model to make a complex
analogy, seemingly unaware of the debate on this issue fifteen years
ago. Finally, they incorrectly assume the existence of fixed, context-
independent relations between objects.
Although relational priming may, indeed, play some role in
analogy-making, it is an enormous – and unjustified – stretch
to say that it is “centrally implicated in analogical reasoning”
(sect. 2, para. 2). This is a very strong statement, and the
authors have not shown at all that this mechanism – as opposed
to, say, explicit structure-mapping (Gentner 1983) or slippage
(French 1995; Mitchell 1993; Mitchell & Hofstadter 1990) or con-
straint satisfaction (Holyoak & Thagard 1989) or dynamic binding
(Hummel & Holyoak 1997), to name a few – is at the heart of
high-level analogy-making.
The proportional analogy that dominates almost three-quar-
ters of the target article, both in the theoretical discussion and
the simulations, is:
BREAD is to CUT BREAD as APPLE is to ?
The possible answers are:
CUT APPLE, APPLE, BRUISED APPLE, and CUT
BANANA.
A simple connectionist attractor network produces the correct
answer (CUT APPLE). The authors claim that “relational pri-
ming” – supposedly what the network is doing – is the key to
analogy-making and that this mechanism can be extended
to full-blown analogy-making. Unfortunately, both claims are
dubious, at best.
Let us start by considering a run-of-the-mill analogy that
occurred to me recently. Ty Cobb, one of baseball’s greatest
players ever, did not hit over-the-wall home runs like his arch-
rival, Babe Ruth. However, in May 1925, after being egged on
by reporters, he said, “You want me to hit home runs like Babe
Ruth? No problem.” So, in the next game he hit three over-the-
wall home runs and two more in the following game, after which
he said, “I told you I could hit home runs. Now I’m going back
to playing baseball the way it was meant to be played.” It occurred
to me that this is analogous to a professor who publishes only
books and who is criticized for never publishing in journals. One
day, in response to his critics, he says, “I could publish in journals
if I wanted to, I simply chose not to,” and, to prove his point, he
rapidly racks up a number of publications in the top journals in
his field. Thereafter, he returns to writing books.
Here we have two situations in which the objects have no fea-
tures in common (base hits and books; home runs and journal
articles) and where the relations are semantically miles apart
(hitting and writing). And yet, the analogy works perfectly.
This is the heart of analogy-making, and it is not in the least
clear how relational priming, as implemented by the authors,
could begin to deal with this problem.
Late in their article, the authors finally come to grips with the
necessity of explaining “how such a mechanism [relational
priming] might explain the more difficult and complex analogies
used to test adults” (sect. 3.4, para. 10). They then discuss how this
would occur by considering an analogy between the 1991 Gulf
War and World War II (Spellman & Holyoak 1992). But where
did the relations and objects on which they train their network
come from? This is a textbook case of the Problem of Represen-
tation (Chalmers et al. 1992), a problem that, incredibly, they
never mention, and one that, arguably, was the greatest
problem of traditional artificial intelligence (AI). Once you
have handcrafted representations for each situation with a
limited number of relations, finding mappings between them
is, relatively speaking, a piece of cake.
This careful handcrafting of objects and relations in the two
situations into exactly the representations that are needed for
an analogy to be found is precisely what certain members of
the analogy-making community (Chalmers et al. 1992) have
been railing against for years. To be completely clear: There
are literally millions of relations and objects that could be used
to describe the 1991 Gulf War and just as many that characterize
World War II. But for their example, Leech et al. have selected
only those relations that make their analogy work. This is wholly
unacceptable as a way forward in analogy-making and, what’s
more, tells us essentially nothing about how real analogy-making
works, since finding the relations is part-and-parcel of the process.
It cannot be separated out.
Finally, the authors write as if the relation between two objects
exists in a context-independent manner and can thus be primed
by the presence of the objects themselves. They write, for
example, “we propose that exposure to the a (e.g., puppy) and
b (e.g., dog) terms of an analogy primes a semantic relation
(e.g., offspring), which then biases the c term (kitten) to
produce the appropriate d term (cat)” (sect. 2.1, para. 1). But
this cannot be right. Consider the following example: puppy:-
dog::watch:? Most people would say: clock. But is a watch an off-
spring of a clock? Of course not. The point is that the word watch
helps determine the relationship between puppy and dog. There
is no a priori intrinsic relation between puppy:dog that can be
used for all analogies, as the Leech et al. model needs to
assume. In the latter analogy, the germane relationship was
bigger than and certainly not offspring of. The authors fail to
understand this absolutely crucial point about the context-depen-
dence of analogy-making. This seems to be a deep, and, in my
opinion, irreparable, flaw in their model. This point is not one
that can be simply glossed over or easily patched up. The
whole manner in which their model is trained up requires
there to be an a priori relationship between a and b, which is
then transferred to c. But this is deeply wrong. Analogy-
making, as the above example clearly shows, doesn’t work that
way. And one can come up with examples like this all day. For
a detailed discussion of this point, see Chalmers et al. (1992).
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Conclusion. The ideas presented by the authors in their model
are not central to the key principles underlying the mechanisms
of analogy-making. Their model is capable of limited relational
learning, that is all; something that was done by earlier connec-
tionist models (e.g., Chalmers 1990) almost twenty years ago.
In short, as a model of analogy-making, the present model is woe-
fully inadequate. There is much, much more to analogy-making
than relational priming.
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Abstract: Leech et al.’s demonstration that analogical reasoning can be an
emergent property of low-level incremental learning processes is critical
for analogical theory. Along with insights into neural learning based on
the salience of dynamic spatio-temporal structure, and the neural priming
mechanism of repetition suppression, it establishes relational primacy as a
plausible theoretical description of how brains make analogies.
At last, a truly developmental account of a fundamental cognitive
“skill,” analogy! Leech et al.’s computational demonstration that
reasoning by analogy can in principle arise from pattern com-
pletion by simple memory processes is extremely important for
analogical theory. Recent advances in cognitive neuroscience
and connectionism are helping us to understand how the brain
builds a complex cognitive system on the basis of simple incremen-
tal learning mechanisms that begin with sensory input (Goswami
2008). Indeed, aspects of development long considered to
require innate “pre-knowledge,” such as syntax acquisition, can
in principle be acquired by networks that learn according to
simple statistical algorithms (Freudenthal et al. 2006). In develop-
mental psychology, connectionist demonstrations have been
crucial both for dealing with the “poverty of the stimulus” argu-
ment (Elman 2005) and for establishing that relational information
can be computed from instance-based learning. Leech et al.
achieve the same outcomes for analogy. Simple sensory input
(apples, cut apples, knives) can be rich in relational information,
and instance-based learning can yield complex cognition.
In my view, the question of whether the brain achieves analogy
on the basis of relational priming is secondary to the demonstration
that analogies can in principle be achieved by low-level, automatic,
and incremental learning processes. Indeed, cognitive neuroscience
and developmental psychology both provide extensive empirical
demonstrations that relations are represented as more than “trans-
formations between items” (sect. 2.2, para. 2). Instead, low-level
sensory processing represents spatio-temporal dynamic structure.
In adult neuroscience, it can be shown that when cross-modal
input has temporal patterning, the brain will abstract these patterns
and alter uni-modal sensory processing in terms of the higher-order
dependencies in the patterns (e.g., Noesselt et al. 2007). Regarding
babies, 3-month-olds who view abstract motion patterns (point light
displays) that specify either vehicles or animals distinguish the two
inputs on the basis of this dynamic information alone (and do so as
well as they distinguish actual pictures of vehicles and animals;
Arterberry & Bornstein 2001). To babies, relations specify as
much information as the objects themselves.
Our sensory processing systems therefore end up prioritising
spatio-temporal dynamic structure (abstracted dependencies)
over instance-based featural (object) information, and this is also
revealed by sensory “illusions” (Riecke et al. 2007). The primacy
given to these abstracted dependencies is very important theoreti-
cally, as it means that the way in which our brains process sensory
structure can in principle yield the “relational primacy” that I
argued for in 1991 (see target article, sect. 3.4, para. 7). In
essence, sensory systems are representing underlying structure
(traditionally discussed as “prototypes,” “naı¨ve theories,” “innate
biases,” or “core knowledge”; e.g., Rosch 1978; Spelke 1994).
Incremental learning by sensory neural networks that represent
dynamic relations automatically represents relational structure.
These emergent knowledge systems are enriched and transformed
as the child acquires language (Vygotsky 1978). In analogy, as in
conceptual development, verbal labeling supports structural simi-
larity over perceptual similarity (Gelman & Coley 1990).
The modelling conducted by Leech et al. is thus compelling in
establishing two central developmental phenomena: Analogical
completion is an emergent property of the way that relational
information is represented in a (neural) network; and incremen-
tal learning processes can yield developmental effects previously
explained by symbolic theories. Do we need the extra assump-
tions, that relations are transformations, and that consequently
a strong test of the relational priming account is whether seman-
tic relational priming is found in young children (target article,
sect. 5.2, para. 4)? I doubt it.
Firstly, relational priming as discussed by Leech et al. and as
tested in the studies on adults they cite is rather narrow in scope
(e.g., “apple” and “cake” priming “made of”). If children didn’t
show these automatic effects (which also require adequate
reading skills, noise-free reaction times [RTs], and relevant
domain knowledge), I am not sure it would matter. Secondly,
priming in the cognitive neuroscience literature offers a general
tool for studying the nature of the code in a given brain region,
via repetition suppression (Dehaene et al. 2001). This latter con-
ceptualisation of priming seems more relevant to analogy as an
emergent phenomenon, and gives inhibition “for free.” Neural
repetition suppression techniques have already been used to inves-
tigate the coding of relational information (e.g., numerical quan-
tity; see Naccache & Dehaene 2001). Hence, to show that
Leech et al’s model is biologically plausible, all that is required
is evidence that young children show neural repetition suppression
to relational information. Even simple causal information (e.g.,
launching events) would suffice for such a test. Priming effects
seem unlikely to be isolated to the temporal cortices (sect. 5.4,
para. 7), as semantic memory is no longer understood as a distinct
symbolic system. Rather, the activation of particular concepts (by
adults) produces neural activation in the sensory modalities asso-
ciated with those concepts and in association areas recording
the conjunctions of particular sets of sensory information (e.g.,
Barsalou et al. 2003). Studying the repetition suppression of such
conjunctions appears the most productive way to understand
analogy as a form of neural priming.
Finally, what of the “unexpected consequence” of the Leech
et al. model (sect. 5.1.1, para. 2), that there is no necessary rela-
tional shift for any given relation in a child’s similarity judgements?
This seems highly likely, and a relational primacy account must
predict that for some relations, children might show an initial
bias for relations over objects. In fact, 3-month-old babies do
just this. In the 1980s, Rovee-Collier and her colleagues conducted
a series of experiments on infant memory, using a “conjugate
reinforcement” paradigm. Three-month-old babies were trained
to kick when they saw a distinctive mobile, and were reinforced
because their kicking set the mobile in motion (a causal relation).
These memories lasted for months, and the most effective retrieval
cues were other mobiles, including mobiles that were visually com-
pletely different from the distinctive training mobile (e.g., a mobile
with one butterfly on a ring as reminder cue, a mobile of hanging
dice during relational learning; see Greco et al. 1990). Thus shared
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functional relations and not object similarity was the core retrieval
cue – consistent with a relational primacy account and with Leech
et al.’s model.
Implicit analogy: New direct evidence and
a challenge to the theory of memory
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Abstract: The authors propose that analogical reasoning may be achieved
without conscious or explicit deliberation. The argument would be
strengthened by more convincingly demonstrating instances of analogy
that do not require explicit deliberation. Recent findings demonstrate
that deliberative or explicit strategies are not necessary for flexible
expression under novel circumstances (Greene et al. 2001) to include
analogical transfer (Gross & Greene 2007). This issue is particularly
critical because the existence of relational priming poses a serious
challenge to the widely held notion that flexible expression of learned
relations requires deliberative processes.
Leech et al. make a compelling argument that analogical transfer
may not require a deliberative or explicit mapping process.
However, they provide no direct evidence showing successful
implicit analogy. The analogy tasks reviewed in the target
article do not provide evidence which rules out the use of deli-
berative strategies. In one such task the intent was to show that
analogical transfer did not require a mapping of base to target
(Ripoll et al. 2003). Although the finding tends to confirm that
subjects perform analogical transfer without deliberative mapping,
it does not rule out the possibility that analogical transfer was
itself accomplished deliberately. Indeed, participants were all
explicitly informed that their task was to complete an analogy.
In another task, pre-exposure to a problem solution in the base
task biased participants to employ a similar strategy in the
target task (Schunn & Dunbar 1996). However, the only evi-
dence that participants employed an implicit strategy was that
they did not mention the base problem as a foundation for the
solution to the target problem. Although these findings are
both consistent with the use of implicit strategies, neither directly
rules out the possibility that deliberative strategies were used.
Recently, direct evidence showed that analogical transfer occurs
in the absence of deliberative strategies (Gross & Greene 2007).
Participants learned a transverse patterning sequence and
transferred the learned relations to a novel stimulus set. For
transverse patterning, given a choice between two faces, A and
B, participants learn by trial and error to select A (A . B), and
likewise they learn B . C and C . A. To test for analogical trans-
fer, participants simultaneously learn a partial set of relations
among different faces, X . Y and Y . Z, and are then tested on
the novel pairing X?Z (the question mark indicated that no
choice was ever reinforced). In the control condition, the training
on the transverse patterning set is omitted, and participants uni-
formly infer that X . Z. However, with exposure to the transverse
patterning set, a significant portion of participants apply the trans-
verse patterning relations and select Z . X. This analogical trans-
fer occurred without intent or awareness of the transfer. Two tests
of awareness were used. First, a post-experimental questionnaire
was employed with increasingly leading questions about the use
of analogical transfer. Only those participants who asserted – in
a forced-choice question – that no analogical reason existed for
the Z . X choice were categorized as unaware. In addition, it was
noted during the debriefing that many participants were surprised
that they had not been trained on the Z?X choice. To test this, a
recognition task revealed that most participants did not recognize
Z?X as a novel configuration. Had a deliberative strategy been the
foundation for analogical transfer, participants would have had to
recognize the novel configuration to apply the mapping.
Analogical transfer is but one instance of relational priming.
Evidence that complex relations can be learned implicitly is
found in the contextual cueing task (Chun & Phelps 1999;
Greene et al. 2007) and the relational manipulation task (Ryan
et al. 2000). Furthermore, evidence that implicit relational learn-
ing can be expressed under novelty is demonstrated by the tran-
sitive inference task (Ellenbogen et al. 2007; Greene et al. 2001;
2006).
These additional relational priming tasks may also assess the
semantic priming hypothesis put forth in the target article. The
authors propose that relational priming is a facet of semantic
priming (e.g., “chicken is to hen” may semantically prime the
term “female” so that “horse is to mare” may be correctly selected),
suggesting that implicit relational learning is verbally mediated.
However, because several implicit relational learning tasks, includ-
ing analogy, are nonverbal tasks, it is difficult to hypothesize that
such verbal primes necessarily mediate performance, particularly
in the spatial tasks (contextual cueing and relational manipulation).
In fact, some evidence suggests that verbal strategies may bias the
use of explicit strategies when implicit strategies could otherwise
be employed (for a review, see Greene 2007), suggesting that it
may be more fruitful to explore the relational priming hypothesis
using nonverbal stimuli.
The evidence that analogical transfer and other forms of rela-
tional priming can be accomplished implicitly forces a major
change in the theory of memory. It has previously been asserted
that only deliberative processes could support learning that is suf-
ficiently flexible for abstract application under novelty (e.g., Cohen
et al. 1997; Reber et al. 1996). It is now evident that such relational
flexibility is not solely the domain of declarative memory (Chun &
Phelps 1999; Ellenbogen et al. 2007; Greene 2007; Greene et al.
2001; 2006; 2007; Gross & Greene 2007; Ryan et al. 2000). The
consequence of the discovery of such implicit tasks is that the
declarative memory model (e.g., Squire 1992) must be considered
inadequate in its current form.
No way to start a space program:
Associationism as a launch pad for
analogical reasoning
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Abstract: Humans, including preschool children, exhibit role-based
relational reasoning, of which analogical reasoning is a canonical
example. The “role-less” connectionist model proposed in the target
article is only capable of conditional paired-associate learning.
Here’s a source analogue for the model proposed in this target
article: A politician wants to start a space program. Lacking
typical prerequisites such as rockets, he gets his assistant to
climb the highest lookout tower in the land. We have lift-off!
Analogical reasoning is a canonical case of role-based relational
reasoning (RRR), a capability (perhaps uniquely human) that typi-
cally emerges around age 5 years (Doumas & Hummel 2005b;
Halford 1993; Penn et al. 2008). Consider the example of 4-year-
old Lori, a participant in one of the earliest experiments on
analogy development (Holyoak et al. 1984). Lori was read a fairy
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tale about a genie faced with the problem of transferring a number
of jewels from his current bottle to a new home in a different bottle.
The genie’s solution was to command his magic carpet to roll itself
into a tube, place it between the two bottles, and then roll his jewels
through it. Without mentioning any connection with the fairy tale,
the experimenter asked Lori to figure out how to transfer some
small balls from one bowl to another at some distance (while
remaining seated). A variety of objects were available, including a
large rectangular sheet of paper. Lori referred to the balls as
“pretend jewels.” Looking at the sheet of paper she said, “That
will be a magic carpet.” She laughed as she picked it up and
rolled it. “I did it just like the genie!”
Lori’s reasoning exploited systematic correspondences between
objects filling parallel roles. For example, the genie wants to move
his jewels from one bottle to another just as Lori wants to move
balls across bowls. More generally, RRR implies the ability to
draw inferences about entities based on the roles they fill in
relations, where the roles are not predictable by features of the
entities and the relations cannot be coded as role-less chunks
(Penn et al. 2008).
The target article illustrates an all-too-common approach to
connectionist modeling of those cognitive processes most
central to human intelligence: suck the essence out, then force-
fit what’s left into an associationist straitjacket. The project
begins by reducing analogical reasoning to a glorified paired
associates task. Leech et al. focus on four-term analogies,
which have the virtue (for associationist purposes) of providing
a highly stereotyped format. Their three-layered network is
trained with “facts” glossed along the lines “appleþ knife!
sliced apple” and “breadþ knife! sliced bread.” After extensive
training, the model is given the inputs “apple” and “sliced apple,”
thereby activating “knife,” which is then clamped so that when
“bread” is added as input it combines with “knife” to yield
“sliced bread.” Analogy solved?
Leech et al. talk about such problems using concepts such as
“causal transformations,” but the model itself simply learns bidir-
ectional conditional paired associates. Let “object at time 1” be
Si, “causal relation” be Ci, and “object at time 2” be Ri. The
model is trained with triples, including ,S1, C1, R1. and ,S2,
C1, R2.. The key to the model’s performance is that it initially
learns all pairwise conditional associations, including ,Si,
Ci .!Ri and ,Si, Ri.! Ci. At test, the input ,S1, R1.
outputs C1; then S2 is added, and ,S2, C1. outputs R2.
The model operates without explicit representations of rela-
tional roles, such as “cause,” “effect,” or “instrument.” In order
to fit the four-term analogy format, the modelers hand-code the
assignments of roles to predetermined banks in the input and
output layers. But although four-term analogies are indeed stereo-
typed, they are nonetheless richer than conditional paired associ-
ates. Consider a couple of small variations. People who understand
what a knife does could also solve the analogy
sliced-apple : apple :: sliced-bread : ??,
where the role assignments are reversed. We suspect that the
Leech et al. model will be unable to solve this simple variation
without additional training, as it has never previously seen, for
example, “sliced apple” assigned to its input layer. The only
way the model could solve this rearranged analogy is if Leech
et al. hand-code the familiar role assignments for it. But if such
hand-holding is acceptable, it seems the model will be led into
a different, equally embarrassing error. Given the problem
apple : knife :: bread : ??,
people will likely reject it or else complete it with “knife.”
However, if Leech et al. help their model along by placing
“knife” in its familiar bank and clamping the output as usual, it
seems that the model will output “sliced bread” as a fine “analo-
gical completion.” Perhaps Leech et al. can provide simulation
results for these examples in their response.
The model’s role-less, paired-associate-style representations,
inadequate for even the simplest four-term analogies, render it
incapable of solving any problem requiring integration of infor-
mation across multiple roles. Such capabilities, illustrated by
the protocol from Lori, are present in preschool children
(Halford 1993). In a gesture toward extending the model to
adult performance, Leech et al. apply it to “a large, complex
analogy” (sect. 4.2, para. 1): that between World War II and
the first Gulf War (Spellman & Holyoak 1992). The most inter-
esting data reported by Spellman and Holyoak, showing that
people were systematic in mapping leaders and countries in
pairs (either Churchill, Britain! Hussein, Iraq, or else FDR,
US! Hussein, Iraq), can only be explained by a model capable
of relational integration (Hummel & Holyoak 1997). But rather
than modeling how a reasoner could sort out the interrelationships
among two source countries (Britain and the United States)
and their leaders with respect to Hitler’s Germany, Leech et al.
simply eliminate this difficulty – by adopting representations of
World War II that leave the United States out of it.
Relational priming is an important phenomenon. But as Spell-
man et al. (2001) reported in demonstrating it, it requires atten-
tional resources (contrary to Leech et al.’s claim that “relational
priming is a robust psychological phenomenon that does not
require explicit strategic control”; sect. 2.1, para. 4). Neuroimaging
data indicate that evaluating causal (as opposed to merely associat-
ive) relations activates the prefrontal cortex (Satpute et al. 2005),
a brain area that is slow to develop. In fact, we are unaware of
any demonstration of relational priming in children (and Leech
et al. do not mention any). In the absence of evidence that
young children actually exhibit relational priming, it seems prema-
ture to assume that it precedes, rather than follows, development
of relational roles. For a recent model of how relational roles could
be acquired from experience, see Doumas et al. (2008).
Returning to the “space program” analogy: Lacking any sense
of relational roles, the target model won’t get the point of the
analogy. Do you?
Dynamic sets of potentially interchangeable
connotations: A theory of mental objects
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Abstract: Analogy-making is an ability with which we can abstract from
surface similarities and perceive deep, meaningful similarities between
different mental objects and situations. I propose that mental objects
are dynamically changing sets of potentially interchangeable connotations.
Unfortunately, most models of analogy seem devoid of both semantics
and relevance-extraction, postulating analogy as a one-to-one mapping
devoid of connotation transfer.
Leech et al. provide an ambitious framework with which to view
analogy as relational priming. I find the idea full of potential, and
I fully agree with a number of points. Having worked over the last
decade on the question of analogy and abstractions in chess cog-
nition, I share with the authors the following conclusions: (1) that
analogies lie at the core of cognition (Hofstadter 2001); (2) that
analogies let us expand our knowledge; and (3) that, as the
target article proposes, relations can be viewed as transform-
ations. These are certainly true in a chess player’s mind (Linhares
2005; submitted; Linhares & Brum 2007).
There are, however, implicit, unstated, assumptions that
should be seriously faced by any computational model of cogni-
tion, as failure to do so generally leads to simplistic and semanti-
cally vacuous models.
First, there is the representational module assumption. The
model presented by Leech et al. supposedly makes analogies
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between apples, lemons, Hitler, Hussein, wars, and the like. The
representational module assumption presupposes that a separate
representation module would provide these mental objects (e.g.,
entities in short-term memory [STM]) as input to Leech et al.’s
computational model. It is an unfeasible idea for which there is
no space to repeat previous arguments (Chalmers et al. 1992;
French 2000; Hofstadter & the Fluid Analogies Research
Group 1995). Hence, I will consider a related, second assump-
tion: metaphysical realism, a doctrine which posits that objects
(bounded entities), and their properties and relations, are inde-
pendent of observers and, hence, can have one static description
(Linhares 2000; Putnam 1981; Smith 1996).
As anyone who has tried to produce a robot navigating real-
world settings knows, such robots cannot see people, animals,
chairs, or Coke cans, as humans do effortlessly. Robots deal with
wave and signal processing. It takes effort to carve waves into
mental objects: This process involves setting boundaries on
waves (e.g., speech recognition, visual segmentation, etc.), finding
properties of these newly bounded entities, finding relations to
other bounded entities, and classifying these into concepts.
Objects, properties, and relations are context- and observer-
dependent. Consider DNA: DNA is like a staircase. DNA is
like a will. DNA is like a fingerprint. DNA is like a zipper.
DNA is like a computer program. DNA is like a tape. DNA is
like a train track that is pulled apart by the train. DNA is like a
tiny instruction manual for your cells.
How can a molecule acquire the properties and relations of
objects so semantically apart as are train tracks, computer
code, fingerprints, staircases? What are mental objects made
of? I suggest that mental objects are dynamic sets of connota-
tions, and that connotations are potentially interchangeable –
two characteristics which are ignored by most cognitive models
(including Leech et al.’s).
Mental objects, I suggest, are dynamically built. Each concept,
and each instance of a concept, has a set of connotations attached
to it. But this set is not fixed. It changes dynamically because of
contextual pressures. And what are such connotations like? They
are either (i) rules for carving waves (sounds into separate spoken
words, an image into a set of objects, etc.), (ii) relations between
mental objects (a chess queen that pins a king), or (iii) properties
of particular objects (red-ness). Most importantly, these connota-
tions are potentially interchangeable between objects. This is why
DNA as a mental object can acquire so many characteristics that
are found far beyond the realm of chemistry.
Analogies are mechanisms by which a mental object acquires
connotations from different mental objects. This theory stems
from Hofstadter and the Fluid Analogies Research Group
(1995), is close to the model of Fauconnier and Turner
(2002), and is different from a one-to-one mapping.
Leech et al.’s model has promising ideas, but does not account
for this. It assumes that the perfect set of mental objects has been
constructed a priori, independently of the analogy in question.
Hitler had a mustache. Hussein had a mustache. Why doesn’t
their analogy consider this mapping? Answer: because it is irrele-
vant. But who is to say so? Why is this irrelevant, even though it
would map beautifully? War in Iraq is hard because it is hot;
roads have literally melted as American tanks drove by (Pagonis &
Cruikshank 1994). War in Germany is hard because it is cold, and
night fires are enemy-attracting (Ambrose 1998). Who is to decide
that this is not relevant?
By providing perfectly built objects a priori, this work does not
reflect the dynamic nature of mental objects. It succumbs to the
Eliza effect: nothing is known about Hitler besides a token.
Although readers see the full imagery of Adolf Hitler come to
mind, with the enormous set of powerful connotations that
name brings up (Nazism, the Aryan race, the swastika, the propa-
ganda, WWII, Auschwitz, etc.), the model is satisfied with a
single token without any connotations attached. I invite readers
to swap all tokens (apple, Hitler, etc.) with randomly chosen
Greek letters and reread the target article. However interesting
the psychological constraints posed by the authors, and
however rigorous their attempt to remain close to biological
plausibility, the model never makes, in any significant sense of
the word, the analogies humans effortlessly do. The one-to-one
mapping model has no connotation transfer and does not
reflect the dynamic nature of mental objects.
Analogical inferences are central to analogy
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Abstract: It is important to take a developmental approach to the
problem of analogy. One limitation of this approach, however, is that it
does not deal with the complexity of making analogical inferences.
There are a few key principles of analogical inference that are not well
captured by the analogical relational priming (ARP) model.
The developmental psychology literature has necessarily used
simple tasks to study analogical reasoning ability in children.
This research has demonstrated that children can complete
simple A:B::C:D analogies when the relations are simple and
well known (e.g., Gentner & Toupin 1986; Goswami & Brown
1989). An unfortunate side-effect of these studies is that they
focused research primarily on factors that influence children’s
abilities to form correspondences between situations on the
basis of relational similarities.
The ability to form relational correspondences is crucial to
analogical reasoning, but it is only one subcomponent of the
process. Analogies are central to cognitive processing because
they allow people to extend their knowledge of one domain by
virtue of its similarity to another domain (Clement & Gentner
1991; Markman 1997). This extension of knowledge is accom-
plished via analogical inferences.
Analogical inference occurs when people take facts about a base
domain that are connected to the match between the base and
target and posit that those facts are also true of the target
domain. Although analogical inference has not been studied exten-
sively in development, it is clear that children draw analogical infer-
ences frequently. For example, in their seminal studies of children’s
mental models, Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) found that children’s
beliefs about the earth were strongly influenced by simple ana-
logues. For example, some children knew that the Earth is round,
but believed it to be round like a pancake, and so they posited a
flat round Earth with people living on the top. Other children
knew that the Earth was round like a ball, but assumed that the
people lived inside the ball with stars painted on the top. In each
case, children were using elements of a known base domain (e.g.,
pancakes and balls) and transferred knowledge from that base to
the less well-known domain of the solar system.
The relational priming model is too limited to account for ana-
logical inference. Obviously, as the model stands, it has no mech-
anisms for making inferences. More importantly, it is not obvious
how such mechanisms could be added in a way that would
respect what is known about the inferences people make.
It is crucial that analogical inferences are constrained in some
way because this prevents analogies from positing that every fact
that is true about the base is also true of the target. (Thus, while a
child might believe that the Earth is flat like a pancake, that child
is unlikely to think that the Earth would taste good with syrup.) In
their WWII–Gulf War analogy simulation, the authors coded
only the facts that were relevant, and this was critical to the
model’s success. The simulation also appears to have benefited
from some external control structure that always suppressed
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the appropriate layers and interleaved the appropriate control
process at just the right time to ensure that each of the necessary
relations was picked out in turn. How else could it be that the
model never cycled through the same relation twice, or searched
for a nonexistent element and became stuck?
In contrast, structural alignment assumes that inferences involve
facts from the base that are connected to matching higher-order
relations between base and target (Clement & Gentner 1991).
This systematic relational structure and the preference for systema-
ticity thus provide constraints on inferences such that structural
accounts can function even with rich natural concepts and
without any external direction. In addition, the inferences can
easily be incorporated into the representation of the target domain.
The authors of the target article try to head off criticisms of this
variety by suggesting that explicit mappings (and presumably infer-
ences) could be carried out by different processes than the more
implicit processes that find correspondences between domains.
The authors use the example of semantic priming in language to
illustrate their point. If their suggestion turns out to be correct,
then it is those processes that could form the basis for a new
theory of analogy. Therefore, the theory posited by the authors
may help us to understand some of the sub-processes that are
recruited during analogical processing, but it is not actually a
theory of analogical processing itself. Indeed, it is worth noting
that semantic priming is not taken to be a theory of language;
rather, it is understood to be a sub-process that is used in language.
If there were no computational models of analogical reasoning
that encompassed both mapping and inference processes, and if
those models had never been applied to both developmental and
adult data, then it might be reasonable to divide these processes
into separate components and assume that two distinct models
are required to account for them. However, models like the Struc-
ture-Mapping Engine (SME) (Falkenhainer et al. 1989) and Learn-
ing and Inference with Schemas and Analogies (LISA) (Hummel &
Holyoak 1997) are designed to account for both analogical mapping
and inference, and both models are able to make use of higher-
order relations in their domain representations. Furthermore, as
the target article notes, SME has been applied to developmental
tasks (Gentner et al. 1995). Thus, it seems unparsimonious to
assume that analogical reasoning abilities begin with processes
that cannot ultimately perform the variety of tasks that are clearly
part of the repertoire of older children and adults.
Although a developmental approach to analogy has the poten-
tial to offer great value, it must ultimately point the way toward
adult analogical competence in order to actually deliver that
value. That is, to be a successful developmental account, a
theory must begin at a reasonable starting point and demonstrate
the path/process through which the system progresses to reach
the known end state. The ARP theory does not explain full com-
petence, and cannot, in principle, be extended to do so without it
becoming a part of a larger theory.
Neurocognitive process constraints on
analogy: What changes to allow children to
reason like adults?
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Abstract: Analogy employs a neurocognitive working-memory (WM)
system to activate and bind relational representations, integrate
multiple relations, and suppress distracting information. Analogy
experiments exploring these processes have used a variety of methodologies
including dual tasks, neuropsychology, and functional neuroimaging, as
well as experiments with children and older adults. Collectively, these
experiments provide a rich set of results useful in evaluating any model
of analogy and its development.
Analogy involves a structured comparison, or mapping, between
one situation (source) and another (target). For instance, a rea-
soner may be given a problem such as:
bird:nest::bear: ? _
and be asked which word, CAVE or HONEY, completes
the analogy. To choose CAVE, the participant would need to
realize that birds live in nests as bears live in caves while not
being distracted by the fact that bears eat honey. Using
several priming tasks, Spellman et al. (2001) investigated
whether analogy might just be a consequence of the organiz-
ation of concepts in semantic memory. They found that unlike
traditional semantic priming, “analogical” priming was not auto-
matic and instead required the participant to direct attention to
relations between word pairs. This suggested that controlled
retrieval of a bound relation into working memory (WM) may
be a necessary process for analogical reasoning. Subsequent
experiments demonstrated that WM was indeed important for
analogical mapping (e.g., Morrison et al. 2001), as well as rela-
tional binding (see Morrison 2005), a finding confirmed using
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; Bunge et al.
2005).
WM is also important for suppressing distracting information,
such as irrelevant semantic associates or featural similarities
likely to enter WM during analogical retrieval and mapping.
Waltz et al. (2000) demonstrated that adults performing a seman-
tically rich scene-analogy task shifted from preferring analogical
to featural mappings under WM dual-tasks. Using the same task,
Morrison et al. (2004) found that frontal patients with damage to
WM areas showed a similar pattern. Morrison et al. also devel-
oped an A:B::C:D or D0 verbal analogy task that required partici-
pants to choose between D (analogically correct choice) and D0
(foil), which were both semantically related to the C term of
the analogy. When the foil was more semantically associated to
the C term than was the correct choice, frontal patients per-
formed near chance. In contrast, semantic dementia patients
who exhibited profound decrements in relational knowledge
performed poorly on all of the verbal analogies regardless
of the degree of semantic association between C:D and C:D0.
Using the same task, Cho et al. (2007b) found that individuals
who scored higher on the Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM)
showed greater fMRI activation increase in neural areas,
including the prefrontal and visual cortices, on trials in which rea-
soners had to reject foils that were highly associated with the C
term. This finding suggests that there are neural regions whose
level of activation for interference resolution during analogical
reasoning relates to individual differences in fluid intellectual
capacity.
Many real-world analogies, as well as reasoning tasks devel-
oped for psychometric purposes such as the RPM and People
Pieces Analogy task (PPA; Sternberg 1977b), require integration
of multiple relations to map more relationally complex analo-
gies. Numerous fMRI studies (e.g., Christoff et al. 2001;
Kroger et al. 2002) have shown increasing levels of activation
in anterior prefrontal cortex for more relationally complex
RPM problems, a finding consistent with a neuropsychological
study with frontal patients (Waltz et al. 1999). Using an adap-
tation of the PPA task, Viskontas et al. (2004) found that
older adults showed decrements in both relational integration
and relational distraction. Using this same task, Cho et al.
(2007a) found that executive resources are shared between rela-
tional integration and interference resolution during analogical
reasoning. In an fMRI follow-up study, Cho et al. (2007c)
found partially overlapping but distinct regions within inferior
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frontal gyri (IFG) showing sensitivity to each component
process of analogical reasoning. Separate regions that showed
exclusive sensitivity to each component process were also
identified within IFG. In addition, the degree of activation
increase in the right ventral IFG during trials in which partici-
pants had to integrate three relations (compared to one)
was greater for individuals whose performance accuracy was
higher.
Although the above studies do not directly deal with the
development of analogy during childhood, they do clearly
demonstrate several component processes involved in analogical
reasoning that are dependent on prefrontal cortex, an area of the
brain that actively develops throughout childhood (Diamond
2002). In an effort to explore these processes directly in chil-
dren, Richland et al. (2006) developed a scene-analogy task
manipulating both relational complexity and featural distraction.
Even 3-year-olds could solve simple (one-relation, no-distraction)
problems, but they had difficulty if the problem required inte-
gration of multiple relations or ignoring a featurally similar
object. Similarly, Wright et al. (2007) performed an fMRI
study with children using another semantically rich visual
analogy task, and found that brain activation in areas associated
with relational integration was the best predictor of analogy
performance. Wright et al. also found that these areas, which
are not associated with semantic retrieval (Bunge et al. 2005),
become more and more engaged over the same time period
in which children dramatically improve in their ability to solve
more relationally complex problems (Richland et al. 2006).
We are highly sympathetic with the target article’s efforts to
computationally model the development of analogy, and we cer-
tainly don’t dispute the importance of relational knowledge in
development. However, we believe that a successful model of
development must (1) explain how knowledge representation
and process constraints interact to produce the changes in
analogy observed in children, including increases in ability to
perform relational integration and resist featural distraction;
and (2) explain how an architecture consistent with the
demands of adult analogical reasoning develops. Unfortunately,
the connectionist model described in the target article does not
meet these requirements. In contrast, Morrison and collabor-
ators have used LISA (Learning and Inference with Schemas
and Analogies; Hummel & Holyoak 1997; 2003), a neurally plaus-
ible model of analogical reasoning, to successfully simulate many
of the developmental and neuropsychological results discussed in
this commentary (e.g., Morrison et al. 2004; 2006; Viskontas et al.
2004).
We believe that the development of analogical reasoning is
best conceptualized as an equilibrium between children’s rela-
tional knowledge and their current processing ability. As children
mature, their prefrontal cortices more efficiently implement WM
and thereby can process more complex analogies. However,
more efficient relational representations can impose fewer pro-
cessing demands at any given age, which is why a child who
becomes an expert in a given domain can show rapid progress
even though the child’s WM system has not improved (Morrison
et al. 2007). This framework can account for the observed
changes in children’s analogical reasoning, as well as subsequent
changes in analogy during normal and abnormal human aging. It
can also be simulated in symbolic-connectionist models of rela-
tional learning and reasoning (e.g., Doumas et al. 2008;
Hummel & Holyoak 1997; 2003).
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Relational priming plays a supporting but not
leading role in adult analogy-making
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Abstract: Leech et al.’s analysis adds to an emerging consensus of the
role of priming in analogy-making. However, their model cannot scale
up to adult-level performance because not all relations can be cast as
functions. One-size-fits-all accounts cannot capture the richness of
analogy. Proportional analogies and transitive inferences can be made
by nonstructural mechanisms. Therefore, these tasks do not generalize
to tasks that require structure mapping.
Leech et al. argue forcefully that adult-level models of analogy-
making must make contact with the developmental constraint.
This argument cuts both ways: Developmental models must
also make contact with adult-level capability. We argue that
although relational priming does play a role in adult analogical
reasoning, it does not play the leading role that Leech et al.
suggest.
Relational priming. The role of priming in analogical reasoning
is well documented empirically (e.g., Kokinov 1990; Schunn &
Dunbar 1996). It also features prominently in several models,
including Associative Memory-Based Reasoning (AMBR)
(Kokinov 1994; Kokinov & Petrov 2001) and Copycat (French
1995; Hofstadter 1984; Mitchell 1993). All of these models
implement priming as residual activation. The present proposal
thus adds to an emerging consensus of the importance of
priming and of its underlying mechanism.
Not all relations can be cast as functions. Leech et al. claim
that “for the purposes of analogy it may be sufficient to concep-
tualize relations as transformations between items” (sect. 2.2,
para. 2). The main idea is to cast each binary relation R(a,b) as
an equivalent univariate function1 b ¼ FR(a). The model uses
hand-coded representations, rep, such that rep(FR(a)) ¼ rep(a)þ
FR(a)) ¼ rep(a)þ rep(R). The authors argue this is beneficial
because “relations do not have to be represented explicitly, avoid-
ing the difficulties of learning explicit structured representations”
(sect. 5.1.1, para. 1). However, this benefit comes at the cost of
rendering the model incapable of scaling up to adult-level
performance.
The problem is that a relation can be cast as a function only if it
is deterministic: that is, if for each a there is precisely one b that
satisfies R(a,b) (Halford et al. 1998). Many important relations
violate this condition. Consider the transitive inference task: tal-
ler(Ann,Beth), taller(Beth,Chris)! taller(Ann,Chris). Now, if
the relation taller(a,b) is cast as a function b ¼ shrink(a), the
query shrink(Ann) ¼ ? becomes ambiguous. There are tech-
niques for supporting nondeterministic functions in connection-
ist networks (e.g., Hinton & Sejnowski 1986) that can be
incorporated into the model. However, the priming account
faces a deeper challenge: Why should Chris be produced as
the answer to the above query after the system has been
primed with Beth ¼ shrink(Ann)?
Many relationships in the world are indeed near-deterministic
transformations such as bread! cut bread. It is an important
developmental constraint that young children find such regular,
familiar relations easier to deal with (e.g., Goswami & Brown
1989). These strong environmental regularities shape coarse-
coded distributed representations that can support generaliz-
ation and inference (Cer & O’Reilly 2006; Hinton 1990; Rogers
& McClelland 2004; St. John & McClelland 1990). The target
article demonstrates the utility of relational priming in these
cases. However, there are also relationships such as left of that
are quite accidental and changeable. To process them, the
brain relies on sparse conjunctive representations (McClelland
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et al. 1995) that do not support priming well. Finally, adult-level
analogies involve higher-order relations and nested propositions
(Gentner 1983). Their brain realization is an active research topic
(e.g., Smolensky & Legendre 2006). One promising approach
relies on dynamic gating in the basal ganglia and prefrontal
cortex (O’Reilly 2006; Rougier et al. 2005). Priming does play a
role in these gated networks, but the critical functionality rests
on other mechanisms.
The role of mapping. Proportional analogies are often pre-
sented in a multiple-choice format (e.g., Goswami & Brown
1989; 1990). An important limitation of the priming model is
that its activation dynamics is not influenced by the available
responses. The network simply produces an output pattern and
stops. Then some unspecified control mechanism compares
this pattern to the response representations. The limitations of
this approach can be demonstrated by analogies with identical
premises but different response sets, as illustrated in Figure 1.
As Leech et al. argue in Figure 11 of the target article, the
model should select response R2 when the choices are R1 and
R2. Arguably, it should select response R3 when the choices
are R1 and R3. To do this, the model must produce a pattern
that is less similar to rep(R1) than it is to both rep(R2) and
rep(R3). This seems to contradict the reasonable assumption
that rep(R1) lies between rep(R2) and rep(R3) because of the
intermediate size of R1.
Examples such as this highlight the role of mapping in analogy-
making. The most important contribution of the target article, in
our opinion, is to lay bare that a model (or a child or an ape)
lacking any mapping capabilities can still perform proportional
analogies quite well. The bold claim that “explicit mapping is
no longer necessary for analogy to occur, but instead describes
a subset of analogies” (sect. 5.4, para. 6) is a terminological
matter. The take-home lesson for us is that proportional analogies
can be solved by nonstructural means and thus cannot represent
the class of analogies for which mapping is necessary.
The “psychologist’s fallacy.” This alerts us to a variant of the
psychologist’s fallacy wherein experimenters confuse their own
understanding of a phenomenon with that of the subject (Oden
et al. 2001). Proportional analogies can be solved by structure
mapping; they are also solved at above-chance levels by many
4-year-olds. Still, it does not follow that “the ability to reason
by analogy is present by at least age four” (Goswami 2001,
p. 443), not if this ability is understood to imply structure
mapping.
The transitive inference task is another case in point. It has
been argued that this task is more complex than proportional
analogies (Halford et al. 1998; Maybery et al. 1986). And yet
even pigeons and rats can make transitive inferences (Davis
1992; Van Elzakker et al. 2003; von Fersen et al. 1991). Does
that mean that the ability to reason by analogy is present in
pigeons and rats? No, it means that transitive inferences can be
made by nonstructural mechanisms (Frank et al. 2003). Human
adults can make such inferences by verbal and nonverbal strat-
egies that can be dissociated (Frank et al. 2005; 2006).
Conclusion. The field can no longer treat analogy-making as a
uniform skill. We need to identify the computational demands of
analogies of different kinds, explicate the various strategies
available for solving them, and design appropriate controls to dis-
criminate among the strategies. Only then would developmental
comparisons be meaningful. Relational priming is indeed a point
of developmental continuity. However, it hardly constitutes a
foundation strong enough for the formidable weight of adult ana-
logical reasoning. After all, “it is probably safe to say that any
program capable of doing analogy-making in a manner truly com-
parable to human beings would stand a very good chance of
passing the Turing Test” (French 2002, p. 204).
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Abstract analogies not primed by relations
learned as object transformations
doi:10.1017/S0140525X08004639
Steven Phillips
Neuroscience Research Institute, National Institute of Advanced Industrial
Science and Technology (AIST), Tsukuba, 305-8568, Japan.
steve@ni.aist.go.jp
http://staff.aist.go.jp/steven.phillips
Abstract: Analogy by priming learned transformations of (causally)
related objects fails to explain an important class of inference involving
abstract source-target relations. This class of analogical inference
extends to ad hoc relationships, precluding the possibility of having
learned them as object transformations. Rather, objects may be placed
into momentarily corresponding, symbolic, source-target relationships
just to complete an analogy.
A glaring concern with Leech et al.’s “relations as transform-
ations” account of analogy is the amount of training needed to
attain a capacity for analogical inference. Adults reach a stage
in development where analogical inference extends to ad hoc
relationships outside the sphere of prior experience. Modeling
this capacity is a problem for common feed-forward and simple
recurrent networks, which rely on stimulus-driven response-
error correction (Phillips 1999; 2000); and for similar reasons,
this level of development is unreachable with the sort of connec-
tionist model proposed in the target article. The analogizer
cannot prepare in advance all possible transformations that
could be primed. Moreover, any degree of generalization
afforded to the model via similarity-based transformation is
thwarted by analogies demanding transformations inconsistent
with previous tasks.
Learning set transfer (Kendler 1995) or relational schema
induction (Halford et al. 1998) involves testing participants on
a series of stimulus-response tasks having a common structure
(e.g., transverse patterning), where each task instance consists
Figure 1 (Petrov). Demonstration of the importance of the
available responses in a proportional analogy. Different response
sets (R1–R2 vs. R1–R3) produce different analogies when paired
with the same premises (A:B::C:?). Compare with Figure 11 in
the target article.
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of a set of stimuli in novel relationships. Suppose, for example, in
one task instance (T1) square predicts circle, circle predicts tri-
angle, and triangle predicts square; in the next task instance
(T2) cross predicts star, star predicts bar, and bar predicts
cross; and so on. The transverse patterning structure and the
fact cross predicts star (information trial) are sufficient to cor-
rectly predict the responses to star and bar in the other two
trials. Even on more complex structures involving more objects
and more information trials, adults reach the point of correctly
predicting the responses on the remaining trials (Halford et al.
1998).
The target authors’ model fails to account for this sort of
abstract analogy because the system can only utilize relations
between objects that have already been learned as transform-
ation functions on the basis of prior experience. Analysis of
internal representations by the authors revealed that the devel-
oped network groups objects in hidden unit activation space by
the relations that transform them. The input/hidden-to-output
connections effectively implement a mapping whose domain is
partitioned into subdomains, one for each causal relation (e.g.,
cut, bruised, etc.). The input-to-hidden connections implement
a mapping from object pairs to points located within the subdo-
main corresponding to the relationship between the two objects,
effectively providing an index to the objects’ relation. For
example, apple and cut apple are mapped to a point in hidden
unit space contained in the subdomain for the cut transformation
function. This point provides the context for mapping the next
object, say, banana to cut banana (assuming that this transform-
ation was also learned) to complete the analogy. The same
sequence of steps may also be applied to transverse patterning,
assuming that the network has learned all the required mappings:
For example, cross and star would map to a point in the subdo-
main corresponding to the task relation T2; and star in the
context of T2 would map to bar. Unlike adults, however, the
network must be trained on all possible transformations to
make this inference.
Notice that the problem with Leech et al.’s model is not
about a complete failure to generalize. Suitably configured,
some degree of generalization may be achievable using a
learned internal similarity space of object representations. All
fruit, for example, could be represented along a common
dimension, and the various causal relations could be orthogonal
projections that systematically translate the representations of
fruit to cut fruit, or bruised fruit, and so on. Learning to com-
plete analogies for some instances of fruit and cut fruit may
generalize to the other instances, assuming the number of par-
ameters (weights) implementing the mappings is sufficiently
small compared to the number of fruit examples. But the
elements of a transverse patterning task may not be systemati-
cally related in any way other than via the transverse patterning
structure; they need not belong to the same category of objects,
and they may even contradict mappings learned from a pre-
vious task instance (e.g., cross may predict bar in a new instance
of the task). Thus, there is no basis on which the needed simi-
larity could have developed. The problem is that the capacity
for abstract analogical inference transcends specific object
relationships.
Despite this pessimistic assessment, perhaps an explanation
for analogy could be based on transformations augmented with
processes that represent and manipulate symbols. Assuming a
capacity to bind/unbind representations of objects to represen-
tations of symbols, abstract analogies such as transverse pattern-
ing may be realized as the transformation of symbols (e.g., symbol
a maps to b, b maps to c, and c maps to a), instead of specific
object representations. However, hybrid theories are to be
judged at a higher explanatory standard (Aizawa 2002). Not
only are they required to explain each component (e.g., an
object transformation account for concrete analogies and a sym-
bolization account for abstract analogies), but they also need to
explain why the components are split that way.
Indeed, Aizawa’s detailed analysis of the systematicity
problem (Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988) and its proposed “solutions”
(for a review, see Phillips 2007) signpost a general developmen-
tal theory of analogy. To paraphrase, the problem is not to show
how analogy is possible under particular assumptions, but to
show how analogy is a necessary consequence of those assump-
tions. The capacity for analogy, like the property of systematicity,
is a ubiquitous product of normal cognitive development. If a
developmental connectionist explanation depends on a particu-
lar network configuration, then why does it get configured that
way? And if the answer is an appeal to error minimization,
then what preserves this configuration in the face of optimization
over numerous stimulus relations that may have nothing to do
with analogy? Answers to these sorts of questions without
relying on what Aizawa distinguishes as ad hoc assumptions
would help to shift Leech et al.’s account from one that is
simply compatible with the data to one that actually explains it.
Leech et al.’s developmental approach may yield valuable
insights into the early acquisition of a capacity for concrete ana-
logical inference. But to expect that it will lead directly to higher
cognition seems more like wishful thinking.
Relation priming, the lexical boost, and
alignment in dialogue
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Abstract: The authors’ claim that analogical reasoning is the product of
relational priming is compatible with language processing work that
emphasizes the role of low-level automatic processes in the alignment
of situation models in dialogue. However, their model ignores recent
behavioral evidence demonstrating a “lexical boost” effect on relational
priming. We discuss implications of these data.
Leech et al. present a connectionist model of analogical reason-
ing based on relation priming, rather than on explicit structure-
mapping processes. Their core idea is that priming is itself a
mechanism for producing analogy, and from it ultimately emerges
the relation that is critical for establishing the similarity between a
pair of terms in one domain and a pair of terms in a second
domain. This claim is compatible with recent work in language
processing that emphasizes the role of “low-level” priming in the
development of semantic representations. This is most apparent
in work on dialogue, in which interlocutors prime each other to
produce equivalent situation models that form the basis of
mutual understanding (Pickering & Garrod 2004). For example,
interlocutors tend to repeat each other’s choice of reference
frames or ways of interpreting complex arrays (Garrod & Anderson
1987; Schober 1993). Clearly, alignment of analogical structures
constitutes an important part of such situation models.
Critically, Pickering and Garrod’s (2004) framework suggests
that alignment takes place at many linguistic levels, and that rep-
etition at low levels such as words enhances alignment at higher
levels, such as the situation model. It follows that lexical rep-
etition should enhance relational priming, and therefore analogi-
cal reasoning. Raffray et al. (2007) directly addressed the issue of
the effects of lexical repetition (of the head or modifier) on
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relation priming of noun-noun combinations such as dog scarf.
Three expression-picture matching experiments investigated
whether relation priming occurred in the context of head rep-
etition, modifier repetition, or both, and allowed direct compari-
son of the effects of head and modifier repetition. Results showed
that participants were more likely to interpret dog scarf as a scarf
decorated with a picture of a dog (i.e., dog DESCRIBES scarf)
than as a scarf worn by a dog (i.e., dog POSSESSES scarf)
after interpreting another expression involving the description
relation rather than the possession relation; but the priming
was greater when one term was repeated (e.g., dog T-shirt or
rabbit scarf) than if neither was repeated (e.g., rabbit T-shirt).
In sum, while conceptual relations were independently primed,
the level of activation that a given relation received was enhanced
where there was repetition of lexical items between prime and
target.
We propose that such “lexical boost” effects, similar to those
found in syntactic priming studies (Pickering & Branigan 1998),
mean that priming of analogical relations should be enhanced by
any repetition of terms. In Goswami and Brown (1989), the partici-
pant infers that lemon is to cut lemon as bread is to cut bread.
Importantly, the concept of a lexical boost within analogical
reasoning only makes sense in the context of two- (or more)
place relations. That is, to get a lexical boost we would need to con-
sider analogies such as boy & ball is to boy kicks ball as man &
stone is to man kicks stone. In this case, the lexical boost predicts
that participants should find it easier to resolve analogies contain-
ing repeated terms, such as boy & ball is to boy kicks ball as man &
ball is to man kicks ball, or similarly boy & ball is to boy kicks ball
as boy & stone is to boy kicks stone. For more complex analogies,
the prediction is that any repetition of concepts will enhance
analogy. To take the authors’ example, it should be easier to
draw the analogy from World War II to World War I than to the
Gulf War, because more of the objects (e.g., Germany) are
repeated (see Table 3 of the target article, sect. 4.1.2). Whereas
the analogy between Churchill orders_attack_of Germany and
Bush orders_attack_of Iraq involves different Object 1s and
Object 2s, the analogy between Churchill orders_attack_of
Germany and Lloyd George orders_attack_of Germany involves
different Object 1s but the same Object 2. If such analogy works
like the priming effects we have discussed, then lexical repetition
should facilitate analogical reasoning.
There is also evidence for a semantic boost to syntactic priming
(Cleland & Pickering 2003), so that priming is stronger when
terms are semantically related than when they are not. For
example, participants are more likely to describe a red sheep as
The sheep that is red after hearing The goat that is red than
after hearing The door that is red. It might similarly be the case
that priming of analogical relations is enhanced by the inclusion
of semantically related terms. That is, boy & stone is to boy
kicks stone as man & pebble is to man kicks pebble might be
easier to process than an analogy that contains semantically unre-
lated terms, such as boy & stone is to boy kicks stone as man & ball
is to man kicks ball. Such effects should affect both the speed and
the likelihood of obtaining a particular analogy.
Pickering and Garrod’s (2004) model of dialogue assumes that
processes by which interlocutors align their models of the situ-
ation are largely the result of automatic priming. In particular,
repetition at one level of representation enhances repetition at
other levels. For example, Branigan et al. (2000) showed that
interlocutors are more likely to repeat each other’s grammatical
choices if they also repeat each other’s choice of verbs. More gen-
erally, we assume that if two people start to use the same words,
they start to take on board the same conceptualizations. One of
the functions of analogical reasoning is to assist in the process
by which interlocutors end up with equivalent situation models,
and therefore we predict that lexical and other repetition will
enhance this process. Therefore analogical reasoning can be
seen as part of the mechanism of alignment and will be affected
by the processes affecting priming.
Child versus adult analogy: The role of
systematicity and abstraction in analogy
models
doi:10.1017/S0140525X08004652
Angela Schwering and Kai-Uwe Ku¨hnberger
Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Osnabru¨ck, D-49076 Osnabru¨ck,
Germany.
aschweri@uni-osnabrueck.de
http://www.cogsci.uni-osnabrueck.de/~aschweri/
kkuehnbe@uni-osnabrueck.de
http://www.cogsci.uni-osnabrueck.de/~kkuehnbe/
Abstract: The target article develops a computational connectionist
model for analogy-making from a developmental perspective and
evaluates this model using simple analogies. Our commentary critically
reviews the advantages and limits of this approach, in particular with
respect to its expressive power, its capability to generalize across
analogous structure and analyze systematicity in analogies.
Leech et al. present a computational (connectionist) approach to
explain analogy-making from a developmental perspective. At the
outset we would like to emphasize that this is a very compelling
and advanced approach: Tackling the problem from a develop-
mental point of view enables the authors to highlight completely
new aspects of analogy-making. This approach reflects the infan-
tile learning process, from comparisons based mainly on superficial
similarity to a controlled and advanced strategy of analogical com-
parison based on structural systematicity. So far, analogy models
have always been inspired by adult analogical reasoning. Empha-
sizing the learning process, it makes sense to approach this
problem from an infantile developmental perspective: Leech
et al.’s model is based on a neural network implementing a
Hebbian learning algorithm which is able to enhance bit by bit
the strategy for analogy-making and explicitly model the develop-
ment from superficial similarity to structural similarity. More pre-
cisely, the network can learn causal relations using a transformation
of an object (e.g., “apple”) by a causal agent (e.g., “knife”) to
achieve a representation of a transformed object (e.g., “cut
apple”). The network extends this ability step by step to different
domains and cross-mapping analogies; it can model the relational
shift from surface similarity to relational similarity; and finally, it
is trained on analogies involving multiple objects and multiple
relations. There exists no other comparable analogy model model-
ing strategic learning – current analogy models can only model
analogical learning by analogical transfer.
Another interesting capability is the creative potential of the
analogy model: A trained network can creatively construct com-
pletely new objects when a relation is applied to a new (target)
object. However, this capability must also be seen critically:
Any relation can be applied to any (suitable or unsuitable) object
and always leads to some result, which might be completely mean-
ingless and absurd.
Inspired by research on infantile development, the authors
investigate mainly analogies used in previously conducted analogy
experiments with children. These are typically proportional
analogies, that is, a-is-to-b-as-c-is-to-what analogies. All of these
analogies are based only on a single, common relation, which is
the same in source and target. We argue that such analogies are
oversimplified – the task in these examples is applying the same
relation to a new target object rather than making an analogous
transfer. The target object is in fact very similar to the source
object with respect to the applicability and the outcome of the
relation. The “analogical” mapping required to solve the analogy
is very small. We do not deny that such oversimplified analogies
are necessary to investigate the initial analogical abilities of very
young children; however, an analogy model (if it is not limited to
modeling the analogy-making capability of 1-to-5-year-old
infants, who anyway have only a very limited ability of analogy-
making) must foremost have the capability to solve analogies with
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a minimum analogous structure. Therefore, the authors extend
their investigation to so-called adult analogies. But in fact, their
“adult analogy” differs from the “child analogy” only in that it com-
prises not just one single identical relation, but a set of single iden-
tical relations. The crucial characteristic of an analogy is, however,
the common structure, that is, the analogous relations which are
part of a common higher-order structural system. The analogy
research community agrees on the fact that “systematicity” is the
decisive point that is crucial for an analogy. Interesting analogies
usually contain mappings that are only partially consistent. The
sets of common relations considered by the authors are only con-
nected via having the same source or target domain (see Fig. 16
in sect. 4.2 of the target article) and therefore have a flat and not
a higher-order hierarchic structure. Principally it would be possible
to extend the proposed approach to cover higher-order structures
as well, by allowing the input of the neural network to represent
composed structures – for example, as in the Structure-Mapping
Engine (SME), where not only the object sun, but also composed
structures such as the mass of the sun mass(sun) and the greater
than relation between the masses of sun and planet mass(sun) .
mass(planet) can each be represented by a single node. But still,
this extended approach would only allow for composing relations
with objects, not for decomposing them again.
We also see a problem in the expressive power, which arises in
almost all analogy models: Except for logic-based analogy models
(such as heuristic-driven theory projection [HDTP]; Gust et al.
2006), no analogy model is able to express complex rules (often
requiring quantified variables and logic operations). Many analo-
gies in the physical and mathematical domains require this expres-
sivity to be correctly modeled (for examples, see Gust et al. 2007).
A further aspect that should be mentioned is a restriction
imposed on the involved relations: all simple analogies discussed
in the target article map only on the same relations. If semantically
similar relations (e.g., “Iraq occupied Kuwait,” but “Germany
annexed Austria”) are represented closely in the neural network,
we can assume that semantically similar relations can also be
mapped on each other (which is an advantage of the neural
network approach to symbolic approaches). However neural
network approaches cannot map two analogous, but semantically
different, relations on each other. In the case of the Rutherford
analogy, the gravitational force in the solar system and the
Coulomb force in the atom are analogous, but they cannot be
mapped on each other. At a more general level, both relations
could be described as two attracting forces. Many analogy models
avoid this mapping problem by representing relations already at
the required level of abstraction. However, the generalization of
gravitation and Coulomb force to attracting force is part – actually
it is the result!! – of the analogical reasoning and therefore must not
be skipped. Like most other analogy models, the approach dis-
cussed here does not support this level of abstraction.
Most of our criticism does not refer specifically to the analogy
model by Leech et al., but rather is directed at general shortcom-
ings of most (subsymbolic) approaches. However, subsymbolic
approaches have certain advantages in handling vagueness and
uncertainty and in modeling learning. To bring together the
strengths and overcome the shortcomings we see a lot of potential
in connecting both approaches via neuro-symbolic integration.
Analogy is to priming as relations are to
transformations
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Abstract: The commentary discusses three components of the target
proposal: (1) analogy as a host of phenomena, (2) relations as
transformations, and (3) analogy as priming. The commentary argues
that the first component is potentially productive, but it has yet to be
fully developed, whereas the second and third components do not have
an obvious way of accounting for multiple counterexamples.
Understanding the mechanism underlying analogy is a notor-
iously difficult problem. As argued by French (2002, p. 204):
“The lessons of almost 40 years of research in the computational
modeling of analogy-making have, more than anything else,
shown us just how hard the problem is.” Analogy involves using
one situation for understanding another situation, and often the
only commonality across the two situations is a common relation
among the constituent elements. Given that the base and the
target relation (or relations) is the only commonality, most
approaches have posited that analogy requires explicit represen-
tation of relations. However, several findings could be potentially
problematic for this idea. Most importantly, there is evidence
that organisms whose ability to represent relations explicitly is
unclear (such as nonhuman primates and very young children),
can perform analogy (Chen et al. 1997; Thompson et al. 1997;
see also Goswami 2001, for a review). The target article attempts
to attack the problem head-on: that is, by considering alternatives
to the idea that analogy requires explicit representation of
relations. This is a laudable attempt – providing a low-level
explanation of a process that has been traditionally explained
by invoking higher-level processes would be an important
contribution.
The target article’s proposal has three components: (a) analogy
could be a host of phenomena, rather than a unitary phenomenon;
(b) relations are construed as transformations between states
rather than as explicit symbols; and (c) analogy is the priming of
a target relation by a base relation. In this commentary, I focus
on each of these components. While I am very sympathetic with
the search for alternatives to explicit representation of relations,
I am not convinced that the proposed account solves the problem.
The construal of analogy as a set of disparate phenomena is a
potentially interesting idea, which attempts to simplify the
problem by suggesting a “divide and conquer” approach to
analogy. In particular, if analogies performed by nonhuman pri-
mates, human infants, and adults are in fact different phenomena,
then there is no need to develop a unified account of analogy, or to
explain how “analogy as priming” gives rise to more complex forms
of analogical reasoning. However, a potential downside of this
approach is that in the absence of a clear taxonomy of these puta-
tively disparate phenomena (what these phenomena are, how they
are interrelated, and how they differ), it is not clear what the
theory of analogy purports to explain. In my view, it remains to
be seen whether the idea is truly productive, or whether it
offers more “divide” than “conquer” in the study of analogy.
The idea of relation-as-transformation, although promising,
seems to cover only a small set of situations, such as some of
the tasks described by Goswami and Brown (1989). At the
same time, even early in development, there are multiple situ-
ations where the relation-as-transformation construal is less
obvious. These examples include the “animal-habitat” relation,
such as “bird to nest as dog to doghouse” (Goswami & Brown
1990); the class inclusion relation (Goswami & Pauen 2005);
spatial relations, such as “in the middle” (Lowenstein &
Gentner 2005); quantitative relations, such as “monotonic
increase” (Kotovsky & Gentner 1996); and identity relations
(Thompson et al. 1997). The fact that young children (and even
nonhuman primates) successfully perform analogies based on
relations that are difficult to construe as transformations suggests
that the construal of relations-as-transformations is at least
unnecessary to account for the early analogy. In addition, even
if some relations could be construed as transformations, surpris-
ingly little is said by Leech et al. about how relations-as-trans-
formations could be learned. At the same time, learning of
relations is a nontrivial problem: It has been argued that different
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instances of the same relation lack statistical density, and, as a
result, it is difficult to learn the categories implicitly, without
some sort of supervision (Kloos & Sloutsky 2008).
The third major component of the proposed account is relational
priming. Whereas priming is a relatively basic phenomenon,
relations that are putatively primed are not. Therefore, it is critically
important to understand how relations are represented. Leech et al.
suggest that a key to representations of relations (which are con-
strued as transformations) is the causal agent that is responsible
for the transformation. For example, the relation “cutting” could
be accessed by “knife” as a putative causal agent. However,
whereas this idea is relatively clear for “cutting” it is less clear for
“melting,” which depends on an invisible causal agent (i.e., heat),
or for “breaking,” which could be implemented by multiple causal
agents. If a causal agent is critical for construing relations as trans-
formations, then analogies with more obvious causal agents (e.g.,
“knife”) should be substantially easier than analogies with invisible
causal agents (e.g., “heat”), or those with multiple causal agents
(e.g., “breaking”). However, there is little evidence in the literature
supporting such differential difficulty (cf. Goswami & Brown 1989).
It is also unclear where constraints on priming come from.
Objects can enter in multiple relations, each of which could be
primed. In addition, a set of entities semantically associated
with these objects could be primed as well. Consider the follow-
ing problem: Falcon is to Pigeon as Human is to what (Canary,
Chimp, or Chicken)? In addition to Canary (which could be
primed by both falcon and pigeon), the Falcon-Pigeon pair can
also prime several relations: (1) Larger (in which case Canary
or Chicken could be selected); (2) Similar Animal (in which
case Chimp could be selected); or (3) Predate (in which case
Chicken could be selected). Given that priming does not lead
to an unambiguous response, response selection becomes a non-
trivial problem; however, the proposed account does not offer an
obvious way of addressing this problem.
There are also important developmental questions associated
with the proposed account. How do children learn that trans-
formations are important? How do they encode, store, and
retrieve relations-as-transformations in the absence of an
obvious causal agent? Do relations-as-transformation undergo
developmental change, or do they remain the same throughout
development? And most importantly, how do people acquire
the ability to perform analogy when relations cannot be con-
strued as transformations? Overall, while the target article
makes a promising proposal, it also provides further evidence
of “how hard the problem of analogy is.”
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Abstract: The target article by Leech et al. presents a compelling
computational theory of analogy-making. However, there is a key
difficulty that persists in theoretical treatments of analogy-making,
computational and otherwise: namely, the lack of a detailed account of
the neurophysiological mechanisms that give rise to analogy behavior.
My commentary explores this issue.
The target article by Leech et al. and the hypothesis about the
nature of analogy on which it is based, are quite compelling
and different from the majority of analogy literature. However,
the authors repeat a key difficulty present in other computational
modeling efforts. This commentary focuses, first, on the persua-
sive aspects of the article and model; then, on the difficulties
associated with the computational model; and finally, presents
a high-level summary of the things that I believe need to be
addressed to demonstrate a computational hypothesis that is
both psychologically and physiologically plausible regarding
how analogy emerges from the brain.
Generally, Leech et al.’s article and model are compelling for a
couple of reasons. First is the hypothesis that relational priming is
at the core of analogy and the parsimonious theoretical impli-
cations for that hypothesis. This theoretical construct easily
accounts for adult novice-expert differences (Novick 1988); inter-
domain transfer difficulty (e.g., variations on the convergence
problem); the ubiquity and effortlessness of analogical transfer
in everyday life (Hofstadter 2001; Holyoak & Thagard 1995);
and the variety of developmental phenomena cited in the
target article. Correspondence with the knowledge accretion
hypothesis also provides a convincing reason explaining why ana-
logies are so difficult to elicit in the laboratory despite the general
agreement that analogy underlies much of human cognition.
Second is the fact that the authors’ computational model uses
distributed representations. The debate between those who
argue that cognition requires discrete symbolic representation
and those who argue that physiology dictates distributed rep-
resentations is an important one in the cognitive literature (Die-
trich & Markman 2003; Spivy 2007), and there is really only one
other model that proposes a computational implementation of
analogy using distributed representations (Eliasmith & Thagard
2001; see Spivy 2007).
I agree with the authors’ assertion that analogy is an emergent
phenomenon. However, I would assert that it is not, at the most
fundamental level, an emergent property of more basic psycho-
logical processes (e.g., relational priming), but is rather an emer-
gent property of basic physiological processes. The authors
repeatedly identify that prior models of analogy do not provide
mechanisms for analogy from a developmental perspective. I
also agree with this assertion, but I believe that the developmen-
tal perspective must take into account the thing that is really
developing: the brain.
Specifically, the authors’ implementation of their hypothesis,
especially when applied to the Saddam–Hitler analogy, repli-
cates a key deficiency in other models of analogy. This omission
is the lack of an in-depth account of how human neurophysiology
produces analogy (despite LISA’s [i.e., the Learning and Infer-
ence with Schemas and Analogies model’s] use of node oscil-
lations to create bindings; Hummel & Holyoak 2003). Such
an account must provide several details:
1. What is the nature of information representation? How are
those representations physically manifested in the brain? As the
authors observe, “how object attributes and relations are rep-
resented is important for modeling analogy because it constrains
what else can take place” (sect. 2.2, para. 1). Although I agree
with the spirit of this statement, I would argue that the knowl-
edge representation must be firmly grounded in neurophysiologi-
cal processes – that to ignore neurophysiological mechanisms as
we currently understand them is to ignore important constraints
on the resulting cognitive behavior.
2. How do those representations come to exist? How does the
physical brain transform energetic information (e.g., photons,
sound waves) into the hypothesized representation format?
Using distributed representations, as in the target article, par-
tially addresses the first issue, but it is still unclear how these dis-
tributed representations might come to exist. Nor is it clear what
these representations are analogous to in the brain. This issue is
not taken into detailed account in any existing computational
model of analogy or higher-order cognition, as far as I am
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aware. Divorcing higher-order cognition from low-level sensory
processes ignores the fact that the brain is connected to physical
sensors and that higher-order cognitive processes necessarily use
the output of those physical sensors.
3. Once these grounded representations exist, how do they give
rise to, or contribute to the “calculation” of analogy (and other
higher-order cognitive processes)? An extension of the first two
points, this issue has been partially addressed from a theoretical
perspective (e.g., Mesulam 1998; cf. the literature on prefrontal
cortex function) but has yet to be fully addressed computation-
ally. However, there exists a significant body of literature that
is coming closer to making this link (e.g., Barabas 2000; Elston
2003; Mogami & Tanaka 2006; Rougier et al. 2005; Tanaka
1992). One implication for analogy is that existing computational
models are totally unable to identify structural characteristics of
problems on their own – a key feature in analogy-making, and
the thing that differentiates experts from novices and positive
from negative transfer (Gentner & Markman 1997; Novick
1988; Ross 1987; Ross & Kennedy 1990). Even though the first
model in the target article takes steps in this direction, it
remains unclear whether the mechanisms by which it accom-
plishes analogy are those used by humans.
As computational models of cognitive processes are hypoth-
eses about the underlying mechanisms giving rise to cognitive
behaviors, it seems necessary to account for known neurophysio-
logical processes. Of course, this approach will radically increase
the complexity of the resulting models, but dynamical systems
theorists would argue that the typical reductionist approach,
which yields crisp, transparent, simple-to-analyze models, likely
does not produce theories that accurately reflect human cogni-
tive mechanisms.
And this point is the core of the issue that my colleagues and
I believe modelers need to begin addressing – how does the brain,
as a physical system, take raw sensory information and perform
higher-order cognition using that information (e.g., solving Raven’s
Progressive Matrices)? And, how much of this physiological
detail do we as a modeling community need to include in our
models in order to accurately emulate what the brain/mind is
really doing?
As Stephen Grossberg has said, theories of consciousness
posited in the absence of links to neurophysiology can only
ever be metaphors (Grossberg 1999). How long before our com-
putational models of analogy become more than just metaphor?
NOTE
1. The author of this commentary is employed by a government
agency and as such this commentary is considered a work of the U.S.
government and not subject to copyright within the United States.
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Abstract: If connectionist computational models explain the acquisition
of complex cognitive skills, errors in such models would also help
explain unusual brain activity such as in creativity – as well as in
mental illness, including childhood onset problems with social
behaviors in autism, the inability to maintain focus in attention deficit
and hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and the lack of motivation of
depression disorders.
Malfunction of artificial neural networks, such as those that
include analogy priming, might cause those networks to make
mistakes about the nature of reality and display analogous beha-
viour to human brains and minds which are not normal. This may
be especially relevant to understanding creativity, as well as the
development of childhood onset neuropsychiatric illnesses. The
following are three such types of defect in computational
models of reasoning – well known in the artificial intelligence
field – which can arise in analogy priming. (For general refer-
ences, see Rumelhart & McClelland [1986], Haykin [1998],
Rojas and Feldman [1996], and Muller et al. [1995].)
Example 1. In the first example (Fraser 1998), a network was
trained on pictures of a landscape with and without a tank
present. In those with the tank, it was placed in all sorts of differ-
ent locations, obscured to various degrees, shot from different
angles. The landscapes without the tank were similarly photo-
graphed from various angles, and some pictures from each set
were used to train the network, the data being provided to indi-
cate whether or not the tank was present. The goal was to see if
the network could “learn” the task of telling whether or not a tank
was present in a picture it had not seen – a very simple form of
analogical reasoning based on previous pictures but without the
need to explicitly isolate the tank as an object in the scene,
which hopefully would lead to the ability to recognize arbitrary
objects in arbitrary scenes. The pictures not used in training
were used as tests – and the results were spectacular, with essen-
tially 100% correct discrimination between pictures with and
without tanks present. How the network had done this was
stored in all the weights of connections between nodes, and the
general feeling was that whatever was going on, it would likely
not be understandable by a human being. However, on examin-
ation, it turned out that what the network had done was effec-
tively to sum up the brightness of each pixel in the photograph.
The pictures with the tank had been taken on a different day
than the pictures without, and the network had discovered a sig-
nificant difference between the two sets of pictures – one set had
been taken on a cloudier, and therefore darker, day than the
other. The network had learned to classify the pictures by
analogy, but had used the total brightness of the scene rather
than the presence or absence of the tank.
This “error” might be seen as a basis for unexpected creativity
in neural networks, in which new perspectives result from drop-
ping prejudices. For example, in the above example, the input
consisted of the raw data. If instead the network had received
the input as a list of possible tank-like features (perhaps extracted
on the basis of some more logic-based algorithm such as match-
ing features in the scene to features on photographs of tanks), it
might have counted up the number of tank-like features and their
quality and made a different discrimination. Dropping the pre-
classification of features in the scene, in a sense, opened up the
“creative realization” that the two scenes were of different bright-
ness – something that typical humans might well (and indeed in
this case did!) miss. Additionally, it also shows how selective
prejudices can sharpen cognition by making some features
stand out.
On the other hand, this alternate solution to the problem might
explain how autistic children make social misjudgements – per-
haps using unusual aspects of a social scene. For example, if
the qualities of the tank were like the intricacies of facial
expressions, the processing of which appears to be impaired in
autism (Schultz 2005), then excluding this information would
lead to some of the social errors that autistic children make in
missing facial expressions.
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Example 2. Networks that have too many connections between
too many neurons often do not work well (Mu¨ller et al. 1995;
Rojas & Feldman 1996). This is perhaps not surprising, since it
essentially means that almost no weights (connections) are
close to zero. Given the high apoptosis rate in the developing
brain, one might wonder whether or not any mental disorders
are associated with defects in this apoptotic process. Indeed,
autism is associated with unusually large brain size (Courchesne
et al. 2004). Perhaps future therapies for autism could be based
upon restoring normal apoptotic mechanisms during infancy.
Contrasting mechanisms of neurogenesis, neural sprouting,
and new synapse formation would also be important in regulating
neural network performance. Abnormalities in those new con-
nections and activity, because of either genetic or environmental
issues, could lead to problems such as structural non-uniformity
in computational models (Rumelhart & McClelland 1986).
Example 3. An efficient neural network must appropriately
switch between flexible and stable states (Haykin 1998; Rumel-
hart & McClelland 1986). The stable state of a neural network
might be akin to a focused state. Perhaps difficulties in reaching
and maintaining stable states in children’s brains manifest as the
lack of focus and hyperactivity of attention deficit/hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD) (American Psychological Association 2000).
Perhaps understanding overactive brain circuits may also
inform our understanding of abnormally active cortex in epilepsy.
Alternatively, states that are too stable may appear like the psy-
chomotor retardation of depression (Sadock & Sadock 2004).
Perhaps treatments such as electroconvulsive therapy in adults
are a sort of “reset,” helping the brain out of a state of excessive
stability. Thinking about mentally ill brains as connectionist
neural networks which have an impaired ability to attain, main-
tain, and switch between stable states may lead to novel therapies
aimed at augmenting these brain mechanisms.
Analogy does indeed lie at the heart of the acquisition of
human cognition, as Leech et al. posit. Connectionist models of
the neural networks in brains may help explain how the acqui-
sition of cognitive skills in humans actually works. In addition,
apparent errors in the development and maintenance of these
networks, which may be modelled computationally, may mimic
aspects of mental illness and lead to improved and alternative
treatments. This kind of innovative approach may be especially
helpful to understand and treat infants and children who are
learning critical cognitive skills, yet are not necessarily able to
communicate their problems clearly.
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Abstract: Leech et al. present a connectionist algorithm as a model of
(the development) of analogizing, but they do not specify the
algorithm’s associated computational-level theory, nor its computational
complexity. We argue that doing so may be essential for connectionist
cognitive models to have full explanatory power and transparency, as
well as for assessing their scalability to real-world input domains.
Leech et al. describe a connectionist algorithm that reproduces
several known effects in the development of analogy-making.
The authors claim that this algorithm models how children
develop the ability to make analogies in a manner not yet cap-
tured by previous (primarily non-connectionist) models of
analogy such as Structure Mapping Theory (SMT) (Gentner
1983). The current version of the algorithm does not account
for (the development of) the complex analogies made by adults.
Moreover, Leech et al.’s target article is silent on two issues
prominent in previous work on analogy, namely: (1) a compu-
tational-level theory in the sense of Marr (1982), that is, a
precise formulation of a cognitive ability as an input-output
function, of which the presented connectionist model sup-
posedly provides an algorithmic-level implementation; and (2)
the computational complexity of the proposed algorithm
and/or its associated computational-level theory. In this com-
mentary, we discuss why consideration of (1) and (2) may be
essential for making progress in research programs such as
Leech et al.’s.
To start, we find it useful to re-cast the problem of deriving
models of cognitive development (be they algorithmic- or com-
putational-level) in terms of satisfying various constraints. The
most basic of these is the empirical constraint, that is, the
model must mimic/predict observed cognitive behavior.
Though this is often construed only in terms of adult cognitive
behavior, the model should be able to fit performance across
the different stages of development (e.g., in infancy, childhood,
and adulthood) and account for any apparent discontinuities
between different stages (e.g., relational shift in the case of
analogy). This constraint holds for any model of natural phenom-
ena. In the case of cognitive abilities, which develop over time,
Leech et al. point out the need for a developmental constraint,
that is, “all proposed mechanisms [of the model] must have a
developmental origin” (sect. 5.5, para. 1). That is, the model
should incorporate mechanisms which allow the ability to
mature consistent with the empirical constraint. Overlooked or
ignored so far is a third and equally important constraint, the
computational constraint; that is, a cognitive model must satisfy
both the empirical constraint and the developmental constraint
while operating within the computational resource-limits
imposed by the human body and its environment.
Computational complexity analysis is the tool of choice for
assessing whether or not a cognitive model can satisfy the compu-
tational constraint, thereby placing such analysis at the heart of
cognitive modeling. This is not to say that such analysis is easy:
Though well-developed measures such as worst-case asymptotic
time complexity are applicable to algorithms operating on digital
computational architectures, it is not obvious which measures
are most appropriate for connectionist algorithms. Potential
measures include the time it takes for the network to settle, the
number of training-cycles required to develop a given level of
performance, and the number of nodes and layers in a network
required for computing a given input-output mapping. Once
defined, such measures can be used in conjunction with a suit-
able criterion for computational tractability (see, e.g., van Rooij
2003; in press). Doing so would enable cognitive modelers
such as Leech et al. to evaluate how their models’ computational
resource requirements scale for the larger inputs that are charac-
teristic of real-world domains of analogizing, and to show
whether or not modifications are necessary to accommodate
adult-level analogizing.
Though algorithmic-level models can be evaluated against the
three constraints mentioned above, there are additional benefits
in specifying the computational problems that these algorithms
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are supposed to be solving – that is, formulating computational-
level theories. The first benefit is explanatory transparency: A
computational-level theory provides a precise input-output
characterization of the cognitive capacity that is to be explained,
which is the primary explanandum.1 In the absence of such a
characterization, it is hard to tell if the proposed algorithmic-
level theory is explaining anything at all (Cummins 2000).
The second benefit is explanatory power: Computational-level
theories postulate organizing principles that govern cognitive
abilities, which in turn give insight into the rationale of cognitive
computations. This is not obviously supported by algorithmic-
level theories, especially when we are dealing with connectionist
algorithms (Cummins 1995). The third benefit is analytical
power: Computational-level complexity analyses can demon-
strate that no algorithm (let alone a given algorithm) meets the
computational constraint for a particular computational-level
theory (see also Tsotsos 1990). Moreover, the same analyses
can highlight aspects of one’s theory that are responsible for
excessive resource demands, and as such can guide the formu-
lation of new theories that meet the computational constraint
(see van Rooij & Wareham, in press; van Rooij et al. 2005;
Wareham 1999).
Formulating computational-level theories of cognitive
capacities is not easy, and seems to be particularly hard for con-
nectionist architectures. Yet, such theories can be formulated
(for an example, see Thagard 2000), and given the benefits we
have identified, it may well be worth the effort. Such theories
may counteract the acknowledged temptation to focus on
getting connectionist algorithms to work rather than focusing
on why they work (Mareschal & Thomas 2007, p. 148), and
enable them to actually count as explanations (Green 2001).
Such theories may also enable the exploitation of known connec-
tionist-oriented complexity results (Bruck & Goodman 1990;
Judd 1990; Parberry 1994), which, given the computational
intractability of theories of analogy such as SMT (Veale &
Keane 1997), may be crucial in helping approaches such as
Leech et al.’s scale to adult-level performance. Finally, compu-
tational-level connectionist theories may more clearly expose
relationships to non-connectionist theories. For example,
reading the target article, we wonder to what extent connectionist
algorithms could be trained to map analogies according to
the criteria set forth by SMT, and hence to what degree
these approaches are complementary rather than competing.
Lacking a characterization of the problem that the connectionist
network is supposed to be solving, we are so far unable to tell.
NOTE
1. Following Cummins (2000), we consider cognitive capacities to be
the primary explananda of cognitive science. The effects considered by
Leech et al., on the other hand, are secondary explananda in that they
help constrain (via the empirical constraint) theoretical accounts of the
cognitive capacity for forming analogies.
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Abstract: Abstract thought, in general, and – reasoning by analogy, in
particular, have been said to reside at the very summit of human
cognition. Leech et al. endeavor to comprehend the development of
analogous thinking in human beings. Applying Leech et al.’s general
approach to the evolution of analogical behavior in animals might also
prove to be of considerable value.
He who wisheth one day to fly, must first learn standing and walking
and running and climbing and dancing—one doth not fly into flying!
— Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra
Highly complex and abstract skills – such as analogous thinking –
have frequently been deemed to represent the very pinnacle of
human cognition (e.g., Penn et al. 2008). Leech et al. appear to
accept this view, but they do not appear to be content to revel
in it. Instead, they seek to understand the emergence of analo-
gous thinking, thereby making its study a decidedly developmen-
tal matter.
Leech et al. hypothesize that analogical completion arises from
simple cognitive mechanisms. Specifically, they suggest that rela-
tional priming is a basic building block for completing analogies.
To the extent that their innovative account is successful, at least
some key aspects of analogical reasoning may not require the
hypothesization of analogy-specific mechanisms.
Leech et al. further suggest that analogical processing may best
be viewed as an umbrella term that comprises different task-
specific concatenations of basic memory and control processes.
Analogy-specific mechanisms may very well exist, but other pos-
sibilities should be entertained first because of their greater par-
simony and plausibility for infants and young children. Finally,
any shifts in children’s strategies of task mastery are believed to
be the result of children acquiring greater and richer relational
knowledge. Leech et al. thus stress the interaction between
learning mechanisms and environmental experiences in deter-
mining children’s developmental trajectory.
Leech et al.’s approach suggests how an advanced cognitive
competence – such as analogy formation and performance – can
be grounded in more elementary processes, and it promises to
provide a fuller picture of the mechanisms underlying the tran-
sition from simple to more complex reasoning. If there is at
least a seed of truth to Ernst Haeckel’s recapitulation theory
that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny,” then applying Leech
et al.’s approach to the evolution of analogical behavior might
prove to be valuable as well.
For instance, different species of animals appear to be more or
less successful in solving a wide range of relational discrimination
problems (Wasserman & Zentall 2006). One of the most inten-
sely studied of such relational discrimination problems is same-
different discrimination learning (Cook & Wasserman 2006;
Delius 1994). Here, the behavioral evidence suggests that
pigeons, baboons, chimpanzees, and humans all can discriminate
first-order same-different relations; they can reliably report
whether two or more stimuli are identical (A¼A or B ¼ B) or
nonidentical (A= B).
An even more advanced form of same-different discrimination
involves higher-order relations between first-order relations.
Task mastery here requires organisms to discriminate groups of
two or more stimuli that involve the same higher-order relations
([A ¼ A] ¼ [B ¼ B] or [A= B] ¼ [C= D]; both groups of
stimuli are the same or both groups of stimuli are different)
from groups of two or more stimuli that entail different higher-
order relations ([A ¼ A]= [C= D]; one group of stimuli is
the same and the other group of stimuli is different). Such
higher-order relations may share important similarities with
human analogical reasoning (Thompson & Oden 2000).
Can only human beings discriminate such higher-order
relations and exhibit analogical reasoning? Perhaps not. Premack
(1983) and Thompson and Oden (2000) have suggested that
both humans and apes can appreciate higher-order stimulus
relations. Comparative study thus becomes critical in deciding
among these and other rival hypotheses and in elucidating the
evolutionary origins of analogical thinking.
Such comparative study is already under way. Cook and
Wasserman (2007) and Fagot et al. (2001) have reported that
pigeons and baboons, respectively, can discriminate second-
Commentary/Leech et al.: Analogy as relational priming
400 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:4
order same-different relations in a matching-to-sample task; that
discrimination also transfers to novel stimuli. So, the hypothesis
that only humans and apes can learn about higher-order same-
different relations seems to be too restricted (Premack 1983;
Thompson & Oden 2000).
Note that the pigeons and baboons in these two studies were
not experimentally naive; each animal had some form of first-
order same-different discrimination training prior to second-
order relational matching-to-sample training. Perhaps previously
learning to attend to simpler first-order relations is a prerequisite
to pigeons’ and baboons’ subsequent success in discriminating
more difficult higher-order relations.
Also note that, in both first-order and second-order relational
discriminations, pigeons and baboons appeared to rely heavily
on the variability of the items in a sample array (Wasserman
et al. 2004). Young and Wasserman (1997) hypothesized that
variability or entropy discrimination lies at the root of same-
different discrimination (for a mechanistic theory of entropy dis-
crimination, see Young et al. 2007). Two or more identical items
always involve zero entropy; two or more nonidentical items
always involve nonzero entropy, with entropy increasing as a
direct function of the number of nonidentical items. Not only
do pigeons (Young & Wasserman 1997; Young et al. 1997) and
baboons (Wasserman et al. 2001a; 2001b) show strong sensitivity
to the variability of the items in an array, but so also do college
students – in both choice accuracy and choice reaction time
(Castro et al. 2006; Young & Wasserman 2001; 2002).
Hence, we see that the interpretive framework proposed by
Leech et al. may be effectively applied to both the development
and evolution of relational discrimination behavior. Assuming
that complex cognitive processes depend on and progressively
evolve from more basic perceptual and cognitive processes – the
notion of anagenesis (Gottlieb 1984) – we can make the follow-
ing predictions. First, some species might only be sensitive to
the variability of arrays of stimuli. Second, other, more select
species may also be able to categorize stimulus arrays into
those comprising identical or nonidentical items. Third, other,
even more select species may be able to discriminate identical
from nonidentical relations. Finally, we might expect to see this
task ordering preserved in the development of relational
responding in individual animals and to find this ordering to
strongly depend on the animal’s environmental experiences.
There’s no “flying into flying” according to this proposal for the
development and evolution of relational responding!
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Abstract: In this response, we reiterate the importance of devel-
opment (both ontogenetic and phylogenetic) in the understanding
of a complex cognitive skill – analogical reasoning. Four key
questions structure the response: Does relational priming exist,
and is it sufficient for analogy? What do we mean by relations
as transformations? Could all or any relations be represented as
transformations? And what about the challenge of more
complex analogies? In addressing these questions we bring
together a number of supportive commentaries, strengthening
our emergentist case for analogy (in particular with insights
from comparative psychology), and review new supportive
evidence. We also rebut those commentaries that ignore devel-
opment at their peril. Along the way, we revisit the main assump-
tions underlying the analogy as relational priming (ARP) account
of analogy, clarifying and elaborating as necessary.
R1. Introduction
Analogy as relational priming (henceforth, ARP) views the
analogical abilities of young children as developing out of
priming – a simple, ubiquitous, cognitive mechanism.
Central to the theory is the importance of development
as a fundamental theoretical constraint for any account
of analogical reasoning (and by extension, other high-
level cognitive processes). It is our view that development
must constrain all theories of analogy (even those just
focusing on adult competence) because, to paraphrase
Stephen Jay Gould quoting Francis Crick, “you can’t
identify the value in something until you know how it is
made” (Gould 1992, p. 137). Consequently, we are
happy to note that many commentators were highly sym-
pathetic to this goal of our work (Cheshire, Ball, &
Lewis [Cheshire et al.]; Goswami; Markman &
Laux; Morrison & Cho; Schwering & Ku¨hnberger;
Wasserman). Indeed, several commentators provided
interesting additional evidence supporting central tenets of
our account (e.g., Estes & Jones; Raffray, Pickering, &
Branigan [Raffray et al.]), and the converging support
provided by the comparative angle of Greene and
Wasserman on the evolution of high-level reasoning and
relational knowledge is of particular interest. However,
as made clear by other commentaries, much research
into how we view analogical reasoning remains polarized
(e.g., French, Holyoak & Hummel, Markman & Laux).
In this response, we begin by reconsidering why we
believe development is so central to understanding analo-
gical reasoning and why ignoring it (as some commentators
do) inevitably distorts any theoretical account of analogy.
We also reiterate our understanding of analogy as an emer-
gent property, recycling existing cognitive processes to
build up complex cognitive skills. We then consider the
two main assumptions underlying the current implemen-
tation of the ARP account: relational priming and repre-
senting relations as transformations between semantic
states, all the time paying particular attention to develop-
ment. We then turn to issues arising from more difficult
analogies that, we agree, require mechanisms or processes
beyond those countenanced by ARP. We close by discuss-
ing other models of analogical completion and some meta-
theoretical issues raised by some commentators.
R2. One doth not fly into flying
A key principle of the target article is the centrality of onto-
geny to our account of analogy. While some commentators
appear to have overlooked this issue (most notably
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Holyoak & Hummel), others clearly appreciate the
importance of an ontogenetic (and phylogenetic) perspec-
tive on cognition and the consequences of such a perspec-
tive for theories of analogy. Wasserman is perhaps the
most articulate of the commentators in this respect,
when he notes that, quoting Nietzsche (1891), “one doth
not fly into flying.”
In our view, there are precursors to the kind of analogi-
cal reasoning and problem solving that is typically exam-
ined in experimental work with adult humans, just as
there are precursors to flying. This is demonstrated by
the developmental literature reviewed in the target
article, which provides strong evidence that even very
young children are able to apply analogical principles to
solve simple proportional analogies, and that this ability
improves with age as children move from basing their
responses on surface similarity to relational similarity. As
an account of the development of early analogical ability,
ARP therefore provides more than just an account of a
set of behavioral findings. It also provides an explanation
of why behavior changes as children acquire greater
knowledge of the world, and more generally of how analo-
gical abilities relate to other cognitive mechanisms (i.e.,
priming).
Two points here require emphasis. First, in presenting
this argument we do not mean to imply that ARP is
intended as a precursor of a greater or more complex
theory that at some point during adolescence replaces or
supplants it. Rather, our view is that the developmental
findings on which ARP is based provide fundamental
insights into basic cognitive mechanisms that are pre-
served and refined as successive mechanisms (e.g., relating
to inhibitory control and working memory) come into play.
The second point to note concerns the nature of expla-
nation. There are many constraints that theorists might
adopt in theory development. As an empirical science,
psychological theories are generally constrained by or
evaluated against empirical findings. But it is generally
agreed that for a theory to have an explanatory role it
must do more than merely match behavioral findings. It
should not, for example, posit special purpose mechanisms
or entities that have no support beyond the range of situ-
ations for which they were introduced. Equally, theoreti-
cal explanations are generally preferred if they are
continuous with theories in related areas, accounting for
behavior in one area using existing, well-supported con-
cepts from other areas. ARP offers just such a theory of
the analogical abilities of young children.1
At the same time, if a theory cannot reach a particular
level of cognitive complexity proposed as an explanation
of adult competence, then this is not an explanation of
the adult competence. Building a bridge on the basis of
principles that cannot be implemented would never
happen in engineering. Our approach therefore is extend-
ing (or in the case of Piaget et al. 1977, re-extending) to
analogical reasoning the developmental principles of
decades of work in other areas of developmental biology
and psychology (see Mareschal et al. 2007).
It is important to note that this issue is independent of
the nature versus nurture debate that rages though devel-
opmental psychology. Regardless of whether one believes
that the essential components of cognition are somehow
encoded throughout the genome, acquired through inter-
action with the environment, or some combination of the
two, the weight of proof remains on researchers to show
how the adult state comes into being (Marcus 2004).
R3. Could analogy boil down to priming?
R3.1. Empirical evidence of relational priming
Several commentators critique ARP by questioning the
existence of relational priming (e.g., Morisson & Cho),
citing, in particular, the negative findings of Spellman
et al. (2001). However, as argued by Estes & Jones,
Greene, and Raffray et al., there is in fact ample evi-
dence of relational semantic priming in a broad range of
domains (including memory retrieval, noun-noun compre-
hension, and syntactic text processing). Much of this evi-
dence has appeared since Spellman et al.’s (2001) article
(for a review, see Estes & Jones 2006). Furthermore, as
Estes & Jones make clear in their commentary, the ARP
model captures many aspects of the relational priming lit-
erature, while at the same time accounting for many
aspects of the development of analogy. In addition,
Raffray et al. point out recent evidence of a “lexical
boost” in relational priming. This is consistent with the
ARP account and further supports the concept of rela-
tional priming.
Despite this growing body of empirical findings, it is
true that no studies have yet shown relational priming in
children using verbal stimuli. Goswami suggests that
behavioral evidence of relational priming in children is
not critical, and that it would in fact be sufficient to
provide evidence at the neural level of repetition suppres-
sion (Dehaene et al. 2001). We agree, but recent work by
Duscherer et al. (in press) suggests that it is plausible to
expect behavioral evidence. Duscherer et al. found,
using a visual priming paradigm, that the prior perception
of an action pantomime facilitates the recognition of the
corresponding image of a tool associated with the action,
but not of an image of a tool unassociated with the
action, in 5- to 12-year-olds. This provides initial evidence
that components of a causal relation can be primed in
young children. Moreover, it is reasonable to expect
verbal relational priming in younger age groups, since
semantic priming effects are normally larger in younger,
less fluent participants (Chapman et al. 1994).
Regardless of these empirical findings, there is currently
something of a debate over what exactly relational priming
consists of; however, we are agnostic with regards to many
of the details of relational priming. Although we implement
a specific type of relational priming in ARP (pattern com-
pletion in a dynamic recurrent network), more broadly,
any kind of semantic priming would carry out the same
effect. Indeed, when making an analogy, all sorts of differ-
ent priming mechanisms could be at play – semantic
priming, lexical priming in addition to “pure” relational pri-
ming – all or any of which would lead to the completion of
the analogy through mechanisms that do not involve special
architectures or processes such as explicit structural
alignment.
R3.2. An associationist straitjacket?
Given the evidence for relational priming, is the mechan-
ism sufficient for reasoning by analogy? Holyoak &
Hummel argue that “the target article illustrates an all-
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too-common approach to connectionist modeling of those
cognitive processes most central to human intelligence:
suck the essence out, then force-fit what’s left into an asso-
ciationist straitjacket.” If by “sucking the essence out” they
mean de-mystifying (i.e., explaining cognitive processes in
terms of simpler processes such as memory that we have a
better handle on), then yes, we absolutely agree with them.
The aim of psychological science is to explain phenomena
in terms of well-defined causal mechanisms whose effects
are reliably measurable (see Smith [2000] for an extended
discussion of this point). Priming in a semantic memory is
an example of such a phenomenon.
Unfortunately, some of Holyoak & Hummel’s criti-
cisms seem to stem from a failure to grasp key elements
of the model’s functioning, leading them to characterize
it as a “glorified paired associates task.” So, to reiterate
in case there is any confusion, the ARP model consists of
a network learning about temporally contiguous states of
the world. It is designed to learn about the causal seman-
tics of the world and not to draw analogies. However, ana-
logical completion falls naturally out of its dynamic pattern
completion properties. To assess analogical completion,
the a and b terms of an analogy (e.g., bread and cut
bread) are first presented to the network. These values
are clamped until the network has settled. This results in
an internal state of the network that is consistent with its
previous experience of bread and cut bread. At this
point, the a and b inputs are unclamped. The network is
then presented with the c term of the analogy (e.g.,
lemon) and allowed to settle again. Because it was in a
state consistent with cut and it now receives a new input
lemon, it settles into the output state of cut lemon. Note
that (contrary to Holyoak & Hummel’s claim) “knife” is
never presented and thus never clamped during the for-
mation of the analogy. It follows that the network’s
ability to complete this analogy is not simply an example
of “glorified paired associates” in which the presence of
bread paired with knife leads to cut bread. The model’s
ability to complete analogies comes instead from the
recurrent network’s dynamic pattern completion abilities.
Different prior events (i.e., different a:b probes) will
situate the network in different locations within a continu-
ous state space. Its response to the current input (e.g.,
lemon) is a function of that new input and its location
within that state space.
R3.3. Systematicity
A second concern over the sufficiency of relational priming
for reasoning by analogy concerns systematicity. Holyoak
& Hummel, Schwering & Ku¨hnberger, and Markman
& Laux all flag the phenomenon of systematicity as a
selection constraint in analogical reasoning that, these
commentators claim, the ARP model fails to capture. We
fully agree that a bias towards systems of relations is a
desirable feature of any model of analogical reasoning;
but, furthermore, we also believe that a bias towards
systematicity is a natural feature of many artificial neural
networks with hidden layers and nonlinear activation
rules, that arises without the need to use more complex
structural representations. The point (made in the target
article) is that systems of relations will vary coherently
across multiple domains reflecting an underlying statistical
structure, whereas superfluous or irrelevant relations will
often be restricted to individual domains. As such, the
hidden units in a network will extract this underlying stat-
istical structure across multiple domains. Relations that
frequently co-occur will be represented closer together
in the trained network’s internal semantic space. Sub-
sequent complex, multi-relation analogies using these
relations will key into this proximity between represen-
tations of relations constituting a system, ensuring that
the network has a bias towards picking systematic
relations. We refer the reader to similar phenomena invol-
ving semantic cognition (Rogers & McClelland 2004) and
metaphor (Thomas & Mareschal 2001).
R3.4. Analogical inference
Markman & Laux make the valid point that one of the
main functions of analogical reasoning is to draw useful
inferences that extend our knowledge. They also point
out that ARP at present does not model how people
draw these inferences. Although we have to date not
focused on analogical inference, the possibility of drawing
novel inferences is consistent with the ARP account.
Under ARP we envisage analogical inferences as proceed-
ing in a somewhat different way from more traditional
mapping accounts (e.g., the Structure Mapping Engine)
that explicitly choose features and relations to map from
a base to a target domain. Instead, we suggest that analo-
gical inferences might best be understood as novel gener-
alizations governed by the distributional information about
which input features and relations co-vary across the base
and target domains. (The Metaphor as Pattern Com-
pletion account provides a template as to how this might
proceed; see Thomas & Mareschal 2001.)
R4. Are relations simply transformations in a
semantic space?
R4.1. Reversible relations
Several commentators (Costello, Petrov, Sloutsky) point
out that although some relations (particularly simple
causal relations such as cutting) could usefully be viewed
as additive transformations in a semantic space, this
cannot be the case for many of the relations habitually
used in analogies, particularly adult analogies. In fact,
Costello clearly demonstrates the impossibility that a
bidirectional relation (e.g., the relation kicks that can be
reversed from John kicks Mary to Mary kicks John)
could be represented as an additive transformation.
However, this misapprehension arises not from an
inherent limitation of our account but from an overly
narrow reading of the notion of relations as transform-
ations. To clarify, we may distinguish between a specific
and a general theory of relations as transformation. The
specific theory is that there is a one-to-one (or close to
one-to-one) correspondence between a given relation and
a given transformation and, consequently, that relations
are additive transformations in semantic space. In our
first simulation, we followed this approach because it
makes sense in the context of simple causal relations
of the kind easily used in analogies by young children.
For a relation such as cutting it is plausible that cutting
transforms everyday objects in somewhat similar ways.
Furthermore, these simple causal relations tend to be
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unidirectional in that we see apples being transformed into
cut apples but not the other way around. However, as
Goswami points out, we need not be wedded to this
specific theory of relations as additive transformations –
instead what is important to the ARP account is a much
more general theory of relations as transformations.
The general account of relations as transformations is
that relations are transformations from one state to another
in semantic/conceptual space, but there is no need for
equivalence between a given relation and a specific addi-
tive transformation. This allows the network to represent
relations that are reversible. Indeed, the second simulation
considering the Gulf War/World War II analogies (sect. 4
of the target article) is implemented using this more
general form of relation as transformations. What is
important is that a given exemplar of a relation is a trans-
formation between states (i.e., a mapping from one state to
another) and the network learns different mappings (i.e.,
transformations) for different exemplars of the same
relations. This approach, as we point out in the target
article, is not unique to us but similar to what is envisaged
in other transformational accounts of cognitive abilities
(e.g., Rogers & McClelland 2004).
In general, therefore, we contend that relations should
be understood as transformations in semantic space
(a conceptual system), but, importantly, that a given
relation is not necessarily represented by a specific
single transformation. Instead, a given relation covers a
set of learned transformations that are triggered by the
specific interaction of objects with the available context.
Within the model, relations are represented implicitly in
the matrix of connection weights, so there is nothing in the
model per se that corresponds directly to the relation
cutting. These implicit representations lead Dietrich to
question whether the ARP model could account for expli-
cit (i.e., conscious) awareness of relational knowledge. We
have two responses to this point: first, (as made clear by
the animal literature referred to by Greene and Wasser-
man; see also Oden et al. [2001] for a discussion of analogy
in nonhuman species) there is no necessity for the relations
underlying analogies to be explicitly known. Humans and
some animal species appear to be capable of solving
analogies using implicit or close-to-implicit knowledge
and without much conscious awareness. Second, we
accept that more complex, adult-like analogies will make
considerable use of explicit strategies (see sect. R5 of
this response). Note finally that by associating verbal
labels with relations, for example, by augmenting the
context layer of the network (see sect. 3.3.5 of the target
article), it is easy to see how the implicit representations
of relations could be linked to explicit (or at least verbaliz-
able) representations in a manner that makes the knowl-
edge consciously accessible.
As the previous point makes clear, we are not com-
mitted to any particular type of context representation
driving analogies, such as causal agents that correspond
to physical objects in the world (see Sloutsky). We intro-
duced causal agents in the first simulations because we
were modeling a specific task involving causal agents.
However, as pointed out in the second simulation on
more complex analogies, the context could take the form
of many different types of mental representation, for
example, something as concrete as a knife but also some-
thing more abstract such as heat or a verbal label.
R4.2. Multiple possible relations
A second objection to relations as transformations, raised
most directly by Akman but also underlying Bouissac’s
uneasiness with ARP and central to one of French’s con-
cerns, is that multiple relations may hold between two
objects. Consider Akman’s example: puppy:dog::kitten:?.
Is the relation of concern offspring, or is it any one of a
number of other possibilities (is_younger_than, is_cuter_
than)? Bouissac argues that the multiplicity of relations
that might hold between the given terms in a proportional
analogy undermines any possibility that there might be any
single “correct” answer. His specific concern is with the
socializing process that leads our society to prioritize one
relation over another (and hence to suggest that there is
just one right answer). In fact, this is wholly consistent
with the ARP approach: when multiple relations hold
between the a and b terms of a proportional analogy, the
one that the model predicts will be applied is the one
that is favored by the model’s training history and current
context. In other words, the model does not predict that
there is a single “correct” answer to an analogy. As
Bouissac notes, correctness is a function of the child’s/
system’s knowledge, which in turn is a function of culture.
French uses the puppy:dog semi-analogy to make a
related point. His argument is that the relation between
the a and b terms that is appropriate within a proportional
analogy depends on the c term. If the c term is kitten then
offspring is the appropriate relation, but if the c term is
watch then the appropriate relation is something else,
maybe small_version_of. In fact, there is substantial
semantic overlap between offspring and small_version_of.
We therefore see no difficulty in accounting for this
analogy within ARP, provided of course that the system
is exposed to exemplar watches and clocks. A more critical
example would be a case where multiple very different
relations hold between the a and b terms of the analogy
and when, given c1, the appropriate response is d1, but
when, given c2, an alternate response d2 is appropriate.
It remains to be demonstrated that young children can
respond appropriately in such a situation. ARP would
predict that, prior to the mastery of executive control,
they could not. That is, within ARP the successful com-
pletion of such analogies is likely to require the kind of
additional machinery for inhibiting responses included in
our model of the Gulf War/World War II analogy, as
described in the target article and further discussed in
section R5 here.
R4.3. Abstract relations
A final issue concerning relations as transformations that
several commentators brought up (Dietrich, Petrov,
Phillips, Schwering & Ku¨hnberger) is how the model
can handle abstract relations. Again, in part this issue
arises because of the confusion between the specific and
general theories of relations as transformations. The
general account of relations as transformations allows for
abstract relations to be represented. For example, “pen
left_of pencil,” although not involving a meaningful trans-
formation in the world, could be implemented as a
mapping between the representation of pen and the rep-
resentation of pencil. However, we acknowledge that
there is still the important question of how relations
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implemented implicitly as transformations can be used
abstractly and flexibly in novel contexts. For example, in
the situation “pen left_of pencil” this is a temporary con-
figuration that we may never have seen before (or at
least never analogized about before). As Phillips makes
clear, we have not had the chance to be exposed to hun-
dreds of epochs of learning about the relative location of
pens and pencils; and even if we had, it would not be
any use if we then saw a pencil to the left of a pen. This
is a legitimate concern, and again we have two responses
to this issue. First, we maintain that some of the complex
and flexible usage of relations observed in the world relies
on complex cognitive control strategies involving working
memory and inhibition. Second, and perhaps more import-
ant, we contend, however, that there really are no examples
of completely abstract and novel analogical or relational
reasoning. Although we may never have seen a given pen
and pencil in a specific and completely temporary configur-
ation (or even two novel objects, e.g., greebles), we have
seen and thought about a vast array of other objects in
similar types of configurations.
R4.4. Empirical evidence for relations as
transformations
As discussed in the target article, Thomas and Mareschal
(1997) and Hahn et al. (2003) have both stressed the
importance of transformations for judging similarity and,
by extension, the importance of transformations for analo-
gical reasoning. In addition, as discussed in section 5.1.2 of
the target article, Leech et al. (2007) directly tested a
strong prediction of the current implementation of
causal relations as transformation. They found that the
size of a transformation instantiating a relation between
two states of the world (e.g., shrinks) was a performance
factor affecting analogical reasoning, in both adults and
adolescents, using a range of different analogical reasoning
tasks. Such similarity effects fall naturally out of the implicit
distributed nature of relations as transformation and are dif-
ficult to interpret in terms of explicit propositional rep-
resentations of relations.
R5. ARP and the bigger picture
R5.1. The challenge of complex analogies
Researchers of adult analogy often make use of very
complex analogies requiring far more than just the mech-
anisms that they propose in order to explain analogy. Take,
for example, the analogy described by French in the
beginning of his commentary relating baseball to acade-
mia. It is (on the surface at least) far more complex than
a:b::c:d. But what has increased its complexity? Such ana-
logies require additional components, such as advanced
semantic knowledge of baseball and the world of acade-
mia, as well as sentence and text processing skills,
working memory, and pragmatic conversational skills.
Are these intended to be central to analogy? It seems
entirely plausible that children’s failure on these more
involved analogies is at least in part due to shortcomings
in world knowledge, working memory (see sect. R5.2),
sentence processing, and pragmatic skills, all of which
develop substantially throughout childhood.
We use proportional analogies in presenting and explor-
ing ARP because they embody what is essential to analo-
gies (Sternberg 1977a). Could French’s example be
recast as a proportional analogy? Does “Ty Cobb:Home
runs::Academic:Journal articles” make sense? Absolutely,
but only if the relevant background knowledge is primed
(i.e., if the reader is located in the appropriate part of
their semantic space) – as French does, by providing the
reader with the background context so as to highlight the
intended relation between Ty Cobb and home runs that
French wishes us to transfer to the domain of academia.
R5.2. Working memory and cognitive control
We agree with Doumas & Richland that there is more to
solving multirelational analogies than relational knowl-
edge. As Morrison & Cho point out, there are clear con-
straints from working memory and changes in inhibitory
control on children’s developing abilities to use and com-
prehend increasingly complex analogies. Again, this is
entirely consistent with the role of executive control that
we posit for interpreting complex multi-relational analo-
gies. We chose, however, to focus on the kind of analogies
that very young children (3 to 4 years old and younger)
seem competent at, and we produced an emergentist
account of how these types of analogy could emerge.
The next, and by no means easy, step is to investigate
the interplay of the emergence of analogy based on rela-
tional priming (with a central focus on knowledge accre-
tion) with the other emerging abilities of working memory
and executive or cognitive control (e.g., active and selec-
tive maintenance and updating of working memory) that
presumably underlie very complex analogical reasoning.
This research agenda will have to address some of the
issues regarding working memory that Morrison & Cho
note (i.e., integration of multiple relations and the sup-
pression of distracting stimuli). However, from our per-
spective it seems likely that analogy is parasitic on the
rest of cognition. So, as Petrov points out, quoting
French (2002, p. 204), “it is probably safe to say that any
program capable of doing analogy-making in a manner
truly comparable to human beings would stand a very
good chance of passing the Turing Test.” The implication
of this statement is that to model the development of ana-
logical reasoning, we must model the development of a
huge raft of interrelated cognitive skills (semantic cogni-
tion, working memory, inhibition, number, mathematical
and spatial reasoning skills, etc.). As discussed in section
R6 of this response, these are all capabilities pre-assumed
by other existing models of analogical development
R5.3. Reversibility and role assignment
A further point raised by multiple commentators is that
people are able to reason about analogies with the terms
reversed; as Akman says, “one apparent objection has to
do with the ‘direction’ of the relationship.” So Holyoak &
Hummel ask whether ARP, trained on apple:sliced apple
and bread:sliced bread, could correctly complete the
analogy “sliced apple:apple::sliced bread:?”. Estes & Jones
similarly suggest that ARP could usefully be extended to
have some mechanism for resolving roles, that is, discover-
ing, for example, whether relational terms are in the
order cause–effect, or effect–cause. The strength of this
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criticism, as pointed out by Akman, depends upon whether
young children can process these types of analogies. If,
following Akman’s intuition, such analogies are harder
for young children when they appear in a non-canonical
form (e.g., sliced apple:apple::sliced bread:bread), what
additional processes are occurring that make them
harder? Tentatively we suggest that in the extended
account of analogical reasoning (i.e., ARP embedded
within additional cognitive control systems), the analogizer
may learn to funnel information that is noted to be in a
non-canonical order into the appropriate order for rela-
tional priming to work.
R5.4. ARP as part of a larger theory
We are very comfortable with Markman & Laux’s
comment that “ARP theory does not explain full compe-
tence, and cannot, in principle, be extended to do so
without it becoming a part of a larger theory.” Where we
differ from Markman & Laux is that we see ARP as a
potential fundamental component of the wider theory, suf-
ficient on its own for some analogies and necessary for many
other more complex analogies. As illustrated by the second
simulation regarding the Gulf War and World War II
(sect. 4 of the target article), we show that, in principle,
ARP could be embedded within other cognitive processes
to construct the kind of complex extended analogies used
to test models such as the Structure Mapping Engine
(SME) and Learning and Inference with Schemas and
Analogies (LISA). In essence, relational priming is itera-
tively applied in a controlled way to construct large
multi-relation analogies. It may be helpful here to make
an analogy with research into language development,
which until relatively recently placed most weight on
studying syntax as the fundamental aspect of human
language (analogous to explicit structure mapping). It is,
in fact, increasingly acknowledged that syntactic develop-
ment and semantic development are fundamentally inse-
parable (Bates & Goodman 1997), especially when a truly
developmental perspective is taken. Similarly, we believe
that research on analogical development (and analogy in
general) will only truly get anywhere if simple processes
such as relational priming that are ontogenetically and
phylogenetically (Wasserman) plausible can be put to
good use in increasingly complex ways (i.e., with executive
control building up to complex structure mapping).
R5.5. Meta-cognitive processes
Providing children with feedback on their analogical per-
formance has been shown to improve subsequent analogi-
cal performance (at least in the short term), as has asking
them to explain their responses (Cheshire et al. 2005;
2007). Cheshire et al. argue in their commentary that
such effects cannot be accounted for within ARP as it
stands, and question how (or indeed whether) ARP might
be extended to allow behavior to be influenced by feed-
back and reflection. On the one hand, we see this as a cri-
ticism of a specific connectionist implementation of ARP,
rather than a criticism of ARP itself. On the other hand, we
are wary about arbitrarily extending the implementation to
incorporate feedback and self-explanation when, as noted
in our target article, analogical abilities develop in the
absence of explicit training on an analogy. To elaborate,
Cheshire et al.’s data does not undermine either the mech-
anism of relational priming or the representation of
relations as transformations. Rather, it suggests additional
learning mechanisms that may influence performance on
proportional analogies. Could the learning mechanism of
our implementation be extended to account for the role
of feedback and self-explanation? Possibly, but it is our
view that the primary effects of feedback and self-expla-
nation lie beyond the semantic system held to be involved
in relational priming processes. They may, for example, be
accounted for by learned attentional processes that differ-
entially weight features of the stimuli, resulting in different
inputs to the semantic system. Alternatively, they may
affect post-semantic decision processes, resulting, for
example, in the rejection (and subsequent inhibition) of
targets that match only on surface similarity.
R6. Other models of analogy
Several commentators raise implicit objections to ARP by
presenting alternative models of one or another aspect of
analogy. Borges, d’Avila Garcez, & Lamb (Borges
et al.) suggest that we have prematurely rejected hybrid
“neural-symbolic” models, arguing that such models
provide the great advantage of combining “trainable
neural networks with symbolic representations,” whereas
Schwering & Ku¨hnberger question the expressive
power of ARP in relation to analogies in the physical
sciences involving quantified variables and logic operations.
We accept the potential advantages of hybrid systems
(i.e., combining learning and symbolic representations)
in some circumstances. However, we dispute the rel-
evance of these properties to our target phenomena.
Thus, in presenting their position, Borges et al. describe
two neural-symbolic systems, Connectionist Inductive
Learning and Logic Programming (CILP) and Sequential
Connectionist Temporal Logic (SCTL). The latter cer-
tainly appears to be capable of performing analogical
reasoning of the type addressed by ARP, but Borges
et al. make no attempt to relate the account to empirical
phenomena, let alone developmental evidence. In particu-
lar, there is no evidence that the SCTL approach might
replicate any of our seven observations on the develop-
ment of analogy, beyond perhaps Observation 1 (concern-
ing knowledge accretion). Even in that case, however, it is
unclear how the learning mechanism of SCTL might relate
to a child’s learning of relational knowledge, which, we
claim, is the product of witnessing many cases of a relation
in a variety of contexts, and not learning from a set of prop-
ositional clauses. Furthermore, as noted by Schwering &
Ku¨hnberger, our non-symbolic (or more precisely, non-
atomic) representation of relations has the advantage
that it allows for semantically similar relations to have
similar representations. Thus, our encoding is in principle
able to account for analogies involving similar, but non-
identical, relations (such as “occupies” and “annexes,” to
use Schwering & Ku¨hnberger’s example). At the same
time ARP cannot be easily compared with the Heuristic
Driven Theory Projection (HDTP) model (see Gust et al.
2007) cited by Schwering & Ku¨hnberger – another model
that is concerned solely with adult-level competence.
Doumas & Richland correctly point out that we over-
looked one model that accounts for how explicit relational
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representations can be learned. The Discovery of Relations
by Analogy (DORA) model (Doumas et al. 2008) proposes
to do just this. We apologise for this oversight and, there-
fore, provide due coverage of this model in the present
reply. At first glance, we are highly sympathetic to the
aims of this work. As argued throughout our target
article, answering the question of how and from where
an ability emerges is essential to any understanding of
that ability. Unfortunately, a more detailed look at the
DORA model suggests that it fails on this vital task. In
fact, the very name of the model, “Discovery of Relations
by Analogy,” suggests that there is a presupposition that
the mechanisms for analogical retrieval and inference
are in place prior to the discovery of any form of relational
representations.
So, what are the assumptions that, according to Doumas
et al. (2008), underlie the development of this ability in
DORA? Fortunately, the authors are exceptionally clear
in what they take as necessary requirements for the
model to function. Thus, we read, “Armed with a basic
vocabulary of perceptual and relational invariants . . .
DORA discovers relations through general learning pro-
cesses and develops as a result of experience” (Doumas
et al. 2008, p. 30). We have nothing to quibble about con-
cerning this proposition. Next come the assumptions: “The
model assumes that memory and perception are present at
the start of learning. It also requires a capacity for com-
parison, mapping, and SSL [Self Supervised Learning],
as well as the ability to flexibly treat a feature as either a
(holistic) feature of an object or as a feature of an explicit
predicate” (Doumas et al. 2008, p. 30; emphasis added).
Even putting aside further mysteries such as how the
complex machinery involving multiple modules, multiple
levels of representation, and multiple processes and
control streams got put together in the first place, most
if not all of the skills believed by many to underlie
analogy are pre-assumed in the DORA model. To us,
this is not an explanation of how analogical abilities
emerge, but rather an explanation of how, once analogy
is in place, it can be used to generate new explicitly acces-
sible relational representations.
Doumas & Richland make the further claim that
DORA can account for all of the phenomena accounted
for by ARP and much more. At the moment, there is no
published evidence of this. As the DORA model is not a
model of analogical development (nor does it claim to
be), it does not try to account for the same tasks as we
do. Although it may be able to capture some of the perform-
ance characteristics of the ARP model on a:b::c:d analogies,
we would be curious to see how easily it could capture
specific developmental phenomena such as the profile of
errors that children are found to make at different ages
(see sect. 1.1.3 of the target article; see also Rattermann
& Gentner 1998a) and the dynamic temporal markers
associated with development on analogical completion
tasks (sect. 1.1.4; see also Hosenfeld et al. 1997).
There is one area in which the DORA and ARP models
do overlap – they both suggest that there is often a shift in
children’s performance from appearing to rely on surface
similarity in drawing analogical inferences to relying on
relational similarity. The two accounts differ in that ARP
suggests that it should be possible to find examples in
which the opposite shift occurs. It turns out that this is in
fact the case. Opfer and Bulloch (in press) tested 3-, 4-,
and 5-year-olds on how they would generalize new infor-
mation. On offspring problems, relational information
yields more accurate generalizations, whereas in prey
problems, surface similarity yields more accurate generaliz-
ation. Opfer and Bulloch found that with offspring pro-
blems there was an increasing reliance on relational
similarity with age (as previously reported), but on prey pro-
blems there was a decreasing reliance on relational simi-
larity and an increasing reliance on surface similarity with
age. These authors suggest that the relational trend com-
monly observed in analogical completion may, in fact,
reflect increasing sensitivity to cue validity rather than an
overall preference to generalize on the basis of relational
similarity over perceptual similarity. These findings are
entirely consistent with what is observed in the ARP
model, and in fact validate a primary prediction made in
section 5.1.1 of the target article. It is difficult to see how
such a trend would fall naturally out of DORA or any of
the associated structural alignment models.
A precursor to DORA coming from the same group of
researchers is LISA, which Morrison & Cho claim can
model many developmental findings. In particular, Rich-
land et al. (2006) demonstrate that by increasing an inhi-
bition parameter, LISA is able to account for effects of
decreasing sensitivity to distracter items and increasing
ability with complex relations with age. As Richland and
colleagues argue, the functional effect of increasing inhi-
bition within LISA is to allow increased working memory
capacity, and, as argued earlier in our response, we agree
that such developmental changes are likely to promote
improved performance in some analogical tasks. However,
as in the case of DORA, the LISA model is not really a
developmental model – it assumes that complex compu-
tational machinery is in place, and all that “develops” is
better inhibitory control. This is also the case with the
efforts to model development using SME that Markman
& Laux direct us to (e.g., Gentner et al. 1995). While it is
a valid hypothesis to argue that performance improvements
are caused by an increase in capacity (such as working
memory), this leaves unanswered the question of where
the specialist machinery comes from in the first place.
This position is in stark contrast to ARP, which does not
posit any special machinery for analogical completion and
argues that such abilities simply fall out of existing
general-purpose semantic memory systems.
R7. Wider issues
A number of commentators raise miscellaneous higher-
level issues concerning metaphysical assumptions and
the methodological approach embodied within ARP. Our
responses to these meta-issues are collected here.
R7.1. Metaphysical assumptions
Linhares is concerned with some of the metaphysical
assumptions underlying ARP, namely, the represen-
tational module assumption and the associated assumption
of metaphysical realism. The central issue in both cases is
the nature of mental representation. Thus, Linhares
suggests that “mental objects” are dynamically built, con-
sisting of a concept with associated sets of connotations,
whereas “[a]nalogies are mechanisms by which a mental
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object acquires connotations from different mental objects.”
In contrast, ARP (or at least its connectionist implemen-
tation) assumes that mental representations can be ade-
quately characterised as sets of features. Consider first
the abstract claims of ARP. Although Linhares expresses
no opinion about relational priming per se, he agrees
with our view of relations as transformations between
mental representations, and with the corollary that the
application of such transformations during analogy effec-
tively results in the acquisition of source features or conno-
tations by a target mental object. What, though, are
connotations? The word itself is slightly ethereal and mys-
terious. Linhares, however, provides some clues: they are
(a) “rules for carving waves,” (b) “relations between mental
objects,” and (c) “properties of particular objects.” The
first of these appears to be a restatement of the represen-
tational module assumption that Linhares denies, while
the third is entirely equivalent to the featural represen-
tations that we have assumed. The difference then
between Linhares’ position and ARP reduces to the
claim that mental objects consist, in addition to featural
representations, of an atomic concept that may stand in
some relation to other atomic concepts. Therefore, we
see Linhares’ position as an elaboration of our position.
That elaboration may well turn out to be justified when
more complex cognitive abilities are considered, but the
simulations reported in our target article demonstrate
that it is not necessary for the target phenomena.
It is also important to be clear about the extent to which
our representational assumptions shape the ARP model’s
behavior. The ARP model would produce equivalent results
regardless of the precise featural representations chosen,
provided that appropriate abstract regularities over the
domain hold (e.g., that the act of cutting affects some
but not all features of an object that may be cut, but pre-
serves all features of an object that cannot be cut). Thus,
the ARP model requires that mental objects have a core
(featural) representation that is invariant within an individ-
ual, but not, as a strong form of metaphysical realism
would suggest, a representation that is invariant across indi-
viduals. Such core representations are presumably acquired
throughout early development as the child becomes attuned
to regularities within its environment, or as Linhares might
argue, acquires “rules for carving waves.” We have no
concerns in accepting this, given its widespread and appar-
ently successful use throughout cognitive modelling (e.g.,
Elman et al. 1996; Mareschal & Thomas 2007; Rogers &
McClelland 2004; Rumelhart & McClelland 1986; Shultz
2003).
R7.2. Computational-level theory and computational
complexity of ARP
Two meta-theoretical issues concerning ARP are raised
by Wareham, Rooij, & Mu¨ller (Wareham et al.).
First, they are concerned with our failure to specify a
computational-level theory of our target domain (in the
sense of Marr 1982), and second, they are concerned
with our failure to discuss the computational complexity
of ARP. In our view the computational-level theory – the
input-output function – is given by the empirical effects
underlying our seven observations. These observations
relate the inputs that the developing child is exposed to
(both in terms of increasing world knowledge and the
specific analogy problems provided to children in the
various developmental studies cited) and the outputs
that the child produces (when presented with an analogy
for completion). We therefore do not see this issue as a
major concern, although it is perhaps behind several
other commentaries that, as discussed above, object to
our equating analogy with performance on the a:b::c:d
task employed originally by Piaget et al. (1977) and later
by Goswami and Brown (1989; 1990).
The computational complexity of ARP, on the other
hand, is a more difficult question and Wareham et al.
are right to raise it. We agree that there is an important
role for computational complexity results to play in cogni-
tive theorizing, particularly when considering issues of
scaling. As Wareham et al. point out, Structure Mapping
Theory (SMT) is computationally intractable, and this is,
or should be, of concern to advocates of SMT. With
regard to the computational complexity of ARP, it is
again relevant to stress that our connectionist model,
with its specific architecture, training procedure, and
algorithm, is presented as an implementation of ARP
that demonstrates the theory’s plausibility, but alternative
approaches to the implementation of the theoretical
claims of ARP (i.e., of relational priming and relations as
transformations between representations) are surely poss-
ible. The question is therefore not one of the computational
complexity of contrastive Hebbian learning, but whether
there exists a computationally tractable implementation of
ARP. This is an open question, but the inherently parallel
nature of priming gives us reason to be cautiously optimistic
about the scaling behavior of the theory.
R7.3. Relation to neurophysiology
An alternative meta-theoretical position is taken by
Speed, who is concerned with the neurophysiological pro-
cesses underlying analogical abilities – Marr’s (1982)
implementation level – and our failure to provide a
theory at this level. Specifically, Speed argues that analogy
is an emergent property not of more basic psychological
processes such as relational priming, but of more basic phys-
iological processes. Unfortunately, she does not suggest
what these physiological processes might be. Although we
accept that psychological processes must eventually
be grounded in physiological ones (see Mareschal et al.
2007), we find this reductionist perspective to be of
limited use. To accept it would lead one to discard the
entire field of cognitive psychology in favor of neurophysiol-
ogy. While neurophysiology has told us much about the
functioning of the brain, it has told us relatively little of
the functioning of the mind.
We could of course have speculated more about the
neural mechanisms underlying ARP (and the first of our
models is at least broadly compatible with what is known
of neural processing mechanisms; see O’Reilly 1996),
but any comments would have been entirely speculative.
Worse, in our view, is that they would conflate levels of
explanation. We firmly believe that the neural level is
important, but our model is concerned with the cognitive
level. One may wish for well-grounded models of how “the
brain, as a physical system, [can] take raw sensory infor-
mation and perform higher-order cognition using that
information (e.g., solving Raven’s Progressive Matrices),”
as Speed writes, but the field is not yet in a position to
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develop such theories. In any case, to do so would in our
view be greatly facilitated by first developing a cognitive-
level theory of how people solve Raven’s Progressive
Matrices, and this is the level at which ARP is conceived.
In a similar vein before considerations of neuropsychologi-
cal problems (e.g., autism or depression) can be mapped
onto connectionist models (see the commentary by
Swain & Swain) we must have a good understanding of
the relations between the components of the model
(e.g., hidden units, connections) and the brain (see also,
Mareschal & Thomas 2007).
R8. Conclusion
Where, then, does this leave us? Young children, infants as
young as 12 months old even, show signs of analogical
ability (as do some chimpanzees). ARP accounts for such
abilities, and for many of the improvements in analogizing
seen in the first decade of the child’s life. We accept,
though, that we need to get to the other end – to adult-
level competence. As argued throughout, our view is of
analogy as an umbrella for a variety of concepts and pro-
cesses – a view also explicitly endorsed by numerous com-
mentators (Borges et al., Sloutsky, Wasserman) and
denied by none. We accept that adult-level analogical
competence involves processes beyond relational priming.
We suspect, though (given what we know of the evolution
and development of our cognitive abilities), that it does
not involve an “analogy module,” as rival models seem to
claim, but instead that it is firmly grounded in recycling
old parts.
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NOTE
1. There are of course other requirements for a cognitive
scientific explanation. Neural plausibility, for example, is one.
This is addressed with respect to ARP in section R7.3.
References
Letters “a” and “r” appearing before authors’ initials refer to target article
and response, respectively.
Aizawa, K. (2002) The systematicity arguments, studies in brain and mind. Kluwer
Academic. [SP]
Akman, V. (2007) Similar situations. In: Context and appropriateness: Micro meets
macro, ed. A. Fetzer, pp. 31–54. John Benjamins. [VA]
Altmann, G. T. M. (2002) Learning and development in neural networks: The
importance of prior experience. Cognition 85:43–50. [aRL]
Ambrose, S. E. (1998) Citizen soldiers. Simon & Schuster. [AL]
American Psychological Association (2000) Diagnostic and statistical manual of
mental disorders: DSM-IV-TR. American Psychological Association. [JES]
Andrews, G. & Halford, G. S. (2002) A cognitive complexity metric applied to
cognitive development. Cognitive Psychology 45:153–219. [LAAD, aRL]
Andrews, G., Halford, G. S., Bunch, K. M., Bowden, D. & Jones, T. (2003) Theory
of mind and relational complexity. Child Development 74(5):1476–99.
[aRL]
Arterberry, M. E. & Bornstein, M. H. (2001) Three-month-old infants’ categoriz-
ation of animals and vehicles based on static and dynamic attributes. Journal of
Experimental Child Psychology 80:333–46. [UG]
Barabas, H. (2000) Connections underlying the synthesis of cognition, memory, and
emotion in primate prefrontal cortices. Brain Research Bulletin 52:319–30.
[ASp]
Barnden, J. A. (1994) On the connectionist implementation of analogy and working
memory matching. In: Advances in connectionist and neural computation
theory, vol. 3: Analogy, metaphor and reminding, ed. J. A. Barnden & K. J.
Holyoak, pp. 327–74. Ablex. [aRL]
Barnden, J. A. & Holyoak, K. J. (1994) Advances in connectionist and neural
computation theory. Analogy, reminding, and metaphor. Ablex. [aRL]
Barsalou, L. W., Simmons, W. K., Barbey, A. K. & Wilson, C. D. (2003) Grounding
conceptual knowledge in modality-specific systems. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences 7:84–91. [UG]
Barwise, J. & Perry, J. (1983) Situations and attitudes. MIT Press. [VA]
Bates, E. & Goodman, J. C. (1997) On the inseparability of grammar and the
lexicon: Evidence from acquisition, aphasia and real-time processing.
Language and Cognitive Processes 12:507–84. [rRL]
Bates, E. & MacWhinney, B. (1989) Competition and connectionism. In: The
crosslinguistic study of sentence processing, ed. B. MacWhinney & E. Bates.
Cambridge University Press. [aRL]
Becker, S., Moscovitch, M., Behrmann, M. & Joordens, S. (1997) Long-term
semantic priming: A computational account and empirical evidence. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 23:1059–82.
[aRL]
Blanchette, I. & Dunbar, K. (2000) How analogies are generated: The roles of
structural and superficial similarity. Memory and Cognition 28:108–24.
[aRL]
(2001) Analogy use in naturalistic settings: The influence of audience, emotion,
and goals. Memory and Cognition 29:730–35. [aRL]
Bowdle, B. & Gentner, D. (1997) Informativity and asymmetry in comparisons.
Cognitive Psychology 34(3):244–86. [aRL]
Branigan, H. P., Pickering, M. J. & Cleland, A. A. (2000) Syntactic coordination in
dialogue. Cognition 75:B13–25. [CNR]
Breton, A. (1924/1969) Manifestos of surrealism. Trans. R. Seaver & H. R. Lane.
University of Michigan Press. [PB]
Brown, A. L. (1989) Analogical learning and transfer: What develops? In: Similarity
and analogical reasoning, ed. S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony, pp. 199–241.
Cambridge University Press. [aRL]
Brown, A. L. & Kane, M. J. (1988) Preschool children can learn to transfer: Learning
to learn and learning from example. Cognitive Psychology 20:493–523. [aRL]
Bruck, J. & Goodman, J. (1990) On the power of neural networks for solving hard
problems. Journal of Complexity 6:129–35. [TW]
Bunge, S. A., Wendelken, C., Badre, D. & Wagner, A. D. (2005) Analogical
reasoning and prefrontal cortex: Evidence for separable retrieval and
integration mechanisms. Cerebral Cortex 15:239–49. [RGM]
Castro, L., Young, M. E. & Wasserman, E. A. (2006) Effects of number of items and
visual display variability on same-different discrimination behavior. Memory
and Cognition 34:1689–1703. [EAW]
Cer, D. & O’Reilly, R. (2006) Neural mechanisms of binding in the hippocampus
and neocortex: Insights from computational models. In: Handbook of binding
and memory: Perspectives from cognitive neuroscience, ed. H. Zimmer, A.
Mecklinger & U. Lindenberger, pp. 193–220. Oxford University Press.
[AAP]
Chalmers, D. (1990) Syntactic transformations on distributed representations.
Connection Science 2(1):53–62. [RMF]
Chalmers, D. J., French, R. M. & Hofstadter, D. R. (1992) High-level perception,
representation, and analogy: A critique of artificial intelligence methodology.
Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 4:185–211.
[RMF, AL]
Chapman, L. J., Chapman, J. P., Curran, T. E. & Miller, M. B. (1994) Do children
and the elderly show heightened semantic priming? Developmental Review
14:159–85. [arRL]
Chen, Z., Sanchez, R. P. & Campbell, T. (1997) From beyond to within their grasp:
The rudiments of analogical problem solving in 10- and 13-month-olds.
Developmental Psychology 33:790–801. [aRL, VMS]
Cheshire, A., Ball, L. J. & Lewis, C. N. (2005) Self-explanation, feedback and the
development of analogical reasoning skills: Microgenetic evidence for a
metacognitive processing account. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Second
Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, ed. B. G. Bara,
L. Barsalou & M. Bucciarelli, pp. 435–41. Erlbaum. [AC, rRL]
Cheshire, A., Muldoon, K., Francis, B., Lewis, C. N. & Ball, L. J. (2007) Modelling
change: New opportunities in the analysis of microgenetic data. Infant and
Child Development 16:119–34. [AC, rRL]
Chittka, L. & Osorio, D. (2007) Cognitive dimensions of predator responses to
imperfect mimicry. PLoS Biology 5(12):e339. Available at:
www.plosbiology.org. [PB]
Cho, S., Holyoak, K. J. & Cannon, T. D. (2007a) Analogical reasoning in working
memory: Resources shared among relational integration, interference resol-
ution, and maintenance. Memory and Cognition 35:1445–55. [RGM]
References/Leech et al.: Analogy as relational priming
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:4 409
Cho, S., Moody, T. D., Cannon, T. D., Poldrack, R. A., Knowlton, B. J. & Holyoak,
K. J. (2007b) Neural substrates for resolving interference from semantic
association in verbal analogical reasoning. Paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of the Society for Neuroscience, San Diego, California, November
3–7, 2007. [RGM]
Cho, S., Moody, T. D., Poldrack, R. A., Cannon, T. D., Knowlton, B. J. & Holyoak,
K. J. (2007c) Neural bases of analogical reasoning: Event-related fMRI yields
evidence of prefrontal substrate for relational integration and interference
resolution. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Cognitive
Neuroscience, New York. May 5–8, 2007. [RGM]
Christoff, K., Prabhakaran, V., Dorfman, J., Zhao, Z., Kroger, J. K., Holyoak, K. J. &
Gabrieli, J. D. E. (2001) Rostrolateral prefrontal cortex involvement in
relational integration during reasoning. Neuroimage 14:1136–49. [RGM]
Chun, M. M. & Phelps, E. A. (1999) Memory deficits for implicit contextual
information in amnesic subjects with hippocampal damage. Nature
Neuroscience 2:844–47. [AJG]
Cleland, A. A. & Pickering, M. J. (2003) The use of lexical and syntactic information
in language production: Evidence from the priming of noun phrase structure.
Journal of Memory and Language 49:214–30. [CNR]
Clement, C. A. & Gentner, D. (1991) Systematicity as a selection constraint in
analogical mapping. Cognitive Science 15:89–132. [aRL, ABM]
Cohen, N. J., Poldrack, R. A. & Eichenbaum, H. (1997) Memory for items and
memory for relations in the procedural/declarative memory framework.
Memory 5:131–78. [AJG]
Cook, R. G. & Wasserman, E. A. (2006) Relational learning in pigeons. In: Com-
parative cognition: Experimental explorations of animal intelligence, ed. E. A.
Wasserman & T. R. Zentall, pp. 307–24. Oxford University Press. [EAW]
(2007) Learning and transfer of relational matching-to-sample by pigeons.
Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 14:1107–14. [EAW]
Courchesne, E., Redcay, E. & Kennedy, D. P. (2004) The autistic brain: Birth
through adulthood. Current Opinion in Neurology 17(4):489–96. [JES]
Crisafi, M. A. & Brown, A. L. (1986) Analogical transfer in very young children:
Combining two separately learned solutions to reach a goal. Child
Development 57:953–68. [aRL]
Cummins, R. (1995) Connectionism and the rationale constraint on cognitive
explanation. Philosophical Perspectives: AI, Connectionism and Philosophical
Psychology 9:105–25. [TW]
(2000) “How does it work?” vs. “What are the laws?”: Two conceptions of
psychological explanation. In: Explanation and cognition, ed. F. Keil &
R. Wilson, pp. 117–44. MIT Press. [TW]
Davelaar, E. J., Goshen-Gottstein, Y., Ashkenazi, A., Haarmann, H. J. & Usher, M.
(2005) The demise of short-term memory revisited: Empirical and
computational investigations of recency effects. Psychological Review
112:3–42. [aRL]
Davidson, D. (1967) The logical form of action sentences. In: The logic of decision
and action, ed. N. Rescher, pp. 81–95. University of Pittsburgh Press. [aRL]
D’Avila Garcez, A., Broda, K. & Gabbay, D. (2002) Neural-symbolic learning
systems: Foundations and applications. Springer-Verlag. [RVB]
Davis, H. (1992) Transitive inference in rats (Rattus norvegicus). Journal of
Comparative Psychology 106:342–49. [AAP]
Dehaene, S., Naccache, L., Cohen, L., LeBihan, D., Mangin, J. F., Poline, J. B. &
Rivie`re, D. (2001) Cerebral mechanisms of word masking and unconscious
repetition priming. Nature Neuroscience 4:752–58. [UG, rRL]
Delius, J. D. (1994) Comparative cognition of identity. In: International perspec-
tives on psychological science, vol. 1: Leading themes, ed. P. Bertelson &
P. Eelen, pp. 25–40. Erlbaum. [EAW]
Dempster, F. N. & Brainerd, C. J. (1995) Interference and inhibition in cognition.
Academic Press. [aRL]
Devlin, K. (1991) Logic and information. Cambridge University Press. [VA]
Diamond, A. (2002) Normal development of prefrontal cortex from birth to young
adulthood: Cognitive functions, anatomy, and biochemistry. In: Principles of
frontal lobe function, ed. D. T. Stuss & R. T. Knight, pp. 466–503. Oxford
University Press. [RGM]
Dietrich, E. (2000) Analogy and conceptual change, or you can’t step into the same
mind twice. In: Cognitive dynamics: Conceptual change in humans and
machines, ed. E. Dietrich & A. Markman, pp. 265–94. Erlbaum. [ED]
Dietrich, E. & Markman, A. B. (2003) Discrete thoughts: Why cognition must use
discrete representations. Mind and Language 18:95–119. [ASp]
Dietrich, E., Markman, A. B. & Winkley, M. (2003) The prepared mind: The role of
representational change in chance discovery. In: Chance discovery by machines,
ed. Y. Ohsawa & P. McBurney, pp. 208–30. Springer-Verlag. [ED]
Doumas, L. A. A. & Hummel, J. E. (2005a) A symbolic-connectionist model of
relation discovery. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-third Annual Conference of
the Cognitive Science Society, ed. B. G. Bara, L. Barsalou & M. Bucciarelli, pp.
606–11. LEA. [LAAD]
(2005b) Modeling human mental representations: What works, what doesn’t, and
why. In: The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning, ed. K. J. Holyoak &
R. G. Morrison, pp. 73–94. Cambridge University Press. [KJH]
(2007) A computational account of the development of the generalization of
shape information. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Annual Conference of
the Cognitive Science Society, ed. D. McNamara & G. Trafton. pp. 221–26.
LEA. [LAAD]
Doumas, L. A. A., Hummel, J. E. & Sandhofer, C. M. (2008) A theory of the
discovery and prediction of relational concepts. Psychological Review
115:1–43. [LAAD, KJH, rRL, RGM]
Duscherer, K., Mounoud, P., Moy, G. & Perraudin, S. (in press) The influence of
action perception on object recognition: A developmental study. Develop-
mental Science. [rRL]
Efron, B. & Tibshirani, R. J. (1998) Introduction to the Bootstrap. Chapman &
Hall. [aRL]
Eliasmith, C. & Thagard, P. (2001) Integrating structure and meaning: A distrib-
uted model of analogical mapping. Cognitive Science 25:245–86. [aRL, ASp]
Ellenbogen, J. M., Hu, P. T., Payne, J. D., Titone, D. & Walker, M. P. (2007)
Human relational memory requires time and sleep. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Science USA 104:7723–28. [AJG]
Elman, J., Bates, E., Johnson, M. H., Karmiloff-Smith, A., Parisi, D & Plunkett, K.
(1996) Rethinking innateness: A connectionist perspective on development.
MIT Press. [arRL]
Elman, J. L. (1990) Finding structure in time. Cognitive Science 14(2):179–211.
[RVB]
(2005) Connectionist models of cognitive development: Where next? Trends in
Cognitive Sciences 9(3):111–17. [UG]
Elston, G. N. (2003) Cortex, cognition and the cell: New insights into the pyramidal
neuron and prefrontal function. Cerebral Cortex 13:1124–38. [ASp]
Estes, Z. (2003) Attributive and relational processes in nominal combination.
Journal of Memory and Language 48:304–19. [ZE, aRL]
Estes, Z. & Jones, L. L. (2006) Priming via relational similarity: A copper horse is
faster when seen through a glass eye. Journal of Memory and Language
55(1):89–101. [VA, ZE, arRL]
Fagot, J., Wasserman, E. A. & Young, M. E. (2001) Discriminating the relation
between relations: The role of entropy in abstract conceptualization by
baboons (Papio papio) and humans (Homo sapiens). Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes 27:316–28. [EAW]
Falkenhainer, B., Forbus, K. D. & Gentner, D. (1989) The structure-mapping
engine: Algorithm and examples. Artificial Intelligence 41(1):1–63. [VA,
aRL, ABM]
Fauconnier, G. & Turner, M. (2002) The way we think: Conceptual blending and
the mind’s hidden complexities. Basic Books. [AL]
Fenker, D. B., Waldmann, M. R. & Holyoak, K. J. (2005) Accessing causal relations
in semantic memory. Memory & Cognition 33:1036–46. [ZE]
Fodor, J. A. & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1988) Connectionism and cognitive architecture:
A critical analysis. Cognition 28:3–71. [SP]
Forbus, K. D., Gentner, D. & Law, K. (1994) MAC/FAC: A model of similarity-
based retrieval. Cognitive Science 19:141–205. [aRL]
Frank, M., O’Reilly, R. & Curran, T. (2006) When memory fails, intuition reigns:
Midazolam enhances implicit inference in humans. Psychological Science
17(8):700–707. [AAP]
Frank, M., Rudy, J., Levy, W. & O’Reilly, R. (2005) When logic fails:
Implicit transitive inference in humans. Memory and Cognition
33(4):742–50. [AAP]
Frank, M., Rudy, J. & O’Reilly, R. (2003) Transitivity, flexibility, conjunctive
representations, and the hippocampus: II. A computational analysis.
Hippocampus 13:299–312. [AAP]
Fraser, N. (1998) Neural network follies. Available at: http://neil.fraser.name/
writing/tank/. [JES]
Frawley, W. (1997) Vygotsky and cognitive science: Language and the unification of
the social and computational mind. Harvard University Press. [AC]
French, R. M. (1995) The subtlety of sameness. Bradford Books/MIT Press.
[aRL, AAP]
(2000) When coffee cups are like old elephants, or why representation modules
don’t make sense. In: Understanding representation in the cognitive sciences:
Does representation need reality? ed. A. Riegler, M. Peschl & A. von Stein,
pp. 93–100. Springer. [AL]
(2002) The computational modeling of analogy-making. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences 6:200–205. [arRL, AAP, VMS]
Freudenthal, D., Pine, J. M. & Gobet, F. (2006) Modelling the development of
children’s use of optional infinitives in Dutch and English using MOSAIC.
Cognitive Science 30:277–310. [UG]
Gagne´, C. L. (2001) Relation and lexical priming during the interpretation of noun–
noun combinations. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition 27:236–54. [ZE, aRL]
(2002) Lexical and relational influences on the processing of novel compounds.
Brain and Language 81:723–35. [aRL]
Gagne´, C. L. & Shoben, E. J. (1997) The influence of thematic relations on the
comprehension of modifier–noun combinations. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 23:71–87. [aRL]
References/Leech et al.: Analogy as relational priming
410 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:4
Gagne´, C. L., Spalding, T. L. & Ji, H. (2005) Re-examining evidence for the use of
independent relational representations during conceptual combination.
Journal of Memory and Language 53:445–55. [ZE, aRL]
Garrod, S. C. & Anderson, A. (1987) Saying what you mean in dialogue: A study in
conceptual and semantic co-ordination. Cognition 27:181–218. [CNR]
Gelman, S. A. & Coley, J. D. (1990) The importance of knowing a dodo is a bird:
Categories and inferences in 2-year-old children. Developmental Psychology
26:796–804. [UG]
Gentner, D. (1983) Structure-mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy.
Cognitive Science 7:155–70. [ED, RMF, aRL, AAP, TW]
(1988) Metaphor as structure mapping: The relational shift. Child Development
59:47–59. [aRL]
(1989) The mechanisms of analogical learning. In: Similarity and analogical
reasoning, ed. S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony, pp. 199–241. Cambridge University
Press. [aRL]
Gentner, D. & Markman, A. B. (1997) Structure mapping in analogy and similarity.
American Psychologist 52:45–56. [ASp]
Gentner, D., Rattermann, M. J., Markman, A. B. & Kotovsky, L. (1995) Two forces
in the development of relational similarity. In: Developing cognitive compe-
tence: New approaches to process modeling, ed. T. J. Simon & G. S. Halford,
pp. 263–313. LEA. [arRL, ABM]
Gentner, D. & Toupin, C. (1986) Systematicity and surface similarity in the
development of analogy. Cognitive Science 10:277–300. [aRL, ABM]
Gerrig, R. J. & Murphy, G. L. (1992) Contextual influences on the comprehension
of complex concepts. Language and Cognitive Processes 7:205–30. [aRL]
Gick, M. L. & Holyoak, K. J. (1983) Schema induction and analogical transfer.
Cognitive Psychology 15:1–38. [aRL]
Glimcher, P. W. (2003) Decisions, uncertainty, and the brain: The science of neu-
roeconomics. MIT Press. [PB]
Gold, J. I. & Shadlen, M. N. (2007) The neural basis of decision making. Annual
Review of Neuroscience 30:535–74. [PB]
Goswami, U. (1991) Analogical reasoning: What develops? A review of research and
theory. Child Development 62:1–22. [aRL]
(1992) Analogical reasoning in children. Erlbaum. [aRL]
(1995) Transitive relational mappings in three- and four-year-olds: The analogy of
Goldilocks and the Three Bears. Child Development 66(3):877–92. [aRL]
(1996) Analogical reasoning and cognitive development. Advances in Child
Development and Behavior 26:91–138. [aRL]
(1998) Is relational complexity a useful metric for cognitive development?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21:838–39. [aRL]
(2001) Analogical reasoning in children. In: The analogical mind: Perspectives
from cognitive science, ed. K. Holyoak, D. Gentner, & B. Kokinov, pp. 437–70.
MIT Press. [aRL, AAP, VMS]
(2008) Cognitive development: The learning brain. Psychology Press. [UG]
Goswami, U. & Brown, A. L. (1989) Melting chocolate and melting snowmen:
Analogical reasoning and causal relations. Cognition 35:69–95. [FJC, arRL,
ABM, AAP, CNR, VMS]
(1990) Higher-order structure and relational reasoning: Contrasting analogical
and thematic relations. Cognition 36:207–26. [arRL, AAP, VMS]
Goswami, U., Leevers, H., Pressley, S. & Wheelwright, S. (1998) Causal reasoning
about pairs of relations and analogical reasoning in young children. British
Journal of Developmental Psychology 16:553–69. [LAAD, FJC]
Goswami, U. & Pauen, S. (2005) The effects of a “family” analogy on class inclusion
reasoning by young children. Swiss Journal of Psychology 64:115–24. [VMS]
Gottlieb, G. (1984) Evolutionary trends and evolutionary origins: Relevance to
theory in comparative psychology. Psychological Review 91:448–56. [EAW]
Gould, S. J. (1992) Bully for brontosaurus. Penguin. [rRL]
Greco, C., Hayne, H. & Rovee-Collier, C. (1990) Roles of function, reminding and
variability in categorization by 3-month-old infants. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 16:617–33. [UG]
Green, A., Fugelsang, J. & Dunbar, K. N. (2007) Automatic activation of categorical
and abstract analogical relations in analogical reasoning. Memory and Cogni-
tion 34:1414–21. [aRL]
Green, C. (2001) Scientific models, connectionist networks, and cognitive science.
Theory and Psychology 11:97–117. [TW]
Greene, A. J. (2007) Human hippocampal-dependent tasks: Is awareness necessary
or sufficient? Hippocampus 17:429–33. [AJG]
Greene, A. J., Gross, W. L., Elsinger, C. L. & Rao, S. M. (2006) An fMRI analysis of
the human hippocampus: Inference, context and task awareness. Journal of
Cognitive Neuroscience 18:1156–73. [AJG]
(2007) Hippocampal differentiation without recognition: An fMRI analysis of the
contextual cueing task. Learning and Memory 14:548–53. [AJG]
Greene, A. J., Spellman, B. A., Dusek, J. A., Eichenbaum, H. B. & Levy, W. B.
(2001) Relational learning with and without awareness: Transitive inference
using nonverbal stimuli in humans. Memory and Cognition 29:893–902.
[AJG]
Gross, W. L. & Greene, A. J. (2007) Analogical inference: The role of awareness in
abstract learning. Memory 15:838–44. [AJG]
Grossberg, S. (1999) The link between brain learning, attention, and consciousness.
Consciousness and Cognition 8:1–44. [ASp]
Gust, H., Krumnack, U., Ku¨hnberger, K.-U. & Schwering, A. (2007) Integrating
analogical and inductive learning at different levels of generalization. In:
LNVD 2007: Learning from Non-Vectorial Data. Proceedings of the KI-2007
Workshop Held in Osnabru¨ck, Germany, September 10th, 2007; Publications
of the Institute of Cognitive Science, vol. 6, ed. P. Geibel & B. J. Jain,
pp. 46–57. Institute of Cognitive Science. [rRL, ASch]
Gust, H., Ku¨hnberger, K.-U. & Schmid, U. (2006) Metaphors and heuristic-driven
theory projection (HDTP). Theoretical Computer Science 354(1):98–117.
[ASch]
Hahn, U., Chater, N. & Richardson, L. B. C. (2003) Similarity as transformation.
Cognition 87:1–32. [arRL]
Halford, G., Wilson, W., Guo, J., Gayler, R., Wiles, J. & Stewart, J. (1994)
Connectionist implications for processing capacity limitations in analogies.
In: Advances in connectionist and neural computation theory, vol. 2:
Analogical Connections, ed. K. Holyoak & J. Barnden, pp. 363–415. Ablex.
[aRL]
Halford, G. S. (1993) Children’s understanding: The development of mental models.
Erlbaum. [KJH, aRL]
Halford, G. S., Bain, J. D., Maybery, M. T. & Andrews, G. (1998) Induction of
relational schemas: Common processes in reasoning and complex learning.
Cognitive Psychology 35(3):201–45. [SP]
Halford, G. S., Wilson, W. H. & Phillips, W. (1998) Processing capacity defined by
relational complexity: Implications for comparative, developmental, and cog-
nitive psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21:803–31; discussion pp.
831–65. [aRL, AAP]
Haykin, S. (1998) Neural networks: A comprehensive foundation. Prentice-Hall.
[JES]
Hinton, G. (1990) Mapping part-whole hierarchies into connectionist networks.
Artificial Intelligence 46:47–75. [AAP]
Hinton, G. & Sejnowski, T. (1986) Learning and relearning in Boltzmann machines.
In: Parallel distributed processing: Explorations in the microstructure of cog-
nition. Vol. 1: Foundations, ed. D. Rumelhart & J. McClelland, pp. 282–317.
MIT Press. [AAP]
Hofstadter, D. R. (1984) The Copycat project: An experiment in nondeterminism
and creative analogies. MIT AI Memo, No. 755. [aRL, AAP]
(2001) Epilogue: Analogy as the core of cognition. In: The analogical mind:
Perspectives from cognitive science, ed. D. Gentner, K. J. Holyoak &
B. N. Kokinov, pp. 499–538. MIT Press. [AL, ASp]
Hofstadter, D. R. & the Fluid Analogies Research Group (1995) Fluid concepts and
creative; computer models of the fundamental mechanisms of thought
analogies. Basic Books. [AL]
Holyoak, K., Gentner, D. & Kokinov, B. (2001) The place of analogy in cognition.
In: The analogical mind: Perspectives from cognitive science, ed. K. Holyoak,
D. Gentner & B. Kokinov, pp. 1–19. MIT Press. [aRL]
Holyoak, K. J. & Barnden, J. A. (1994) Advances in connectionist and neural
computation theory, Analogical connections. Ablex. [aRL]
Holyoak, K. J. & Hummel, J. E. (2001) Toward an understanding of analogy within a
biological symbol system. In: The analogical mind: Perspectives from cognitive
science, ed. D. Gentner, K. J. Holyoak, & B. N. Kokinov, pp. 161–95. MIT
Press. [aRL]
Holyoak, K. J., Junn, E. N. & Billman, D. O. (1984) Development of
analogical problem-solving skill. Child Development 55:2042–55. [LAAD,
KJH, aRL]
Holyoak, K. J. & Thagard, P. (1989) Analogical mapping by constraint satisfaction.
Cognitive Science 13:295–355. [RMF, aRL]
(1995) Mental leaps: Analogy in creative thought. MIT Press. [ASp]
Hosenfeld, B., van der Maas, H. L. J. & van den Boom, D. C. (1997) Indicators of
discontinuous change in the development of analogical reasoning. Journal of
Experimental Child Psychology 64:367–95. [arRL]
Houde´, O. (2000) Inhibition and cognitive development: Object, number, categ-
orization, and reasoning. Cognitive Development 15:63–73. [aRL]
Hummel, J. E. & Holyoak, K. J. (1997) Distributed representations of structure:
A theory of analogical access and mapping. Psychological Review 104(3):
427–66. [LAAD, RMF, KJH, aRL, ABM, RGM]
(2003) A symbolic-connectionist theory of relational inference and generaliz-
ation. Psychological Review 110:220–63. [LAAD, ZE, RGM, ASp]
Inagaki, K. & Hatano, G. (1987) Young children’s spontaneous personifications as
analogy. Child Development 58:1013–20. [aRL]
Japkowicz, N. (2001) Supervised and unsupervised binary learning by feedforward
neural networks. Machine Learning 42:97–122. [aRL]
Judd, J. S. (1990) Neural network design and the complexity of learning. MIT
Press. [TW]
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1998) Development itself is the key to understanding devel-
opmental disorders. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2:389–98. [aRL]
Keane, M., Ledgeway, T. & Duff, S. (1994) Constraints on analogical mapping: A
comparison of three models. Cognitive Science.18:387–438. [aRL]
References/Leech et al.: Analogy as relational priming
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:4 411
Keane, M. T. & Brayshaw, M. (1988) The incremental analogy machine: A com-
putational model of analogy. In: Third European working session on learning,
ed. D. Sleeman, pp. 53–62. Morgan Kaufmann. [aRL]
Kendler, T. S. (1995) Levels of cognitive development. Erlbaum. [SP]
Kloos, H. & Sloutsky, V. M. (2008) What’s behind different kinds of kinds: Effects of
statistical density on learning and representation of categories. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General 137:52–72. [VMS]
Kokinov, B. (1990) Associative memory-based reasoning: Some experimental
results. In: Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Conference of the Cognitive
Science Society, pp. 741–49. Erlbaum. [aRL, AAP]
Kokinov, B. & French, R. M. (2003) Computational models of analogy-making. In:
Encyclopedia of cognitive science, vol. 1, ed. L. Nadel, pp. 113–18. Nature
Publishing Group. [aRL]
Kokinov, B. & Petrov, A. (2001) Integration of memory and reasoning in analo-
gy-making: The AMBR model. In: The analogical mind: Perspectives from
cognitive science, ed. D. Gentner, K. Holyoak & B. Kokinov, pp. 59–124.
MIT Press. [aRL, AAP]
Kotovsky, L. & Gentner, D. (1996) Comparison and categorization in the
development of relational similarity. Child Development 67:2797–822.
[aRL, VMS]
Kroger, J. K., Sabb, F. W., Fales, C. L., Bookheimer, S. Y., Cohen, M. S. & Holyoak,
K. J. (2002) Recruitment of anterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in human
reasoning: A parametric study of relational complexity. Cerebral Cortex
12:477–85. [RGM]
Kutas, M. & Federmeier, K. D. (2000) Electrophysiology reveals semantic memory
use in language comprehension. Trends in Cognitive Science 12: 63–70.
[aRL]
Lamb, L., Borges, R. V. & d’Avila Garcez, A. (2007) A connectionist cognitive model
for temporal synchronisation and learning. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-
second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 827–32. AAAI Press.
[RVB]
Larkey, L. B. & Love, B. C. (2003) CAB: Connectionist analogy builder. Cognitive
Science 27:781–99. [aRL]
(2007) Relations as transformations: Implications for analogical reasoning.
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 60:897–908. [arRL]
Leech, R., Mareschal, D. & Cooper, R. (2007) Relations as transformations:
Implications for analogical reasoning. Quarterly Journal of Experimental
Psychology 60:897–890. [arRL]
Linhares, A. (2000) A glimpse at the metaphysics of Bongard problems. Artificial
Intelligence 121(1–2):251–70. [AL]
(2005) An active symbols theory of chess intuition. Minds and Machines
15(2):131–81. [AL]
(submitted) Decision-making and strategic thinking through analogies. [AL]
Linhares, A. & Brum, P. (2007) Understanding our understanding of strategic
scenarios: What role do chunks play? Cognitive Science 31(6):989–1007.
[AL]
Loewenstein, J. & Gentner, D. (2005) Relational language and the development of
relational mapping. Cognitive Psychology 50:315–53. [aRL, VMS]
Marcus, G. F. (2004) The birth of the mind: How a tiny number of genes creates the
complexities of human thought. Basic Books. [rRL]
Mareschal, D., Johnson, M. H., Sirois, S., Spratling, M., Thomas, M. &
Westermann, G. (2007) Neuroconstructivism, vol. I: How the brain constructs
cognition. Oxford University Press. [arRL]
Mareschal, D. & Thomas, M. S. C. (2007) Computational modeling in develop-
mental psychology. IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation (Special
Issue on Autonomous Mental Development) 11(2):137–50. [rRL, TW]
Markman, A. B. (1997) Constraints on analogical inference. Cognitive Science
21(4):373–418. [ABM]
Markman, A. B. & Gentner, D. (1997) The effects of alignability on memory
storage. Psychological Science 8(5):363–67. [aRL]
Marr, D. (1982) Vision: A computational investigation into the human represen-
tation and processing of visual information. W. H. Freeman. [rRL, TW]
Maybery, M., Bain, J. & Halford, G. (1986) Information processing demands of
transitive inferences. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition 12:600–13. [AAP]
McClelland, J., McNaughton, B. & O’Reilly, R. (1995) Why there are comp-
lementary learning systems in the hippocampus and neocortex: Insights from
the successes and failures of connectionist models of learning and memory.
Psychological Review 102:419–57. [AAP]
McClelland, J. L. & Thompson, R. M. (2007) Using domain-general principles
to explain children’s causal reasoning abilities. Developmental Science
10:333–56. [aRL]
McKoon, G. & Ratcliff, R. (1995) Conceptual combinations and relational contexts
in free association and in priming in lexical decision and naming. Psychonomic
Bulletin & Review 2:527–33. [aRL]
Mesulam, M. M. (1998) From sensation to cognition. Brain 121:1013–52. [ASp]
Mitchell, M. (1993) Analogy-making as perception: A computer model. Bradford
Books/MIT Press. [RMF, aRL, AAP]
Mitchell, M. & Hofstadter, D. R. (1990) The emergence of understanding in a
computer model of concepts and analogy-making. Physica D 42:322–34.
[RMF]
Mogami, T. & Tanaka, K. (2006) Reward association affects neuronal responses to
visual stimuli in macaque TE and perirhinal cortices. Journal of Neuroscience
26(25):6761–70. [ASp]
Morrison, R. G. (2005) Thinking in working memory. In: Cambridge handbook of
thinking and reasoning, ed. K. J. Holyoak & R. G. Morrison, pp. 457–73.
Cambridge University Press. [RGM]
Morrison, R. G., Doumas, L. A. A. & Richland, L. E. (2006) The development of
analogical reasoning in children: A computational account. In: Proceedings of
the Twenty-eighth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, ed.
D. McNamara & G. Trafton, pp. 603–608. Erlbaum. [RGM]
(2007) Inhibition vs. relational knowledge constraints in children’s analogical
reasoning: A symbolic-connectionist approach. Poster presented at the Fifth
Biennial Meeting of the Cognitive Development Society, Santa Fe, New
Mexico, October 26–27, 2007. [RGM]
Morrison, R. G., Holyoak, K. J. & Truong, B. (2001) Working memory modularity in
analogical reasoning. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-fourth Annual Conference
of the Cognitive Science Society, ed. C. D. Schunn & W. Gray, pp. 663–68.
Erlbaum. [RGM]
Morrison, R. G., Krawczyk, D., Holyoak, K. J., Hummel, J. E., Chow, T., Miller, B.
& Knowlton, B. J. (2004) A neurocomputational model of analogical reasoning
and its breakdown in frontotemporal dementia. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience 16:260–71. [RGM]
Muldoon, K., Lewis, C. & Berridge, D. (2007) Predictors of early numeracy: Is
there a place for mistakes when learning about number? British Journal of
Developmental Psychology 25:543–58. [AC]
Mu¨ller, B., Reinhardt, J. & Strickland, M. T. (1995) Neural networks: An intro-
duction. Springer. [JES]
Naccache, L. & Dehaene, S. (2001) The priming method: Imaging unconscious
repetition priming reveals an abstract representation of number in the parietal
lobes. Cerebral Cortex 11:966–74. [UG]
Nietzsche, F. (1891) Thus spake Zarathustra. [rRL]
Noesselt, N., Rieger, J. W., Schoenfeld, M. A., Kanowski, M., Hinrichs, H., Heinze,
H.-J. & Driver, J. (2007) Audiovisual temporal correspondence modulates
human multisensory superior temporal sulcus plus primary sensory cortices.
Journal of Neuroscience 27:11431–41. [UG]
Novick, L. R. (1988) Analogical transfer, problem similarity, and expertise. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 14:510–20.
[aRL, ASp]
Oden, D., Thompson, K. R. & Premack, D. (2001) Can an ape reason analogically?
Comprehension and production of analogical problems by Sarah, a chimpan-
zee (Pan troglodytes). In: The analogical mind: Perspectives from cognitive
science, ed. D. Gentner, K. Holyoak & B. Kokinov, pp. 471–97. MIT Press.
[rRL, AAP]
Opfer, J. & Bulloch, M. (in press) What makes relational reasoning smart?
Revisiting the perceptual-to-relational shift in the development of
generalization. Developmental Science. [rRL]
O’Reilly, R. C. (1996) Biologically plausible error-driven learning using local
activation differences. Neural Computation 8:895–938. [arRL]
(2006) Biologically based computational Models of high-level cognition. Science
314:91–94. [aRL, AAP]
O’Reilly, R. C. & Munakata, Y. (2000) Computational explorations in cognitive neuro-
science: Understanding the mind by simulating the brain. MIT Press. [aRL]
Pagonis, W. G. & Cruikshank, J. L. (1994) Moving mountains. Harvard Business
School Press. [AL]
Parberry, I. (1994) Circuit complexity and neural networks. MIT Press. [TW]
Pauen, S. & Wilkening, F. (1997) Children’s analogical reasoning about
natural phenomena. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 67:90–113.
[aRL]
Penn, D. C., Holyoak, K. J. & Povinelli, D. J. (2008) Darwin’s mistake: Explaining
the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences 31(2):109–78. [PB, KJH, EAW]
Phillips, S. (1999) Systematic minds, unsystematic models: Learning transfer in
humans and networks. Minds and Machines 9(3):383–98. [SP]
(2000) Constituent similarity and systematicity: The limits of first-order con-
nectionism. Connection Science 12(1):45–63. [SP]
(2007) Kennith Aizawa, the systematicity arguments, studies in brain and mind.
Minds and Machines 17(3):357–60. [SP]
Piaget, J. (1970) Genetic epistemology, trans. E. Duckworth. Columbia University
Press. [aRL]
Piaget, J., Montangero, J. & Billeter, J. (1977) La formation des correlats. In:
Recherces sur l’abstraction reflechissante I, ed. J. Piaget, pp. 115–29. Presses
Unversitaires de France. [arRL]
Pickering, M. J. & Branigan, H. P. (1998) The representation of verbs: Evidence
from syntactic persistence in written language production. Journal of Memory
and Language 39:633–51. [CNR]
References/Leech et al.: Analogy as relational priming
412 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:4
Pickering, M. J. & Garrod, S. (2004) Towards a mechanistic theory of dialogue.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27:169–226. [CNR]
Premack, D. (1983) The codes of man and beasts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences
6:125–67. [EAW]
Putnam, H. (1981) Reason, truth, and history. Cambridge University Press. [AL]
Raffray, C. N., Pickering, M. J. & Branigan, H. P. (2007) Priming the interpretation
of noun-noun combinations. Journal of Memory and Language 57:380–95.
[ZE, CNR]
Ramsay, J. O. & Silverman, B. W. (2002) Applied functional data analysis: Methods
and case studies. Springer-Verlag. [aRL]
Rattermann, M. J. & Gentner, D. (1998a) More evidence for a relational shift in the
development of analogy: Children’s performance on a causal-mapping task.
Cognitive Development 13:453–78. [LAAD, arRL]
(1998b) The effect of language on similarity: The use of relational labels improves
young children’s performance in a mapping task. In: Advances in analogy
research: Integration of theory and data from the cognitive, computational, and
neural sciences, ed. K. Holyoak, D. Gentner & B. Kokinov, pp. 274–82. New
Bulgarian University. [aRL]
Rattermann, M. J., Gentner, D. & DeLoache, J. (1990) The effects of familiar labels
on young children’s performance in an analogical mapping task. In: Proceed-
ings of the Twelfth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, pp.
22–29. LEA. [aRL]
Reber, P. J., Knowlton, B. J. & Squire, L. R. (1996) Dissociable properties of
memory systems: Differences in the flexibility of declarative and nondeclara-
tive knowledge. Behavioral Neuroscience 110:861–71. [AJG]
Recanati, F. (2004) Literal meaning. Cambridge University Press. [VA]
Richland, L. E., Morrison, R. G. & Holyoak, K. J. (2006) Children’s development of
analogical reasoning: Insights from scene analogy problems. Journal of
Experimental Child Psychology 94:249–73. [LAAD, arRL, RGM]
Riecke, L., van Opstal, A. J., Goebel, R. & Formisano, E. (2007) Hearing illusory
sounds in noise: Sensory-perceptual transformations in primary auditory
cortex. Journal of Neuroscience 27:12684–89. [UG]
Ripoll, T., Brude, T. & Coulon, D. (2003) Does analogical transfer involve a term-
to-term alignment? Memory and Cognition 31:221–30. [AJG, aRL]
Rogers, T. T. & McClelland, J. L. (2004) Semantic cognition: A parallel distributed
processing approach. MIT Press. [aRL, AAP]
(2005) A parallel distributed processing approach to semantic cognition:
Applications to conceptual development. To appear in: Building object cat-
egories in developmental time: Proceedings of the Carnegie Symposium on
Cognition, vol. 32, ed. D. Rakison and L. Gershkoff-Stowe, pp. 335–87.
Erlbaum. [aRL]
Rojas, R. & Feldman, J. (1996) Neural networks: A systematic introduction.
Springer. [JES]
Rosch, E. (1978) Principles of categorisation. In: Cognition and categorisation, ed.
E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd, pp. 27–48. Erlbaum. [UG]
Ross, B. H. (1987) This is like that: The use of earlier problems and the separation of
similarity effects. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition 13:629–39. [ASp]
Ross, B. H. & Kennedy, P. T. (1990) Generalizing from the use of earlier examples
in problem solving. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition 16:42–55. [ASp]
Rougier, N. P., Noelle, D., Braver, T. S., Cohen, J. D. & O’Reilly, R. C. (2005)
Prefrontal cortex and the flexibility of cognitive control: Rules without symbols.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 102:7338–43. [aRL, AAP,
ASp]
Rumelhart, D. E. & McClelland, I. L. (1986) Parallel distributed processing:
Explorations in the microstructure of cognition foundations, vol. 1. MIT Press/
Bradford Books. [JES]
Rutherford, E. (1911) The scattering of a and b particles by matter and the
structure of the atom, Philosophical Magazine. Series 6, vol. 21:669–88. [ED]
Ryan, J. D., Althoff, R. R., Whitlow, S. & Cohen, N. J. (2000) Amnesia is a deficit in
relational memory. Psychological Science 11:454–61. [AJG]
Sadock, B. J. & Sadock, V. A. (2004) Kaplan and Sadock’s comprehensive textbook of
psychiatry. Lippincott, Williams & Wilkins. [JES]
Satpute, A. B., Fenker, D. B., Waldmann, M. R., Tabibnia, G., Holyoak, K. J. &
Lieberman, M. D. (2005) An fMRI study of causal judgments. European
Journal of Neuroscience 22:1233–238. [KJH]
Schober, M. F. (1993) Spatial perspective-taking in conversation. Cognition
47:1–24. [CNR]
Schultz, R. T. (2005) Developmental deficits in social perception in autism: The role
of the amygdala and fusiform face area. International Journal of Developmental
Neuroscience 23(2–3):125–41. [JES]
Schunn, C. D. & Dunbar, K. (1996) Priming, analogy, and awareness in complex
reasoning. Memory and Cognition 24:271–84. [AJG, aRL, AAP]
Shastri, L. & Ajjanagadde, V. (1993) From simple associations to systematic
reasoning: A connectionist representation of rules, variables, and dynamic
bindings using temporal synchrony. Behavioral and Brain Sciences
16:417–51. [aRL, RVB]
Shultz, T. R. (2003) Computational developmental psychology. MIT Press.
[arRL]
Shultz, T. R. & Rivest, F. (2001) Knowledge-based cascade-correlation: Using
knowledge to speed learning. Connection Science 13:43–72. [aRL]
Shultz, T. R., Rivest, F., Egri, L. & Thivierge, J. P. (2006) Knowledge-based
learning with KBCC. In: Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on
Development and Learning. [aRL]
Siegler, R. S. (2006) Microgenetic analyses of learning. In: Handbook of child
psychology: Vol. 2, Cognition, perception, and language, 6th edition, ed.
D. Kuhn & R. S. Siegler, pp. 464–510. Wiley. [AC]
Siegler, R. S. & Svetina, M. (2002) A microgenetic/cross-sectional study of matrix
completion: Comparing short-term and long-term change. Child Development
73:793–809. [AC]
Smith, B. C. (1996) On the origin of objects. MIT Press. [AL]
Smith, L. B. (2000) Avoiding associations when it’s behaviorism you really hate. In:
Becoming a word learner: A debate on lexical acquisition, ed. R. M. Golinkoff,
K. Hirsh-Pasek, L. Bloom, L. B. Smith, A. L. Woodward, N. Akhtar,
M. Tomasello & G. Hollich. Oxford University Press. [rRL]
Smolensky, P. & Legendre, G. (2006) The harmonic mind: From neural compu-
tation to optimality-theoretic grammar. MIT Press. [AAP]
Spelke, E. S. (1994) Initial knowledge: Six suggestions. Cognition 50:431–45.
[UG]
Spellman, B. A. & Holyoak, K. J. (1992) If Saddam is Hitler then who is George
Bush? Analogical mapping between systems of social roles. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology 62: 913–33. [RMF, KJH, aRL]
Spellman, B. A., Holyoak, K. J. & Morrison, R. G. (2001) Analogical priming via
semantic relations. Memory and Cognition 29:383–93. [ZE, KJH, arRL,
RGM]
Spivy, M. (2007) The continuity of mind. Oxford University Press. [ASp]
Squire, L. R. (1992) Memory and the hippocampus: A synthesis from findings with
rats, monkeys, and humans. Psychological Review 99:195–231. [AJG]
St. John, M. & McClelland, J. (1990) Learning and applying contextual constraints
in sentence comprehension. Artificial Intelligence 46:217–57. [AAP]
Sternberg, R. J. (1977a) Component processes in analogical reasoning. Psycho-
logical Review 84:353–78. [arRL]
(1977b) Intelligence, information processing, and analogical reasoning: The
componential analysis of human abilities. Erlbaum. [RGM]
Sternberg, R. J. & Nigro, G. (1980) Developmental patterns in the solution of verbal
analogies. Child Development 51:27–38. [aRL]
Sternberg, R. J. & Rifkin, B. (1979) The development of analogical reasoning
processes. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 27:195–232. [aRL]
Tanaka, K. (1992) Inferotemporal cortex and higher visual functions. Current
Opinion in Neurobiology 2:502–505. [ASp]
Thagard, P. (2000) Coherence in thought and action. MIT Press. [TW]
Thagard, P., Holyoak, K. J., Nelson, G. & Gochfeld, D. (1990) Analog retrieval by
constraint satisfaction. Artificial Intelligence 46(3):259–310. [VA]
Thelen, E. & Smith, L. B. (1994) A dynamic systems approach to the development of
cognition and action. MIT Press. [aRL]
Thomas, M. S. C. & Mareschal, D. (1997) Connectionism and psychological notions
of similarity. In: Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual Conference of the
Cognitive Science Society, ed. M. G. Shafto & P. Langley, pp. 757–62.
Erlbaum. [arRL]
(2001) Metaphor as categorisation: A connectionist implementation. Metaphor
and Symbol 16:5–27. [arRL]
Thomas, M. S. C., Mareschal, D. & Hinds, A. (2001) A connectionist account of
the emergence of the literal-metaphorical-anomalous distinction in young
children. In: Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science
Society, ed. J. D. Moore & K. Stenning, pp. 1042–47. LEA. [aRL]
Thompson, R. K. R. & Oden, D. L. (2000) Categorical perception and conceptual
judgments by nonhuman primates: The paleological monkey and the analogical
ape. Cognitive Science 24:363–96. [EAW]
Thompson, R. K. R., Oden, D. L. & Boysen, S. T. (1997) Language-naive chim-
panzees (Pan troglodytes) judge relations-between-relations in a conceptual
matching task. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes
23:31–43. [VMS]
Towell, G. & Shavlik, J. (1994) Knowledge-based artificial neural networks.
Artificial Intelligence 70(1–2):119–65. [RVB]
Tsotsos, J. K. (1990) Analyzing vision at the complexity level. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences 13(3):423–69. [TW]
Tulving, E. & Schacter, D. L. (1990) Priming and human memory systems. Science
247:301–306. [aRL]
Tunteler, E. & Resing, W. C. (2002) Spontaneous analogical transfer in 4-year-olds:
A microgenetic study. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 83:149–66.
[aRL]
Valiant, L (2003) Three problems in computer science. Journal of the ACM
50(1):96–99. [RVB]
van der Maas, H. & Molenaar, P. (1992) A catastrophe-theoretical approach to
cognitive development. Psychological Review 99:395–417. [aRL]
References/Leech et al.: Analogy as relational priming
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:4 413
Van Elzakker, M., O’Reilly, R. & Rudy, J. (2003) Transitivity, flexibility, conjunctive
representations, and the hippocampus: I. An empirical analysis. Hippocampus
13:292–98. [AAP]
van Rooij, I. (2003) Tractable cognition: Complexity theory in cognitive psychology.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of Psychology, University of
Victoria, Canada. [TW]
(in press) The tractable cognition thesis. Cognitive Science. [TW]
van Rooij, I., Stege, S. & Kadlec, H. (2005) Sources of complexity in subset choice.
Journal of Mathematical Psychology 49:160–87. [TW]
van Rooij, I. & Wareham, T. (in press) Parameterized complexity in cognitive
modeling: Foundations, applications and opportunities. Computer Journal.
[DOI: 10.1093/comjnl/bxm034] [TW]
Veale, T. & Keane, M. T. (1997) The competence of sub-optimal theories of
structure mapping on hard analogies. In: Proceedings of the 1997 International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI’97), vol. 1, pp. 232–37.
Morgan Kaufmann. [TW]
Viskontas, I. V., Morrison, R. G., Holyoak, K. J., Hummel, J. E. & Knowlton, B. J.
(2004) Relational integration, inhibition, and analogical reasoning in older
adults. Psychology and Aging 19:581–91. [RGM]
von Baeyer, H.C. (2003) Information:Thenewlanguageof science. Orion Books. [PB]
von Fersen, L., Wynne, C., Delius, J. & Staddon, J. (1991) Transitive inference in
pigeons. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes
17:334–41. [AAP]
Vosniadou, S. (1989) Analogical reasoning as a mechanism in knowledge acqui-
sition: A developmental perspective. In: Similarity and analogical reasoning,
ed. S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony, pp. 199–241. Cambridge University Press.
[aRL]
Vosniadou, S. & Brewer, W. F. (1992) Mental models of the earth: A study of
conceptual change in childhood. Cognitive Psychology 24(4):535–85. [ABM]
Vygotsky, L. (1978) Mind in society. Harvard University Press. [UG]
Waltz, J. A., Knowlton, B. J., Holyoak, K. J., Boone, K. B., Mishkin, F. S.,
de Menezes Santos, M., Thomas, C.R. & Miller, B.L. (1999) A system
for relational reasoning in human prefrontal cortex. Psychological Science
10:119–25. [RGM]
Waltz, J. A., Lau, A., Grewal, S. K. & Holyoak, K. J. (2000). The role of
working memory in analogical mapping. Memory and Cognition
28:1205–12. [RGM]
Wareham, T. (1999) Systematic parameterized complexity analysis in computational
phonology. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of Computer
Science, University of Victoria, Canada. [TW]
Wasserman, E. A., Fagot, J. & Young, M. E. (2001a) Same-different conceptual-
ization by baboons (Papio papio): The role of entropy. Journal of Comparative
Psychology 115:42–52. [EAW]
Wasserman, E. A., Young, M. E. & Cook, R. G. (2004) Variability discrimination in
humans and animals: Implications for adaptive action. American Psychologist
59:879–90. [EAW]
Wasserman, E. A., Young, M. E. & Fagot, J. (2001b) Effects of number of items on
the baboon’s discrimination of same from different visual displays. Animal
Cognition 4:163–70. [EAW]
Wasserman, E. A. & Zentall, T. R. (2006) Comparative cognition: Experimental
explorations of animal intelligence. Oxford University Press. [EAW]
Wikipedia, Rutherford Scattering: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rutherford_
scattering, and Gold Foil Experiment: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geiger-
Marsden_experiment. [ED]
Wisniewski, E. J. & Love, B. C. (1998) Relations versus properties in conceptual
combination. Journal of Memory and Language 38:177–202. [aRL]
Wright, S. B., Matlen, B. J., Baym, C. L., Ferrer, E. & Bunge, S. A. (in press) Neural
correlates of fluid reasoning in children and adults. Frontiers in Human
Neuroscience. [RGM]
Young, M. E. & Wasserman, E. A. (1997) Entropy detection by pigeons:
Response to mixed visual displays after same-different discrimination
training. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes
23:157–70. [EAW]
(2001) Entropy and variability discrimination. Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 27:278–93. [EAW]
(2002) Detecting variety: What’s so special about uniformity? Journal of Exper-
imental Psychology: General 131:131–43. [EAW]
Young, M. E., Wasserman, E. A. & Ellefson, M. R. (2007) A theory of variability
discrimination: Finding differences. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review
14:805–22. [EAW]
Young, M. E., Wasserman, E. A. & Garner, K. L. (1997) Effects of number of
items on the pigeon’s discrimination of same from different visual displays.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes 23:
491–501. [EAW]
References/Leech et al.: Analogy as relational priming
414 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:4
